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Statement of Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal inula I HJIII ( ode \ nnuuii d
§78-2-2(3)(j), w Inch piovidcd the (\:>iirt with appellate jurisdiction over civil judgments of
tiiv

[,\h Ok-trict Courts, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate

jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(4), by way of transfer from the Utah Supreme ( unit
Statement of the Issues
a

Issue: Whether the Court below erred in making findings and conclusions,
and fashioning a remedy for claims not plead in the Complaint or in any
pleading, and for which no such remedy was requested h\ the Plaintiff.
Determinative hn\ • Holmes - In juKliiion. \\w h>U< »w inp maybe authorities
pertinen •
1.

i e review of this issue:

Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
Pleadings.

2.

Rule o

: en.

ij-.i-• J'-.\. .u - i - ..-•, i*r .- -i:ar iing the tira.endment

of pleadings.
Standard of review:

This issue presents a question of law review for

correctness to which no particular deference should be given to the lower
court's judgment, law.
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b.

Issue: Whether the Court below erred in finding and concluding that Slone
Porter and Tracey Cowley reached an agreement as indicated in the Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Determinative law: Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d
733,735 (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,585 P.2d
724 (1978); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 P.2d 411
(1977)).
Standard of review: This issue challenges certain findings of fact of court

below, and raises issues questions of both fact and law. The findings of fact are reviewed
to determine sufficiency of the evidence, to which the lower court is afforded appropriate
deference as the trier of fact. The questions of law are reviewed for correctness for which
the lower court is afforded no particular deference as to its judgment.
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules
Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be dispositive of this
Appeal. There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or ordinances
applicable in this case.
Statement of the Case
a.

Nature of the case.

This case arises from the failure of an eight year business association between Slone
Porter and Tracy Cowley. In 1993, Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley, together with Bill Berg

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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formed a Utah Corporation known as Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("AMS").
Following a course of events which occurred between June 22, 2002 and Juh 1 {K 2')UJ,
Tracy Cowley and his wife Ken n ( \nvlcy eonimenced this aelion in (he court below against
SJum Failcr ami his wife Veralynn Porter. Mrs. Cowley and Mrs. Porter were dismissed as
parties to the case following trial.1 The Complaint which commenced this case in the Court
below as asserted by Tracy Cowley, contains only nine (9) paragraphs, ana n ,uu . w
action. The Complaint was never amende
th,

H'

:

i

'

s

;

\ :• u^l!: r

rderfrom

a ui AMS under the Utah Revised Business Corporation

Act, Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-101 et seq. Mr. Porter denied the allegations in the
Complaint, and asserted an affirmative defense that AMS was properly dissolved, based upon
•the parties' oral agreement reached on July \kK -(I<L', "^ lii''l) picvluded imlicuil inVn I.MIIIOII
as sought in the Complaint ' I 'he terms of that oral agreement, as asserted by Mr. Porter, were
as set forth in a letter from Porter's Counsel to Cowley's Counsel. (Ex. "" ~
b.

Course of Proceedings.

Cowley, upon review of the Answer, filed a Motion foi Judgment on (lie Pleadings,
basetl upon his Affidavit in w hicii he testified that there was no agreement with Porter
concerning the dissolution of AMS.

That motion was denied. Thereafter, Cowley

repackaged his motion and filed it as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds.

1

The court's order dismissing Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter as parties is the subject
of a cross-appeal filed by the Appellee, Tracy Cowley which has been consolidated with this case
for hearing.
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In response, Mr. Porter requested additional time to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion, allowing thirty (30) days to
complete discovery necessary to respond to the motion. Mr. Porter took extensive discovery,
including the depositions of the Tracy and Kerin Cowley during the thirty day period.
Mr. Porter then filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which included
36 exhibits (including Cowley's answers to requests for admissions and deposition testimony
of Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley) supporting the conclusion that there existed material
issues of fact concerning whether the parties had an enforceable agreement, thus precluding
judicial dissolution under the Statute. The motion for summaryjudgment was denied.
In the trial court's decision denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court
concluded that Cowley and Porter had reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of
AMS, but that there were two primary issues left for trial. Those issues were: (1) the terms
of the agreement reached by the parties; and (2) whether sufficient part performance of the
oral agreement had been completed that would allow the court to enforce the oral agreement
under the Statute of Frauds.
Cowley then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Cowley then filed
a second motion for reconsideration of the denial of the renewed motion for summary
judgment, which was denied days prior to trial. In the second motion for summaryjudgment
Cowley raised a new theory of recovery for the first time, for which the there was no
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amendment to the Complaint. The case proceeded to trial to the court upon those two issues
on June 1 and 2, 2004.
c.
In

Disposition of the trial court.
;

^

is the subject of Mr. Porter's appeal, the Court rejected

Mr. Porter's assertion that there was an oral agreement as outlined in Ex. "17". The lower
Court also rejected Cowley's assertion that there was a written agreement as set forth in Ex.
"5". Instead, the Court concluded that Cowley and Mi, Poller reached a tlilTcrcnt era!
•agreement upon in HIS. inconsisU'nt u ith either of the two competing exhibits, but including
the &W, £>$>.$> which the Cowieys admitted was ne^er accepted and was "taken off the
table", and that the Court's

agreement was enforceable under the "substantial part

performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds.
The f ourt (iiillier e-eik. hivied (hal Mi, I'm KM had breached the agreement by failing
to make sufficient payments against the $600,000.00, and awarded damages for breach of
contract to Cowley, where there was no cause of action plead for breach of contract by
Cowley and'basedupon a contract different from that asserted by Cowley in response to Mr.
Porter's afilmiati\ e defense.:;;
Statement of Relevant Facts
Defendant Slone Porter hereby incorporates as his Statement of Relevant Facts, the
Findings of Fact entered by the court below on September 9, 2t)04, except, expressly
Findings 33 3

;:id3y. . ( :

Defendant is challenging the lower court's
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Statement of Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Annotated
§78-2-2(3)(j), which provided the Court with appellate jurisdiction over civil judgments of
the Utah District Courts, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(4), by way of transfer from the Utah Supreme Court.
Statement of the Issues
a.

Issue: Whether the Court below erred in making findings and conclusions,
and fashioning a remedy for claims not plead in the Complaint or in any
pleading, and for which no such remedy was requested by the Plaintiff.
Determinative law: Holmes — In addition, the following may be authorities
pertinent to the review of this issue:
1.

Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
Pleadings.

2.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the amendment
of pleadings.

Standard of review:

This issue presents a question of law review for

correctness to which no particular deference should be given to the lower
court's judgment, law.
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b.

Issue: Whether the Court below erred in finding and concluding that Slone
Porter and Tracey Cowley reached an agreement as indicated in the Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Determinative law: Combe v. Warren fs Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d
733,735 (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,585 P.2d
724 (1978); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 P.2d 411
(1977)).
Standard of review: This issue challenges certain findings of fact of court

below, and raises issues questions of both fact and law. The findings of fact are reviewed
to determine sufficiency of the evidence, to which the lower court is afforded appropriate
deference as the trier of fact. The questions of law are reviewed for correctness for which
the lower court is afforded no particular deference as to its judgment.
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules
Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be dispositive of this
Appeal. There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or ordinances
applicable in this case.
Statement of the Case
a.

Nature of the case.

This case arises from the failure of an eight year business association between Slone
Porter and Tracy Cowley. In 1993, Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley, together with Bill Berg
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formed a Utah Corporation known as Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("AMS").
Following a course of events which occurred between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002,
Tracy Cowley and his wife Kerin Cowley commenced this action in the court below against
Slone Porter and his wife Veralynn Porter. Mrs. Cowley and Mrs. Porter were dismissed as
parties to the case following trial.l The Complaint which commenced this case in the Court
below as asserted by Tracy Cowley, contains only nine (9) paragraphs, and one cause of
action. The Complaint was never amended. In the Complaint, Cowley sought an order from
the Court for the judicial dissolution of AMS under the Utah Revised Business Corporation
Act, Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-101 et seq. Mr. Porter denied the allegations in the
Complaint, and asserted an affirmative defense that AMS was properly dissolved, based upon
the parties' oral agreement reached on July 19,2002, which precluded judicial intervention
as sought in the Complaint. The terms of that oral agreement, as asserted by Mr. Porter, were
as set forth in a letter from Porter's Counsel to Cowley's Counsel. (Ex. "17)
b.

Course of Proceedings.

Cowley, upon review of the Answer, filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
based upon his Affidavit in which he testified that there was no agreement with Porter
concerning the dissolution of AMS.

That motion was denied. Thereafter, Cowley

repackaged his motion and filed it as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds.

1

The court's order dismissing Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter as parties is the subject
of a cross-appeal filed by the Appellee, Tracy Cowley which has been consolidated with this case
for hearing.
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In response, Mr. Porter requested additional time to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion, allowing thirty (30) days to
complete discovery necessary to respond to the motion. Mr. Porter took extensive discovery,
including the depositions of the Tracy and Kerin Cowley during the thirty day period.
Mr. Porter then filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which included
36 exhibits (including Cowley's answers to requests for admissions and deposition testimony
of Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley) supporting the conclusion that there existed material
issues of fact concerning whether the parties had an enforceable agreement, thus precluding
judicial dissolution under the Statute, The motion for summary judgment was denied.
In the trial court's decision denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court
concluded that Cowley and Porter had reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of
AMS, but that there were two primary issues left for trial. Those issues were: (1) the terms
of the agreement reached by the parties; and (2) whether sufficient part performance of the
oral agreement had been completed that would allow the court to enforce the oral agreement
under the Statute of Frauds.
Cowley then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Cowley then filed
a second motion for reconsideration of the denial of the renewed motion for summary
judgment, which was denied days prior to trial. In the second motion for summary judgment
Cowley raised a new theory of recovery for the first time, for which the there was no
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amendment to the Complaint. The case proceeded to trial to the court upon those two issues
on June 1 and 2, 2004.
c.

Disposition of the trial court.

In the Court's ruling which is the subject of Mr. Porter's appeal, the Court rejected
Mr. Porter's assertion that there was an oral agreement as outlined in Ex. "17". The lower
Court also rejected Cowley's assertion that there was a written agreement as set forth in Ex.
"5". Instead, the Court concluded that Cowley and Mr. Porter reached a different oral
agreement upon terms inconsistent with either of the two competing exhibits, but including
the $600,000.00 which the Cowleys admitted was never accepted and was "taken off the
table", and that the Court's

agreement was enforceable under the "substantial part

performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds.
The Court further concluded that Mr. Porter had breached the agreement by failing
to make sufficient payments against the $600,000.00, and awarded damages for breach of
contract to Cowley, where there was no cause of action plead for breach of contract by
Cowley and based upon a contract different from that asserted by Cowley in response to Mr.
Porter's affirmative defense.
Statement of Relevant Facts
Defendant Slone Porter hereby incorporates as his Statement of Relevant Facts, the
Findings of Fact entered by the court below on September 9, 2004, except, expressly
Findings 33, 36, 37, and 39. . (R. 1651-1660) Defendant is challenging the lower court's
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Statement of Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Annotated
§78-2-2(3)(j), which provided the Court with appellate jurisdiction over civil judgments of
the Utah District Courts, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(4), by way of transfer from the Utah Supreme Court.
Statement of the Issues
a.

Issue: Whether the Court below erred in making findings and conclusions,
and fashioning a remedy for claims not plead in the Complaint or in any
pleading, and for which no such remedy was requested by the Plaintiff.
Determinative law: Holmes — In addition, the following may be authorities
pertinent to the review of this issue:
1.

Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
Pleadings.

2.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the amendment
of pleadings.

Standard of review: This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness to which no particular deference should be given to the lower
court's judgment.

b.

Issue: Whether the Court below erred in finding and concluding that Slone
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
1

Porter and Tracey Cowley reached an agreement as indicated in the Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Determinative law: Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d
733,735 (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,585 P.2d
724 (1978); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 P.2d 411
(1977)).
Standard of review: This issue challenges certain findings of fact of court
below, and raises issues questions of both fact and law. The findings of fact are reviewed
to determine sufficiency of the evidence, to which the lower court is afforded appropriate
deference as the trier of fact. The questions of law are reviewed for correctness for which
the lower court is afforded no particular deference as to its judgment.
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules
Rules 7 through 12 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure maybe dispositive
of this Appeal. There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or ordinances
applicable in this case.
Statement of the Case
a.

Nature of the case.

This case arises from the failure of an eight year business association between Slone
Porter and Tracy Cowley. In 1993, Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley, together with Bill Berg
formed a Utah Corporation known as Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("AMS").
Following a course of events which occurred between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Tracy Cowley and his wife Kerin Cowley commenced this action in the court below against
Slone Porter and his wife Veralynn Porter. Mrs. Cowley and Mrs. Porter were dismissed as
parties to the case following trial.1 The Complaint which commenced this case in the Court
below as asserted by Tracy Cowley, contains only nine (9) paragraphs, and one cause of
action. The Complaint was never amended. In the Complaint, Cowley sought an order from
the Court for the judicial dissolution of AMS under the Utah Revised Business Corporation
Act, Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-101 et seq. Mr. Porter denied the allegations in the
Complaint, and asserted an affirmative defense that AMS was properly dissolved based upon
the parties' oral agreement reached on July 19,2002, which precluded judicial intervention
as sought in the Complaint. The terms of that oral agreement, as asserted by Mr. Porter, were
as set forth in a letter from Porter's Counsel to Cowley's Counsel. (Ex. "17)®. 415-420)
b.

Course of Proceedings.

Cowley, upon review of the Answer, filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
based upon his Affidavit in which he testified that there was no agreement with Porter
concerning the dissolution of AMS.

That motion was denied. Thereafter, Cowley

repackaged his motion and filed it as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds.
In response, Mr. Porter requested additional time to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion, allowing thirty (30) days to
complete discovery necessary to respond to the motion. Mr. Porter took extensive discovery,

1

The court's order dismissing Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter as parties is the subject
of a cross-appeal filed by the Appellee, Tracy Cowley which has been consolidated with this case
for hearing.
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including the depositions of the Tracy and Kerin Cowley during the thirty day period.
Mr. Porter then filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which included
36 exhibits (including Cowley's answers to requests for admissions and deposition testimony
of Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley) supporting the conclusion that there existed material
issues of fact concerning whether the parties had an enforceable agreement, thus precluding
judicial dissolution under the Statute. The motion for summary judgment was denied.
In the trial court's decision denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court
concluded that Cowley and Porter had reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of
AMS, but that there were two primary issues left for trial. Those issues were: (1) the terms
of the agreement reached by the parties; and (2) whether sufficient part performance of the
oral agreement had been completed that would allow the court to enforce the oral agreement
under the Statute of Frauds.
Cowley then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Cowley then filed
a second motion for motion for summary judgment, which was denied just days prior to trial.
In the second motion for summary judgment Cowley raised a new theory of recovery for the
first time, for which the there was no amendment to the Complaint. That motion was denied.
The case proceeded to trial to the court upon those two issues on June 1 and 2, 2004.
c.

Disposition of the trial court.

In the Court's ruling which is the subject of Mr. Porter's appeal, the Court rejected
Mr. Porter's assertion that there was an oral agreement as outlined in Ex. "17". The lower
Court also rejected Cowley's assertion that there was a written agreement as set forth in Ex.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"5". Instead, the Court concluded that Cowley and Mr. Porter reached a different oral
agreement upon terms inconsistent with either of the two competing exhibits, but including
the $600,000.00 which the Cowleys admitted was never accepted and was "taken off the
table", and that the Court's

agreement was enforceable under the "substantial part

performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds.
The Court further concluded that Mr. Porter had breached the agreement by failing
to make sufficient payments against the $600,000.00, and awarded damages for breach of
contract to Cowley, where there was no cause of action plead for breach of contract by
Cowley and based upon a contract different from that asserted by Cowley in response to Mr.
Porter's affirmative defense.
Statement of Relevant Facts
Defendant Slone Porter hereby incorporates as his Statement of Relevant Facts, the
Findings of Fact entered by the court below on September 9, 2004, except, expressly
Findings 33, 36, 37, and 39. . ®. 1651-1660) Defendant is challenging the lower court's
conclusions of law in their entirety. Defendant has also challenged findings 33,36 and 37
by detailed reference to the record in accordance Rule 29 of the Utah Rules. App. Procedure,
in part II of the Argument, below.
Summary of the Argument
I.

The trial Court's judgment for Plaintiff on or about September 10, 2004, should

be reversed because it is based on claims not asserted in the Complaint, where the Complaint
was never amended, and where defendant was 4enied any meaningful notice and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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opportunity to meet the claim at trial in violation of Rules 8 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
II.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment at Issue on

Appeal Are Clearly Erroneous and Abuse of the lower court's discretion and and subject to
reversal as a matter of law.
Argument
I.

The Judgement of the Court Below Should be Reversed Because of Plaintiff s
Failure to Plead a Cause of Action in Contract and the Plaintiffs, and the Lower
Court's Failure to Amend the Pleadings to Include a Claim for the Relief
Awarded in violation of Rules 8 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The fundamental purpose of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE is to "liberalize

both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Timm v.
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993) (citing Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86,91 (Utah
1963)). The purpose of liberalization, however, is subject to the requirement that a party's
adversary have "fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d
403,406 (Utah 1998). The fair notice requirement is substantive. "If an issue is to be tried
and a party's rights concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and an
opportunity to meet it." National Farmers' Union Property & Casualty Co. V. Thompson,
286 P.2d 249, 253 (1955). Thus, the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE respect both the
importance of being able to present legitimate concerns in court, as well as the right of the
opposing party to receive fair notice of any claims and be able to adequately answer claims
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and issues asserted against it.
To provide appropriate notice and an opportunity to meet the claim, Rule 8(a) of the
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

requires that a claim for relief by a plaintiff in his

complaint "shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself
entitled." UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a). Rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed when determining
the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint." Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter,
930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah
1986)). Rule 8(f) provides further that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice." UTAH R. Qv. P. 8(f). As a result, recovery will not be barred based on
"nothing more than a technicality" in the pleadings, but may be precluded due to lack of fair
notice of the grounds, nature, and basis of the claim. See Consolidated Realty Group at 27576 (holding that recovery is not barred when complaint alleged liability based on a lease
agreement to which the defendant was not a party where the principal of the two corporations
was the same person, and "it [was] apparent from the defenses raised . . . that [defendant]
understood precisely what claims were being made and to which agreement they pertained").
Thus, where a theory of recovery is "fully tried by the parties," and it "appears that the parties
understood the evidence was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue," failure of the other to plead
pursuant to Rule 8 will not bar receipt of evidence on a claim. See e.g., Colman v. Colman,
742 P.2d 782,785 (Utah App. 1987) (citingMBIMotor Co. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709,
711 (6th Cir. 1974)); Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). In some instances, where
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a plaintiffs pleading does not technically fulfill the requirements of Rule 8, but the nonplead issues are tried by the parties anyway, failure of the court to amend pleadings fully to
that effect may be non-prejudicial in light of the liberal rules regarding amending pleadings
under Rule 15(b). U T A H R . Q V . P . 15(b); See e.g. Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison,
2003 UT 14, f 23 (citing Seamons v. Anderson, 252 P.2d 209, 212 (1952)).
Rule 15 allows a liberal approach to pleadings by providing two procedures through
which pleadings can be amended to conform to the evidence. UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(b). The
first procedure provides: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if an issue is not fully pleaded, the
court can base its decision on issues that are "clearly focused" on by the parties, or issues that
have been "fully tried." Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176; Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey,
2001 UT App 44, If 6 n.2. Of course, "the test for determining whether the pleadings should
be deemed amended under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) is [always subject to] whether the opposing
party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it could offer additional evidence if the
case were retried on a different theory." Colman, 12>A P.2d at 785 (citing R.A. Pohl Const.
Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266, 267 (10th Cir. 1981)).
In contrast to amendment by express or implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) also
provides:
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
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would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.

UTAH R. CIV. P.

1 5(B). In order to move for leave to amend under this second procedure, "a

litigant must file a motion that 'shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the
grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.'" Holmes Development,
LLCv. Cook, 2002 UT 38,157 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)).2 In addition, "[a]ll motions
... shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum." UTAHR. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (emphasis
added). Finally, a motion to amend must follow any other applicable pleading requirements
contained in UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 7, 8, 9, and 10. Holmes, 2002 UT at ^ 31.
Thus, if the pleadings are not deemed by the court to be automatically amended based on
express or implied consent of the parties, they may only be amended by motion to the court,
after complying with the procedures outlined in Rule 7, as well as any other applicable
pleading requirements.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where a pleading is not amended by express
or implied consent of the parties as per Rule 15(b), amendment by motion must conform with
Rule 7, as well as other applicable pleading requirements contained in Rules 8, 9, and 10.
There is no exception to this rule other than amendment by express or implied consent. As
a result, in Holmes, the court rejected a plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint, where the
2

Note that Rule 7(b)(1) no longer exists as cited by the Supreme Court in Holmes.
However, Rule 7(b) states, "A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought'-virtually identical to the
former Rule 7(b)(1). UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(b). In any event, it is clear that a motion to amend must
follow the procedure outlined in Rule 7(b).
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plaintiff "never filed an actual motion for leave to amend" the complaint, never stated with
particularity the grounds upon which he based his motions, "never articulated a single reason
why the trial court should have granted it leave to amend," and "never provided the trial court
a proposed amended complaint so that the court could determine the changes that [the
plaintiff] intended to make." Holmes Development, 2002 UT 38, at f 59 (citing Glenn v.
First Natl Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368,370 (10th Cir. 1989)). The court held that
"[a] plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for recovery
in a memorandum in opposition to dismiss or for summary judgment." Id. at f 31 (citing
Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989); McDowell v. Sullivan, 132
F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D. 111. 1990)) (emphasis added). As a result, "because [plaintiff] failed
to raise a breach of contract action in its complaint... that was not predicated either upon
third-party beneficiary liability or upon the title insurance policy, any claim that [the
defendant] assumed and breached additional contractual duties to [plaintiff] was waived."
Id. Because the plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint to assert additional contractual
duties without following the procedures required the Rules 7, 8,9, and 10, the plaintiff "did
not comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules," and his motions for leave to amend
his complaint were found to be "insufficient." Id. at \ 59.
Requiring that parties seeking to amend their pleadings follow the relevant rules
promotes the policies of "(1) mitigating prejudice to opposing parties by allowing that party
to respond to the motion for leave to amend, and (2) assuring that a court can be apprised of
the basis of a motion and rule upon it with a proper understanding of the motion." Id. at ^
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58 (citing Calderon v. KansasDep'tofSoc. &Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180,1186 (10thCir.
1999)). In determining whether a complaint can be amended to include new issues, a court
must ensure that a party is not "misled nor in any way prej udiced by the introduction of new
issues," and is given the "benefit of every doubt." Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d
226, 229, 310 P.2d 517 (1957) (emphasis added). A trial court, in determining a party's
rights in connection with a claim, is restricted to the grounds set forth in the complaint, or
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Mitchell v. Palmer, 121 Utah 245,240
P.2d 970 (1952). If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the parties, the court may base its
decision on that theory and deem the pleadings amended, even if the theory was not
originally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the pretrial order. However, that the issue
has, in fact, been tried, and that this procedure has been authorized by the express or implied
consent of the parties, must be evident from the record. Colman v. Colman, 1A2> P.2d 782
Utah Ct. App. (1987). In the present case, there were introduced new issues or theories, one
before and two following trial which were not included in the complaint, and which were not
tried by consent of the parties. The judgment of the court below which is the subject of this
appeal, is based upon to those new issues. As is evident from the record, the introduction of
those new issues severely prejudiced defendant Slone Porter and constitutes reversible error
by the court below under the circumstances of this case.
a.

Plaintiffs new theory.

The Complaint in this case contains just nine (9) paragraphs, and only one (1) cause
of action. (R. 1-17) In the Complaint, Cowley sought only an order of the court tojudicially
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dissolve AMS under Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-1402, et seq. Nothing more. The
Complaint has never been amended. In the Complaint, the only reference to any agreement
is in paragraph 2, in which Plaintiff refers to a written Stock Redemption Agreement to
support an allegation
that both Mr. and Mrs. Cowley were shareholders of AMS.3 There is no claim asserted to
enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement.
In his answer, Slone Porter denied each of the nine paragraphs of the Complaint, and
asserted an affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claim was barred because the shareholders of
AMS had entered into an enforceable oral agreement for the dissolution of AMS which
terminated the Stock Redemption Agreement by its terms, and which effectively rendered
Plaintiffs claim for judicial dissolution moot. ®. 18-22) Thus, according the Complaint,
the nature, grounds and basis for the complaint, and the type of litigation involved concerns
only the Plaintiffs right to a judicial dissolution of AMS. Nowhere does the Complaint
suggest a claim by Plaintiff arising under an alleged written agreement to dissolve AMS.
Almost immediately upon service of the Answer, Plaintiff moved for a judgment on
the pleadings, asserting: (1) that there had been no agreement of any kind to dissolve AMS;
and (2) that because Defendant admitted that the parties had been equal shareholders in
AMS, and had not denied the existence of the Stock Redemption Agreement, the Plaintiff
was entitled to an order to judicially dissolve AMS as if stock certificates had been issued.
®. 27-46) The court below found that the motion turned on substantial questions which were
3

That Stock Redemption Agreement is attached to the Complaint. It should be noted
that neither Kerin Cowley
Veralynn
Porter
are
signatory
thatBYU.
agreement.
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beyond the pleadings, denied the motion and suggested that Plaintiff re-assert the matter as
a motion for summary judgment. ®. 98-100)
Plaintiff quickly repackaged his motion as one for summary judgment.4 Defendant
responded under Rule 56(f) and requested time for discovery to respond to Plaintiff s motion,
which was granted. After substantial discovery, including the depositions of Mr. and Mrs.
Cowley, Defendant responded in a detailed memorandum, including 36 exhibits, with
overwhelming evidence of the existence of multiple genuine issues of material fact. ®. 415420,504)5 In his reply memorandum supporting the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
again asserted that there had been no oral or other agreement for the dissolution of AMS, and
that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. ®. 753-783)
Plaintiffs first motion for summary judgment was denied. ®. 1013) in the trial court's
Memorandum Decision to deny the motion for summary judgment, the court stated in
pertinent part as follows:
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that a verbal buy-out agreement was
reached, but they disagree as to the materials] sic. terms of the agreement. The Court
finds that there is a material dispute of fact as to which offer was accepted as the buyout agreement between the parties.
The Court finds that all buy-out offers violate the Statute of Frauds. The
Statute of Frauds requires that any agreement regarding interests in real estate or
agreements that cannot be performed within one year to be in writing or they are void.
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-1,4(1). Both alleged agreement consist of the transfer
of property and payments to be made over a period of years. These agreement would
4

This was to be the first of two motions for summary judgment filed by Cowley prior to

trial.
5

Included in those exhibits were two documents of particular import which were later
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be void under the Statute of Frauds unless the agreement has been partially
performed. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742,7'51 (Uath2002). The Court finds that there
are material issues of fact regarding whether sufficient part-performance has been
completed that would allow this Court to enforce the oral agreement.
®. 1013-1014)(emphasis added)
For those reasons the motion for summaryjudgment was denied. ®. 1014) Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ®. 1058-1059; 1079-1096) In his supporting
Memorandum Plaintiff suggested a wholesale change in his legal theory, but did not seek to
amend the Complaint. Instead of asserting that there had been no oral agreement or any other
agreement reached to dissolve AMS, Cowley asserted that the parties had entered into a
written agreement memorialized in a writing signed by Slone Porter but not Tracy Cowley.
®. 1095) The Motion for reconsideration was denied. In its Ruling the court stated in
pertinent part:
This Court has found and still finds that there are genuine disputes as to material facts
of this case, such as what agreement was reached by the parties, whether the parties
agreed to dissolve AMS. and whether AMS issued stock.
®. 1197-1199)(emphasis added)
The Court thereafter amended its Ruling as to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment to correct mistakes as to dates in the original ruling, but otherwise made no change
as to the disputed issues of fact remaining for trial. ®. 1197-1201) Thereafter, Plaintiff
repackaged his motion for reconsideration and filed his second Motion for Summary
Judgment. ®. 1100-111)

The Plaintiffs new claim that the parties had entered into an

enforceable written agreement appears in detail for the first time in that motion. ®. 1109,
ff3-8; 1104-1108).Digitized
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theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, because such a amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements. Holmes
Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002), citing, McDowell v. Sullivan, 132
F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D. 111. 1990) and Utah R. Civ. P. 7, 8, 9, andlO. Under these
circumstances, the court below was restricted to the grounds set forth in Cowley's Complaint.
See also, Mitchell v. Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 251, 240 P.2d 970, 972 (1952).
Moreover, in opposition to the second motion for summary judgment, Defendants'
objected to the new claim and the failure of Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint as follows:
The Court should note at this point that the Plaintiffs have completely
abandoned the theories underlying the Complaint by which they commenced this
action. Plaintiffs, in the Complaint claimed that there was no oral or other agreement
reached between the parties, and based upon the lack of an agreement were seeking
judicial dissolution of AMS. Now, without any amendment to the Complaint, they
are wholly relying on the existence of an agreement which is nowhere mentioned in
the Complaint, and which is based solely upon their spin on the facts established by
this Court in denying their two prior summary judgment requests. Plaintiffs cannot
have it both ways, where they simply seem to be adopting a new legal theory of the
moment as they seem convenient in order to avoid having to bring their claims to trial
The Plaintiffs' latest attempt at summary judgment lacks credibility because the
Plaintiffs' cannot even figure out what it is they are claiming or suing for in this case
at this point, because the record evidence and the court's prior rulings have resulted
in a finding that there was an agreement, which completely eliminates the Plaintiffs'
position set forth in the Complaint. Plaintiffs latest spin on its motion for summary
judgment is merely an inappropriate attempt at damage control where their previous
theories have wholly filed to cajole Defendants into paying them more money than
was agreed to on July 19, 2002.
®. 1273-1274)(emphasis added).
In their reply, Plaintiffs make a startling observation as follows:
The matter now devolves into a defense that everything done by the parties
from and after June 24,2002 was "part performance" under the Statute of Frauds of
either an oral agreement reached June 24th to pay $ 10,000/month or an oral agreement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reached July 19th to pay $4,000/month. ®. 1291)
Moreover, Plaintiffs filed a Motion in Limine to restrict the evidence at trial to only
those issues relating to their new claim arising under the alleged writing which they
contended satisfied the Statute of Frauds, specifically to exclude evidence concerning terms
of the oral agreement asserted by way of affirmative defense in the Answer. ®. 1409 -1417)
Both the second motion for summary judgment and the motion in limine were denied. As
of that time, following the close of discovery and less than one month prior to trial, the
Plaintiffs' clearly were no longer contending that there was no agreement and they were
entitled to judicial dissolution, the only claim asserted in the Complaint. They were now
claiming that they had effectively an enforceable written agreement as of June 24, 2002
based on a one page document signed only by Slone Porter, and, apparently, were seeking
a judgment for breach of that written agreement. At trial, Mr. Cowley testified that the newly
contrived claim of a written contract was not included in the Pleadings. (Day Two, Tr. at
19) The court below, having been informed of the failure to amend, simply let defendants
change their claim contrary to the rules governing pleading, notice and opportunity to defend.
That, without more, constitutes reversible error in this case and warrants the relief prayed for
by Mr. Porter in this appeal. But there is more.

b.

The Trial Court's New Theory for Plaintiff

As indicated by the court below, at trial this case was supposed to be about what the
terms were of agreement between the parties to dissolve AMS, and whether those terms were
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enforceable. Nothing in the court's rulings indicated there was to be tried any claim for
breach of contract. At issue, were two competing agreements, "A" and "B". Agreement
"A" was an oral agreement which Slone Porter asserts was reached on July 19, 2002, and
contained the terms indicated in Exhibit "17". ( R. 415-420)

Agreement "B" was

essentially a written agreement evidenced by a one page writing signed only by Slone Porter,
Exhibit "5". ®. 504). However, following the trial, the court rejected both Agreement "A"
and Agreement "B", and found that the parties had reached an oral agreement, Agreement
"C", which called for, inter alia, the payment from Porter to Cowley of $ 10,000.00 per month
over five years, and terms different from those argued by Cowley. ®. 1650-1660) The court
then went on to find a breach of Agreement "C", and awarded damages based on that breach
based on a claim which was never plead in its judgment which is the subject of this appeal.
®. 1650-1660,1690)6
Generally, '" questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic
evidence9" are matters of law, which [a court] reviewfs] for correctness." Fairbourn
Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, f 6 (citing Zions First
Natl Bank, N.A. v. Natl Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)). Even when
questions of the meaning of a contract are unclear, "the goal in interpreting contracts is to
give effect to the intent of the parties." Uintah Basin Medical Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92,
f 20 n.7. Accordingly, if the contract itself is ambiguous, but the parties agree that it should
6

Agreement "C" appears to consist of terms imposed by the court which combines
elements of both Agreement "A" and Agreement "B". The findings of Agreement "C" are the
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be viewed in a certain way, or be given a certain meaning, a court should "be particularly
reluctant to reject the parties' stipulations or concessions in [the] case." Id. As a result,
"[reformation is not available to rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by
the parties." RHNCorp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 38; see also Cunningham v. Cunningham,
690 P.2d 549,552 ("A court does not have carte blanche to reform any transaction to include
terms that it believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly bounded. Reformation may be
appropriate where both parties were mistaken as to a term of the contract, or where one party
is mistaken and the other party is guilty of inequitable conduct... but it is not available to
rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by the parties.").
In addition, findings at variance with the claims of the parties to a case are "not
favored and are carefully scrutinized on review." Combe v. Warren *s Family Drive-Inns,
Inc., 680 P.2d 733,735 (Utah 1984). Thus, "[i]t is error to adjudicate issues not raised before
or during trial and unsupported by the record." Id. at 736. A judgment must be responsive
to the pleadings, "and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not
presented for determination." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, "[a]ny findings rendered
outside the issues are a nullity." Id. (citing Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,
585 P.2d 724 (1978)). In sum, the Utah Supreme Court has laid down the rule of law that:
"A court may not grant judgment for relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor
within the theory on which the case was tried, whether that theory was expressly stated or
implied by the proof adduced." Id. (citing Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace,
559 P.2d 411 (1977)). ^The limitation to try the issues presented obtains whether the action
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is one in law or in equity and includes declaratory judgments as well." Id. In applying this
principle, the court found in Combe that since "[n]either party requested a dissolution of the
Corporation, let alone a partnership . . . . The Court... erred when it adjudicated [those]
matters." Id.
There is no allegation of Agreement "C" in any of the pleadings in this case.
Agreement "C", was not plead or asserted by any of the parties.7 There was no notice, and
could have been no notice that Defendants were required to defend against Agreement "C".
There could not have been consent to try the case involving agreement "C", either express
or implied, under the circumstances of this case.
Moreover, prior to trial, in chambers and off the record, the court below instructed the
parties that it would not permit any evidence concerning the then status of QMS, the business
which Plaintiff alleged was the continuation of AMS, or other evidence concerning the effect
of Cowley's conduct on the business from which money was to be paid to Cowley for the
buy-out of AMS. Under these circumstances, Defendant Slone Porter was denied notice and
an opportunity to meet the claim which the court injected improperly into this case, following
the close of the evidence. Under these circumstances, defenses such as impossibility of
performance, the wrongful conduct of the plaintiff, failure to mitigate damages, etc., were
not even permitted to be litigated based upon some breach of contract theory which, as of the
first day of trial was not articulated by the Plaintiff. The court's determination in this case
is patently improper under the pleading rules.
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What was at issue, according to the court's rulings prior to the trial, was whether
there was an enforceable agreement to dissolve AMS. Once the court determined that there
was, that should have been the end of the case, with judgment for Defendant, and an order
to dismiss the Complaint for judicial dissolution — Plaintiffs only asserted cause of action.
If Plaintiff wanted to contend that he was entitled to damages for breach of the agreement,
then he was free to pursue such an action upon appropriate pleadings, and procedure, to
allow substantive development of the evidence on all defenses concerning that claim. That
is the relief sought by Mr. Porter in this appeal. That is the justice that so far has been
denied Mr. Porter in this case.
This finding by the court below concerning Agreement "C" is even more astonishing,
given the presentation of the evidence at trial. In fact, Mr. Cowley testified that there was
no "mention of any other agreement anywhere in the case." 8 (Day Two, Tr. at 68) By
further example, Tracy Cowley testified at trial concerning the events of June 24, 2002,
leading to the asserted enforceable written agreement. (Tr. 232-241)

However, at his

deposition, and as acknowledged on cross-examination, Mr. Cowley testified that as of June
24,2002, no agreement had been reached, at least as to the amount of the payout. (Day Two,
Tr. pp. 21-70) Mr. Cowley's explanation for the inconsistency was he was changing his
factual testimony on the advice of his attorney, both by his preceding attorney and by Mr.
Smay in preparation for trial. (Day two, Tr. at 19,50,57, and 59) Finally, for the first time,

8

The transcript of the two-day trial appears in three volumes modified as first half of first
day, second half of first day, and second day. References are to identify the partial volume of the
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a potential for finding some agreement other than "A" or "B" was first mentioned by
Plaintiffs counsel in colloquy with the court below, following the close of the evidence.
(Day Two, Tr. at 181-182). It is that alternative, which was never raised before or during
the trial, of which there was no notice, and about which there could have been no consent,
express or implied, which renders the court's judgment defective and subject to reversal in
the present case. The court below, having concluded that there was an enforceable
agreement for the dissolution of AMS, should have simply entered judgment for defendant
and dismissed the single cause of action in the Complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice.

n.

The Salient Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment at
Issue on Appeal Are Clearly Erroneous and subject to reversal as a
matter of law.

Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. In
the present case, defendant is challenging all of the lower court's findings on which the court
relies in concluding that there was some agreement reached between the parties, other than
the agreement of June 24, 2002, or the agreement of July 19, 2004, which are the only
agreements asserted by the parties in this case.
In the lower court's ruling, there are 48 findings of fact. ®. 1649-1660) Defendant
is challenging findings 33, 36 and 37.
a.

Evidence supporting the challenged Findings of Fact

Evidence tending to support this finding is as follows:
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The terms of the alleged agreement of June 24, 2002, are contained in Exhibit "5."
Concerning the performance of the parties under the terms of the buy-out alleged by Plaintiff,
Mr. Cowley testified as follows:
As of June 24,2002, Mr. Cowley was willing to accept the buy-out offer previously
made by Mr. Porter, with some additional terms. (Day One, Part I, Tr* 234-235) Those
terms, including the changes were written by hand on a piece of paper in discussion with the
Porters, and later were typed by Mrs. Porter. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 234-238, Ex. "3", Ex.
"7") Mrs. Cowley was not present at the meeting of June 24,2002. (Day One, Part I, Tr.
235) The writing indicated the date of July 1, 2002, which signified that date on which
performance was to be completed. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 236) Mr. Cowley chose to receive
the Midway property to be distributed from Listo, LLC. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 237) Mrs.
Porter printed out two copies of the proposed terms, one for signature by Mr. Cowley, and
one for signature by Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter signed his copy. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 238)
Mr. Cowley did not want to sign the agreement without Mrs. Cowley being present.
(Day One, Part I, Tr. 239) After discussing the agreement with Mrs. Cowley and requested
changes, Mr. Cowely made notes regarding change items and a request to Mrs. Porter to call
him, signed his initials and left his copy of the Agreement on the table at the office. (Day
One, Part I, Tr. 239-241) The Cowleys met with the Porters on the evening of June 27,
2004, following separate meetings between 7-Eleven, Inc. and Mr. Cowley, and the Porters.
(Day One, Part I, Tr. 249) At that meeting, the Porters did not suggest that the meetings
with 7-Eleven, Inc. had any effect on the arrangement they had reached on June 24, 2002,
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or that the Porters were altering any of that in any way. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 249-250) On
June 27,2002, Cowley received a check for $25,000 which represented one half of the cash
on handfromthe accounts of AMS. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 250)

On June 27, 2002, the

parties discussed preparing an inventory of hard assets. (Day One, Part I, Tr, 255) The buyout agreement of June 24, 2002, states that all hard assets are to remain the property of the
Porters. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 255-256) The purpose of the inventory was not to make some
determination of what Porters would pay to Cowley for his share of AMS because Cowley
believed they already had an agreement. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 257) As of the day Mr.
Cowley left the AMS offices on or about June 25, 2002, nobody had ever mentioned any
other price for Mr. Cowley's interest in AMS other than $10,000 per month over five years
for a total of $600,000.00. (Day Two, Tr. 2-3) The next meeting between Cowley and
Porter occurred on July 19,2002. (Day Two, Tr. 4) The purpose of that meeting was to tie
everything up in a nice neat bow. (Day Two, Tr. 4-5) At the meeting the parties discussed
the inventory, but they were not attempting to determine a precise evaluation. (Day Two,
Tr. 5-6) At that meeting, Mrs. Porter told Mr. Cowley that he would only get one-half of the
$208,000 inventory amount as his buy-out of the assets. Mr. Cowley got angry. There was
a discussion of the debt of AMS with which Mr. Cowley did not agree. The parties disagreed
concerning the debt and the asset amount completely. At that meeting the parties discussed
Porter only paying $4,000 per month. (Day Two, Tr. 6-7) The $4,000.00 amount was a
number Porters made up from the top of their head. Mr. Cowley had no reason to believe
that $ 4 , 0 0 0 0 was the number that Porters could afford to pay. Porters suggested that the
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amount of $4,000 was the amount they could pay until they got the contracts back from 7Eleven, Inc. which was not likely to happen until the fall of 2002. (Day Two, Tr. 7-9) At
that point, Mr. And Mrs. Cowley left the meeting. (Day Two, Tr. 9) Later that evening of
July 19,2002, Mr. Cowley telephoned Mr. Porter to tell Mr. Porter that Mr. Cowley would
accept payments of $4,000 per month until the contracts were reinstated sometime in the fall.
(Day Two, Tr. 9) Following the meeting on July 19,2002, Mr. Cowley did not request Mrs.
Porter to draft an agreement. (Day Two, Tr. 11) The parties' next meeting occurred at the
request of Mr. Cowley in October 2002. At that meeting Mr. Cowley told the Porters that
he needed them to raise the payments up to the $10,000 amount which had been previously
agreed to. Porter's indicated that they had sought legal counsel and that they had a verbal
agreement relating to the $4,000 per month, and that Porter refused to pay the $10,000.00.
At that point, Mr. Cowley had no documents signed by either of the parties in his possession.
Mr. Cowley only had the handwritten notes made between he and Mrs. Porter on June 24,
2002. (Day Two, Tr. 11-15) As of the second day trial, Mr. Cowley never doubted that he
had reached an agreement with the Porters to pay $600,000.00 in $10,000 monthly
instalments for five years. (Day Two, Tr. 19-20) On July 29 and 31,2002, Cowley received
additional payments of $ 16,500 and $ 11,000 respectively for relating to the split up of AMS,
and payout of the accounts receivable. (Day Two, Tr. 58). The agreement of June 24,2002,
was silent as pay outs of money because that had just been a given. (Day Two, Tr. 62) At
the meeting on July 19, 2002, Mr. Cowley stated to Mrs. Porter that the agreement was for
$600,000.00. (Day Two, Tr. 66) Cowley's agreement required payment of $10,000 per
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month whether the contracts were ever reinstated or not. (Day Two, Tr. 68-69) Of the items
listed in the June 24, 2002, buy out agreement, Items 2, 5, and 7, together with the
confidentiality agreement and no-non compete have been accomplished. (Day One, Part
H, Tr. 186-188)
a.

Evidence contradicting the challenged Findings of Fact.

In contrast, all other items of the June 24, 2002 purported agreement were not
performed. (Day Two, Tr. 186-188) As of the July 19, 2002 meeting, the Cowleys were
"kicking themselves" for not having accepted the $600,000.00 offer. (Day Two, Tr. 166)
The Cowley's believed the Porters offer of $600,000 was ludicrous. (Day Two, Tr.
164) Mrs. Cowley, and hence Mr. Cowley never agreed to the $600,000 terms, because Mrs.
Cowley was out of town and she would never have agreed to those terms. (Day Two, Tr.
164-168) Between June 27,2002 and July 19,2002 the parties were still negotiating over
the terms of an agreement. (Day Two, Tr. 168-170) The court found that Mr. Cowley's
signature did not appear on the document. (Day Two, Tr. 171) As of June 24,2002, the total
buy out price was never agreed upon. (Day Two, Tr. 171-172) All of the provisions of the
agreement asserted by Slone Porter were performed, including the $4,000 per month
payments. (Day one, Part II, Tr. 188-191)
In deposition, Mr. Cowley denied that there was ever any agreement about $4,000 per
month based on the advice of his attorney. (Day Two, Tr. 25) As of June 24, 2002, Mr.
Cowley believed the value of AMS to exceed the $600,000 amount. (Day Two, Tr. 26)
The document of June 24, 2002, does not include any payment For distribution of cash on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hand. The June 24,2002, was instead of what the Porters had originally offered. (Day Two,
Tr. 29)

On June 27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters

substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley.
(Day Two, Tr. 39-40) Contrary to his testimony of direct examination, as of June 24,2002,
Cowley was still reserving terms of agreement. On June 27, 2002, following the meetings
with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July
as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 40-43) As of June 27,2002, Mr. Cowley was
still negotiating with the Porters and expected to reach an agreement as of the end of the
month.

On June 27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters

substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley.
(Day Two, Tr. 43-47) Prior to June 19,2002, there had been no agreement as to the payout
amount for AMS. On June 27,2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters
substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley.
(Day Two, Tr. 50) The inventory of equipment, prepared after June 24,2002, had to do with
the price Porters wanted to pay for the buyout of AMS. On June 27, 2002, following the
meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered the terms previously proposed,
not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 51-52) All of the terms of
agreement between the parties had not been agreed to or fulfilled by June 24,2002. On June
27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered the
terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 52-54)
At his deposition Cowley testified that the payments of June 27, 2002, June 29, 2002 and
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June 31, 2002, were merely normal partnership distributions because there had been no
agreement to dissolve AMS. At trial, Mr. Cowley testified that the payments were made as
part of the split up and dissolution of AMS according to the lately asserted agreement. On
June 27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered
the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 5560) All of comes directly from the testimony of Mr. And Mrs. Cowley at trial. They then,
with the advice of their attorney, changed their testimony, with apparent impunity from the
court below, to suit there new legal theory which was never pled. It was clear error from this
record to conclude that (1) there was an agreement reached on June 24,2002, and that terms
of that agreement were being performed beginning on or after June 27, 2002, as stated in
finding 33 of the Court's Findings of Fact. Without that finding, the Court cannot support
its judgment as to the terms of agreement between the parties, and the subsequent finding of
a breach. The same is true for the trial court's Findings of Fact 35, 36 and 37. The court
below cannot properly sustain its findings and conclusions of law that the parties ever
reached an agreement including the requirement of paying $600,000 on this record, given the
admissions of the Plaintiffs to the contrary. The only agreement alleged in the pleadings of
this case, for which there is substantial and real proof of adequate partial performance is that
asserted by Slone Porter. Under the circumstances, the court should reverse the judgment
of the court below, with instructions to enter judgment for Defendant and dismiss the
Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.
Conclusion
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In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Appellant Slone D. Porter requests
this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the case to the trial court
with instructions to enter judgment for Defendant Slone D. Porter and against Plaintiff Tracy
Cowley and to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, and together with all
further relief the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
//
//

i*a

DATED this 2^^-^clay of March, 2005.

BOSTWICK & PRI

Attorneys for Appellant Slone D. Porter.
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Addendum
a.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the Court below.

b.

The Record

c.

The Transcript
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 2fc'H r "o , n

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

v.

Case No. 030500244

Slone and Veralynn PORTER,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendant.

SEP iiao*

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and hte court being
fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff forthwith the sum of $24,000 ($6,000/month for

August, September, October and November, 2002) due November 1, 2002, plus $6,000/month
for December 2002 through July 2004, together with interest thereon at the legal rate since due;
plus $10,000/month hereafter until there shall have been paid $600,000 of principle without
interest.
2,

The Plaintiffs are awarded their costs, but not attorneys fees.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTitf - r ~ ; 0 f„; c: KO
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
Slone and Veralynn PORTER,

Case No. 030500244
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial before the court on June 1st and 2nd, 2004. The Court
having heard and considered the evidence and the submission of the parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant, Slone Porter, was employed by 7-Eleven Inc. ("7-Eleven") from

February 1981 until November, 1995, when he was laid off.
2.

Tracy Cowley was employed by 7-Eleven as the Area Facilities Manager in the

maintenance department, with responsibility for overseeing maintenance work at the stores and
for approving outside maintenance contracts for all 7-Eleven stores in Utah.
3.

7-Eleven published a code of Business Conduct ("CBC"), Exhibit 9, that

expressly prohibited employees from engaging in conduct which constituted a conflict of interest
by solicitation of gifts, entertainment and travel by a supplier, business relationship with outside
companies doing business with 7-Eleven and doing business with former employees of 7-Eleven
for a certain period of time.
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4.

Tracy Cowley, Slone Porter and Bill Berg created a company known as Advanced

Maintenance Services ("AMS") in December 1994 for the purpose of entering into contracts with
7-Eleven for general maintenance of its stores.
5.

At the time of the formation of AMS, both Mr. Cowley and Mr. Porter were

prohibited under the CBC from contracting with 7-Eleven, because of their past and current
employment with 7-Eleven. Mr. Berg served as the face and front for the company because he
was already doing work for 7-Eleven as a landscape contractor.
6.

On December 6,1994, AMS was incorporated in the State of Utah.

7.

Mr. Cowley, Mr. Porter and Mr. Berg held equal ownership interests in AMS,

although AMS never issued stock certificates nor any written document of any kind relating to
stock or stock ownership was ever created while Mr. Berg was involved with AMS.
8.

Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS was concealed from

7-Eleven.
9.

In June of 1997, following arbitration between the three owners of AMS, Mr.

Berg departed as an owner of AMS, in consideration of payment of cash, the landscaping
contracts with 7-Eleven and two vehicles, thereafter, Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley became equal
owners of AMS.
10. At the time Mr. Berg left AMS, Slone Porter, now representing AMS with 7-Eleven,
requested and received permission from Jim Craig, the division facilities manager and Mr.
Cowley's boss at 7-Eleven to own and operate AMS as a contractor with 7-Eleven, even though
the CBC mandated time period had not passed from the time Mr. Porter had left 7-Eleven. Mr.
Cowley's ownership interest in AMS was again not disclosed.
Ruling Page 2
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11.

During 1997, AMS acquired a company called Straight Line Striping ("SLS"),

which was a corporation in the business of pavement marking.
12.

In May, 1998, at the recommendation of AMS's accountant, AMS acquired

certain life insurance policies, pertaining to Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley. As part of the
requirement for obtaining the life insurance policies, AMS and its two owners executed a written
Stock Redemption Agreement. Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley executed the Stock Redemption
Agreement as shareholders, and Mrs. Porter signed the agreement as President of AMS.
13.

The Stock Redemption Agreement stated that it would terminate upon the

dissolution of AMS. The agreement is silent concerning the process or procedure or details
relating to one owner buying the interest of another while both are still living. There is no
evidence at trial that AMS actually ever did issue stock.
14.

In 2000, the Porter's and Cowley's formed a new corporation called Listo, Inc.

("Listo"). Listo was used as a holding company for certain real estate purchased using AMS
money. Specifically, there were two rental properties; one located in Midway, Utah and the other
located in St. George, Utah.
15.

From the creation of AMS until March 31, 2001, Tracy Cowley continued his

employment with 7-Eleven, and did no work directly for AMS. Mr. Cowley, at some point,
began receiving compensation from AMS in an amount which would make the compensation
equal for both he and Slone Porter, taking into account Mr. Cowley's salary at 7-Eleven.
16.

Mr. Johan de Besche ("Mr. de Besche") replaced Jim Craig as Mr. Cowley's boss

at 7-Eleven during 1999. At some point in time, he became concerned about Mr. Cowley's job
performance and his cost reports. He began to scrutinize the billings of AMS. During February,
Ruling Page 3
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2001, Mr. de Besche became aware that the Cowleys and the Porters had gone on a vacation to
Hawaii together. He wanted to knowfromMr. Cowley whether AMS had paid for his vacation
to Hawaii.
17.

Mr. Cowley resigned his position with 7-Eleven effective March 31, 2001.

18.

After leaving 7-Eleven, Mr. Cowley started working with AMS and drawing

compensation equal to that of Mr. Porter. 7-Eleven was aware that Mr. Cowley was an employee
of AMS, but did not know of his ownership interest.
19.

Ann Atkin ("Atkin") replaced Mr. Cowley as area facilities manager for 7-Eleven.

She became concerned about the billing practice of AMS. She began to scrutinize and critically
analyze each bill and payment for compliance with the contracts. She expressed her concerns to
Mr. Porter.
20.

The Porters became concerned about the pressures put on them by 7-eleven and

their relationship with the Cowleys. Slone Porter and his wife, Veralynn Porter requested a
meeting with Tracy Cowley and his wife, Kerin on June 22, 2002, at the AMS office in Midway,
Utah. At the meeting, the Porters indicated they wanted to buy out Tracy Cowley's interest in
AMS. They offered to pay $600,000 in cash in monthly installments of $10,000/month paid over
five years without interest, to transfer 100% of SLS to the Cowleys and to give Tracy Cowley his
choice of the Listo properties with in Midway or the one in St. George, the Cowleys were given
twenty-four hours to respond to the offer. Slone Porter said he formulated the offer as one he
would accept. The Porters taped the meeting.
21.

The Cowleys were stunned with the meeting. On the evening of June 22,2002,

Mr. Cowley called MR. Porter and suggested that if the offer was one that he would accept, he
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should accept it, and the Cowleys would retain AMS. Mr. Porter refused the counter-offer,
suggesting to Cowley that if Cowley acquired AMS, 7-Eleven would discover that Cowley had
been an owner of AMS while working for 7-Eleven, then 7-Eleven would refuse to contract with
AMS and Cowley would not be able to pay Porter the required $600,000. Cowley expressed his
confidence that this would not happen.
22.

Veralynn Porter on June 22, 2002, without the knowledge of the Cowleys,

contacted Atkin of 7-Eleven and informed her of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS
throughout the length of AMS's contracts with 7-Eleven. She also alleged that Cowley had
threatened a hostile takeover of AMS which would adversely affect the work of AMS for 7Eleven. Atkin requested the Porters to come to her home in Utah county, the next day on June
23, 2002.
23.

At the meeting with Atkin on June 23,2002, the Porters reviewed the total history

of AMS with her, and Mr. Cowley's involvement. Atkin informed the Porters that she did not
know what would happen between AMS and 7-Eleven, but that she would have to contact Mr. de
Besche and 7-Eleven's legal department to inform them of the AMS situation.
24.

On the evening of June 23, 2002, the Cowleys again met with the Porters at the

AMS office. The Porters peremptorily informed the Cowleys of their conversation with Atkin
and their disclosure of her of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS. This disclosure rendered
moot Mr. Cowley's suggestion that the Porters sell AMS to the Cowleys. The meeting was again
tape recorded by the Porters.
25.

During the evening of June 23, the Cowleys agreed among themselves that they

would accept the buy-out terms submitted by the Porters, with certain changes that Mr. Cowley
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would submit to the Porters on June 24th. Mrs. Cowley was then committed to accompany a
church youth group on a trip out-of-state early on June 24th.
26.

On the morning of June 24, 2002, Tracy Cowley came to the AMS office and met

with Slone and Veralynn Porter. During that meeting, MR. Cowley enumerated certain
additional terms which he would accept in selling his portion of AMS to Slone Porter, which
items were handwritten on a paper by Mrs. Porter. This meeting was also tape recorded by the
Porters.
27.

These handwritten notes were then typed on a computer by Mrs. Porter. This

document was entitled "Partnership Buy-Out" of which, two copies were printed. Mr. Porter
signed one and placed it back on the desk. Mr. Cowley said that the terms were agreeable to him,
but he wanted to read them to his wife before signing. He attempted to call her but couldn't get a
clear connection on his cell phone. The Porters left him for approximately one hour, taking Mr.
Porter's copy of the agreement with them. Upon returning, they found Cowley's copy left behind
with a note, "Vera - Call me. T.C.". The Porters kept possession of both copies of the
agreement.
28.

Mr. Porter called Mr. Cowley that evening. They discussed a "no non-compete"

clause previously sought by Cowley, and determined not to change it.
29.

On the afternoon of June 24, 2002, Mr. Cowley called Atkin to verify the Porter's

assertion that SLS could continue to do stripping work for 7-Eleven. Atkin informed him that 7Eleven would not do business with any company associated with Mr. Cowley. Mr. Cowley later
informed Porter of this conversation with Atkin.
30.

Pursuant to instructions from Atkin, the Porters took steps to form Quality
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Maintenance Systems ("QMS"), which the Porters incorporated o June 25, 2002 as owners to
continue the maintenance work for 7-Eleven formerly done by AMS.
31. On June 27,2002, Tracy Cowley met with Mr. de Besche of 7-Eleven in a meeting
also attended by Atkin. Later that day, the Porters also met with Mr. de Besche and Atkin. Both
Cowley and the Porters informed Mr. de Besche that Cowely had agreed to sell out to the Porters
and would leave AMS. Notes of the meetings kept by Atkins indicate that the Porters showed
Mr. de Besche the buy-out agreement signed by Slone Porter June 24, 2002, because there were
references to specific provisions contained therein.
32.

Mr. de Besche agreed for 7-Eleven that the newly created QMS, without Mr.

Cowley being involved in the ownership could continue to provide the same services to 7-Eleven
on a time and material basis.
33.

After June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform the terms of the written buy-out

agreement of June 24th. Mr. Cowley vacated the AMS offices in Midway, delivering the previous
AMS employees, equipment, stock account, books and premises to the Porters. They divided the
$50,000 cash funds of an AMS investment account. There was a further division of accounts
receivable and transfer of the rental properties held by Listo, transfer of SLS and its equipment to
the Cowleys and changing of the logos on the premises and equipment from AMS to QMS.
There was also a transfer of some vehicles to the Cowleys.
34.

The Cowleys asked for copies of the tape recordings of the earlier meeting. The

Porters always indicated they would provide them with copies of said tapes.
35.

The parties met together on July 19,2002 to discuss an inventory of equipment

and supplies belonging to AMS and SLS. This meeting was not tape recorded as has been the
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pattern in the past. At this meeting, the Porters asked the Cowelys to accept half the value of the
inventory of equipment and supplies decreased by half the debt attached to the equipment being
retained by the Porters. This was not acceptable to the Cowleys.
36.

The Porters then indicated at the July 19th meeting, that because AMS was

temporarily on a "time and material basis" pending re-bidding of the 7-Eleven contracts in the
fall, QMS could only afford to pay the Cowleys $4,000/month and not the $10,000/month they
had previously offered and which the Cowleys had ultimately accepted. The $4,000 figure was a
unilaterally derived figure submitted by the Porters. At this meeting, the Cowleys again asked
for copies of the tape recordings of the previous meetings. Mrs. Porter replied that she had
destroyed them.
37.

Slone Porter testified at trial that Tracy Cowely called him on the evening of July

19, 2002 and accepted $4,000/month for five years as a final agreement to purchase Cowleys
share of AMS. The Cowleys testified they agreed to accept $4,000/month to help the Porters out
until the contracts were rebid to see if QMS was awarded the 7-Eleven contracts, as they were
currently only being paid on a "time and material" basis and once QMS secured the 7-Eleven
contracts, the $10,000/month for sixty months provision would be restored.
38.

On July 21, 2002 the Porters filed Articles of Dissolution for AMS signed by

Slone Porter. This document purports that no agreement of shareholders was necessary as AMS
had no shareholders.
39.1n October, 2002,the Cowleys learned that QMS had successfully obtained 7-Eleven
contracts. Although not exactly the same contracts as held by AMS, they were substantially the
same, and they had a similar monetary value.
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40.

Prior to June 27, 2002, both the Porters and Cowleys were receiving between

$10,000 and $14,000 per month in compensation for their ownership interest in AMS.
41.

On October 21,2002 the Cowleys demanded that the Porters bring the payments

for the buy-out of AMS up to the $10,000/month level because they had successfully re-obtained
the 7-Eleven contracts. The Porters said they would consider starting to make the $10,000/month
payments and get back to them.
42.

After being re-contacted by the Cowleys concerning the $ 10,000/month payments

the Porters responded that their attorney had advised them that the $4,000/month discussion on
July 19th constituted an enforceable oral agreement to purchase Cowley's half of AMS for
$4,000/month for five years.
43. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000/month from August, 2002 through the
time of trial.
44.

The Cowleys subsequently filed this action against the Porters on May 15,2003

wherein the Complaint and in a subsequent Motion for Summary judgment they took the position
that AMS was improperly dissolved and asked this court to judicially dissolve AMS dividing the
value of AMS between the plaintiff and the defendant. Mr. Cowley subsequently changed his
position and asked the Court to enforce the buy-out agreement set forth in Exhibit 5. In
pleadings filed since the trial herein, the plaintiff has changed his position again, and again asks
the Court to judicially dissolve AMD and set its value as of June 22, 2002 prior to the Porters
telling 7-Eleven management of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS.
45.

After ruling upon motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment and

in response to the defendant's Answer wherein it was alleged that an agreement for buy out had
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been reached between the parties, the Court ordered the trial to be bifurcated. The first trial
being to decide if there was a contract to dissolve AMS and thus rendering a second trial to
determine the value of AMS and the need to judicially dissolve it unnecessary if the Court found
an enforceable contract to exist.
46.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant testified at trial differently than sworn

statements they gave in affidavits theyfiledwith the Court at various staged of the litigation in
this case. The credibility of both the Cowleys and the Porters is difficult to ascertain by the
Court.
47.

Veralynn Porter testified at trial that she destroyed the tape recordings of the June

meetings by throwing them into the Jordanelle Reservoir on a July 24, 2002 outing, which act
made them unavailable for use at the trial and was contrary to her representation that she had
destroyed them prior to the July 19th meeting of the parties.
48.

Both parties were involved in a scheme to deceive 7-Eleven as to the actual

ownership of AMS over many years.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There is no need to judicially dissolve AMS because the parties entered into

an enforceable contract wherein Mr. Porter agreed to buy-out Mr. Cowley's interest in AMS for,
among other things, $10,000/month for five years, until $600,000 had been paid. The remainder
of the terms agreed upon, including distribution of accounts, properties and equipment, has been
performed.
2.

The agreement signed by Slone Porter June 24,2002 does not meet the

requirements of the Statute of frauds, U.C.A. 25-2-1 et seq. (1953), however, the agreement
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shown by the document has been sufficiently performed to be fully enforceable. The terms of the
agreement are clear and definite; the acts done in performance are clear and definite and the
extensive acts shown would not have been performed absent the agreement. See Spears v. Warr,
44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted).
3.

The Cowleys agreed to accept reduced payments of $4,000/month from August

2002 through October 2002, as an accommodation to the Porters. The Parties, however, agreed
that payments of $10,000/month would commence as soon as 7-Eleven renewed maintenance
contracts with QMS and continue until $600,000 had been paid. The 7-Eleven contracts were
renewed in October 2002.
4.

The parties never agreed to reduce the total amount due from Porter to Cowley to

$240,000; the agreement has always been to pay $600,000.
5.

Defendant Porter has been in breach of the agreement with Cowley since October

2002 in the amount of $6,000/month through the present. Porter has an obligation to pay
$10,000/month hereafter until the full $600,000 is paid.
6.

The unilateral acts of the Porters in their interaction with representative of

7-Eleven from June 23,2002 through June 27,2002 were coercive of the Cowleys to sell their
half interest in AMS. The Porters breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing contained
within their duty of loyalty to their corporation and their co-owners. See Nicholson v. Evans 642
P.2d 727, 730 (1982) and Brown v. Richards 840 P.2d 143, 153 (1992).
DATED this

<£

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
x&sgsi?**OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 03 0500244 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

day of

NAME
CHRISTOPHER C HILL
ATTORNEY DEF
13 9 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 320
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
JEFFERY R PRICE
ATTORNEY DEF
13 9 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 320
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
E CRAIG SMAY
ATTORNEY PLA
174 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
, 20,

"7

Deputy Court dlerk

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paap 1

f1a=!t-]

E. Craig Smay #2985
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544

."H ?• .-.IKICT COURT

•.. ~:. i ;-. o F in A H
-V •'• ' r '"H COUNT Y
r o M i v i r tv o "
0J r «A I I b A,1 3

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,

Case Number: f)9)!)^)

v.

^fUf

Slone and Veralyn PORTER.
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Tracy and Kerin Cowley, complain of defendants Slone and Veralyn Porter, now
doing business as Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc., and in support of said Complaint allege:
1. Plaintiffs and defendants are residents of Wasatch County, Utah.
2. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, are the owners of fifty percent (50%) of the stock of
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah corporation, as shown by the Stock Redemption
Agreement attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A".
3. Defendants, Slone and Veralyn Porter, husband and wife, are owners of fifty percent
(50%) of the stock of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah corporation.
4. On or about July 22, 2002, without authority so to do, and without consent of plaintiffs,
defendants filed with the Commerce Department of the State of Utah Articles of Dissolution for
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein
by reference.
5. Thereupon, defendants incorporated a Utah corporation, Quality Maintenance Systems,
Inc., purporting to be wholly owned by defendants, and transferred to it the business of Advanced
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Maintenance Services, Inc.
6. Exhibit "B" hereto is false and ineffective to dissolve Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.
Defendants are estopped to deny the issuance of stock in Quality Maintenance Services, Inc., or to
unilaterally seek dissolution of the corporation.
7. Thereafter, defendants have paid to plaintiffs a small part of plaintiffs' regular income from
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., but have otherwise refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership
in the corporation and have prevented plaintiffs' participation in the business of the corporation.
8. Plaintiffs have at all times protested the attempt of defendants to dissolve Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc., and to operate its business under another name. Such protests have been
unavailing.
9. Defendants, over the protest of plaintiffs, continue to operate the business of Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc., under the name Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc., utilizing and
disposing of the assets thereof, incurring liabilities therefor, and collecting and disposing of the
income thereof, all without authority and in violation of the law.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court promptly issue its Order to defendants
commanding them forthwith to:
a. cease operation of the business of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., under any other
name;
b. fully account for all business done following the purported dissolution of Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc., with or for any customer of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.,
including, without limitation, any disposition of any asset thereof, following its purported dissolution;
c. fully account for all receipts and disbursements in connection with the business of
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., following its purported dissolution;
d. take no further step in the conduct of the business of Advanced Maintenance Services,
Inc., without consultation with and approval of plaintiffs;
2
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e. sequester all income derived from the business of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.,
subject, in the absence of express written agreement of plaintiffs, to further order of the court;
f promptly pay plaintiffs income from the operation of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.,
since its purported dissolution, in the same amounts as paid during the year prior to such purported
dissolution, less any payments actually made;
g. initiate forthwith proceedings for the statutory dissolution of Advanced Maintenance
Services, Inc., pursuant to § 16-10a-1402 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953);
h. pay to plaintiffs their fees and costs of this action, to be shown by appropriate affidavit of
counsel.
Plaintiffs pray for such other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises.
I

RESPECTFULLY submitted this (1/

day of May, 2003.

E. Craig Sma
Attorney for fMaintiffs\

b
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Attack iRebemptioxx Agr? exxxexxi
(Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.)

THIS AGREEMENT is made this j££'day of May, 1998, by and between
Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley (hereinafter referred to as "shareholders") and Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., an S-Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "company") created and existing under the laws of the
Sate of Utah.
RECITALS
WHEREAS, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley are the primary
shareholders of the company, Slone Dee Porter owning fifty percent (50%) of
the stock thereof, and Tracy J. Cowley owning fifty percent (50%); and
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement believe that it is to their mutual
best interest to provide for continuity and harmony in management and the
policies of the company; and
WHEREAS, the purposes of this agreement are (1) to provide for the
purchase by the corporation of shares of an shareholder in the event of his
death, (2) to provide for the purchase of shares of a shareholder who during his
lifetime desires to dispose of any of his stock, and (3) to provide the funds
necessary to carry out such purchases;

1
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NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and
covenants contained herein and for other valuable consideration, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, it is mutually agreed and covenanted by and
between the parties to this agreement as follows:
ARTICLE I
DISPOSAL OF STOCK DURING LIFETIME
During his lifetime no shareholder shall transfer, encumber or dispose of
any portion of his stock interest in the company except that if a shareholder
should desire to dispose of his stock in the company during his lifetime, he shall
first offer such stock to the company at a price determined in accordance with
the provisions of Article II. Any shares not purchased by the company within
thirty (30) days after receipt of such offer in writing shall be offered at the
same price to other shareholders, each of whom shall have the right to
purchase such portion of the remaining stock offered for sale as the number of
shares owned by all other shareholders excluding the selling shareholder.
Provided however that if any shareholder does not purchase his full proportionate share of stock, the balance of the stock may be purchased by other
shareholders equally.

If the stock is not purchased by the remaining share-

holders within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the offer to them, the shareholder desiring to sell may sell it to any other person but shall not sell it without
giving the company and the remaining shareholders the right to purchase such
remaining stock at the price and on the terms offered to such other persons.
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ARTICLE II
VALUATION OF SHARES
Unless changed as hereinafter provided, the value of each share of stock
of the company held by each shareholder shall be one dollar ($1.00) per share.
The price has been agreed upon by the shareholders of the company as
representing the fair market value of the interest of each shareholder, including
his interest in the goodwill of the corporation.
The respective shareholders hereby mutually agree to sell the stock
standing in their names and, subject to this agreement, at the value herein
stipulated, or at the value stipulated in any proper amendment to this agreement.

The shareholders and the company agree to redetermine the value of

the company and their respective interests within sixty (60) days following the
end of each fiscal year.

The value so agreed upon shall be endorsed on

Schedule "A", attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement.

If

the shareholders and the company fail to make a redetermination of valuation
for a particular year, the last previously stipulated value shall control, except
that if the shareholders and the company have not so redetermined the value
within twenty-four (24) months immediately preceding the death of a
shareholder, then the value of a shareholder's interest shall be agreed upon by
the representative of the deceased shareholder and the company through its
surviving shareholders.

If they do not agree upon a valuation within one

hundred and twenty (120) days after the death of the shareholder, the value of
the deceased shareholder's interest shall be determined by arbitration as
follows:
3
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The company, through the supervising shareholders and the personal
representatives of the estate of the deceased shareholder shall each name one
arbitrator.

If two arbitrators cannot agree upon a value within thirty (30) days,

they shall appoint a third arbitrator and the decision of the majority shall be
binding upon all parties.

In any determination of value made after the death

of a shareholder, the value of the insurance proceeds in excess of the policy's
cash surrender value at the time of the decedent's death must not be taken into
account.
ARTICLE

III

DISPOSITION OF STOCK UPON DEATH OF A SHAREHOLDER
Upon the death of any shareholder, the company shall purchase and the
estate of the decedent shall sell all of the decedent's stock in the company now
owned or hereafter acquired.

The purchase price of such stock shall be

computed in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement.
If the purchase price exceeds the proceeds of the life insurance, the
balance of the purchase price shall be paid in five (5) consecutive annual
payments beginning three (3) months after the date of the shareholder's death.
Such unpaid balance of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a series of
negotiable promissory notes executed by the company to the order of the
deceased's estate with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum.

Such notes

shall provide for the acceleration of the due date on all unpaid notes in the
series upon default in the payment of principal or interest. All such notes shall

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

become due and payable immediately upon default and shall give the company
the option of prepayment in whole or in part at any time, provided however,
that the personal representative of the decedent shareholder's estate shall have
the option to demand in cash, an amount at least equal to thirty percent (30%)
of the agreed purchase price.

Upon failure of the surviving shareholder(s) to

comply with such demand, this agreement may be terminated at the option of
the personal representative.
ARTICLE

IV

INSURANCE POLICIES
The company has procured insurance on the lives of shareholders in order
to fund its obligations under this agreement and made it subject hereto.
A.

Slone Dee Porter is insured under Beneficial Life Insurance Com-

pany, policy number BL2013210 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof.
B.

Tracy J. Cowley is insured under Beneficial Life Insurance Com-

pany, policy number BL2013196 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof.
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. agrees to pay the premiums on the
insurance policies taken out pursuant to this agreement and shall give proof of
payment of premiums to the shareholders whenever any one of them shall
request such proof.

If the premium is not paid within fifteen (15) days after
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its due date, the insured shall have the right to pay such premium and be
promptly reimbursed therefore by the company.
The company shall have the right to purchase additional insurance on the
lives of any or all of its shareholders.

All insurance policies shall be listed in

Schedule " B " , attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement,
along with any substitution or withdrawal of life insurance policies subject to
this agreement.

In the event that the company decides to purchase additional

life insurance on %he life of any shareholder, each shareholder hereby agrees to
cooperate fully by performing all the requirements of the life insurer which are
necessary conditions to the issuance of life insurance policies.

The company

shall be the sole owner of the policies issued to it and it may apply any
dividends to the payment of premiums.
Upon the joint agreement of the shareholders, other policies may be
substituted for any policies made subject to this agreement or any policies made
subject hereto may be withdrawn.

If there should be no insurance subject to

this agreement on the life of any shareholder, or if such insurance made subject
to this agreement is impaired in value so that it would not provide proceeds
equal to at least fifty percent (50%) of the face amount of such insurance, such
shareholder may elect to declare this agreement terminated by giving written
notice of termination to the other shareholder(s). Any addition, substitution or
withdrawal of policies shall be endorsed on Schedule " B " attached hereto and
signed by the shareholders.

6
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ARTICLE V
PURCHASE OF NONMATURED POLICIES BY THE INSURED
If any shareholder withdraws from the company during his lifetime, or if
this agreement terminates before the death of a shareholder, such shareholder
shall have the right to purchase the policy or policies on his life owned by the
company by paying an amount equal to the cash surrender value as of the date
of transfer, less any existing indebtedness charged against the policy or
policies. This right shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days after such
withdrawal or termination.
ARTICLE

VI

ENDORSEMENT OF STOCK CERTIFICATES
The shareholders agree to endorse the certificates of stock as follows:
The shares of stock represented by this certificate may not be so/d,
transferred or assigned except as provided in the corporation's certificate of incorporation, its by-lawsf or agreement among the
shareholders and any amendments thereto.

ARTICLE

VII

EXECUTION OF AGREEMENT
A duly authorized officer of the company and the personal representative
of the deceased shareholder's estate shall make, execute and deliver any
documents necessary to carry out this agreement.

This agreement shall be

binding upon the company and the shareholders, their heirs, personal
representatives, successors and assigns.
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ARTICLE V!!l
AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT
This agreement may be altered, amended or terminated by an instrument
in writing signed by the company and all shareholders.
ARTICLE IX
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
This agreement shall terminate on the occurance of any of the following:
A.

The written agreement of the shareholders to that effect.

B.

The exercise of a shareholders election to terminate this agreement
pursuant to Article IV or the exercise of a similar option by the
personal representative pursuant to Article III.

C.

Bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the company.

D.

Death of two or more shareholders simultaneously or within a
period of thirty (30) days.

E.

When there remains only one shareholder, a party to the
agreement.
ARTICLE X
LIABILITY OF INSURER

No insurance company which has issued or shall issue a policy or policies
to this agreement shall be under any obligation with respect to the performance
of the terms and conditions of this agreement.

Any such company shall be

bound only by the terms of the policies which it has issued or shall hereafter
issue and shall have no liability except as set forth in the policies.
8
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ARTICLE X!
GOVERNING LAW
This agreement shall be subject to and governed by the laws of the State
of Utah irrespective of the fact that one or more parties may become a resident
of another state.
ARTICLE

XII

EFFECT OF BAR AGAINST STOCK REDEMPTION
If the company is unable to make any purchase required of it hereunder
because of the provisions of the applicable statutes of its charter or by-laws,
the company agrees to take such action as may be necessary to permit it to
make such purchases and the shareholders who are parties to this agreement
agree that they will also take action as may be necessary for the company to
make such purchases.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this agreement
at the City of Midway in the Wasatch County, State of Utah on the day and
year first indicated.
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.

mkh
Shareholder
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASATCH

On this

)
:
)

ss.

day of May, 1998, personally appeared before me, a Notary

Public, Veralynne C. Porter, as President of Advanced Maintenance Services,
Inc.; and shareholders, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley, all of whom duly
acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing document.

Notary Public

10
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SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE POLICIES SUBJECT TO STOCK-REDEMPTION

Insurance Company

Policy Number

Face Amount

Date of Policy

Beneficial Life Insurance Co.

BL2013210

$660,000.00

514"

19

Beneficial Life Insurance Co.

BL2013196

$660,000.00

<J/?

19,
19
19
19
_19_
19

Sharej>o1der

Shareholder
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Division of Corporations & Commercial Code

This form must be tvpe written or computer generated

RECEIVED

Articles of Dissolution

JUL 22200Z

(Prior to the Issuance of Shares)

Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the undersigned directors or
corporators adopt the following Articles of Dissolution.
Corporation Name:

Advanced Maintenance S e r v i c e s ,

Inc.

The corporation has not issued shares, A majority of its director or if no directors have been elected
or arc no longer serving, a majority of its incorporators hereby authorize the dissolution of this
Corporation
This dissolution was authorized by the directors or incorporators on:
July
V>1

so
o

Fourth:

1 , 2002

The address of the corporation's principal office or other address where service of process may be
mailed:

o

1010 Magpie Circle, Midway, Utah 84049 4
City

Street Address

State

Zip

K P e r J i W J declare that these Articles of Dissolution have been examined by me and are,
>w/edgefciirfj belief, true, correct md complete.

Under
to the

Title:

President

Dated:19

Jul

FREE! You can visit our Web Sit^ to access this document and other information.

Mail In: S.M Box 146705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84! 14-6705
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JefferyR. Price (6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.

One Thirty Nine East
South Temple St., Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 961-7400
Facsimile: (801) 961-7406
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY
TRACEY and KERIN COWLEY,
ANSWER AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 030500244

SLONE and VERALYNN PORTER,
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr.
Defendants.

Defendants Slone and Veralynn Porter ("Defendants"), acting by and through their attorneys of
record, BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C, hereby answer the enumerated paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Complaint as
follows:
1.

Admitted.

2.

Denied.

3.

Denied.

4.

Denied.

5.

Denied.
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6.

Denied.

7.

Denied.

8.

Denied.

9.

Denied.
Affirmative Defenses

Defendants hereby incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Complaint above as
if set forth in their entirety below, and by way of further response to the Complaint hereby assert the
following affirmative defenses:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Any injury or damage sustained by Plaintiffs was caused by the fault of Plaintiffs, defendants other
than Defendants, or third persons not parties to this action.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants deny every allegation of the complaint not expressly admitted, denied or qualified.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The fault of the Plaintiffs was the sole proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of, or,
alternatively, was equal to or greater than that of Defendants, and such fault bars recovery.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The fault of Plaintiffs was a proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of, and any award
of damages should be reduced proportionately.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages and may not recover damages due to such failure.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The complaint fails to join an indispensable party.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred by the doctrine ofwaiver, estoppel, or uncleanhands.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred because no damages have been incurred by
Defendants.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims are barred as to Kerin Cowley because of the fact that she has no standing in this
case.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred because Advanced Maintenance, Inc. was properly
dissolved.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred by reason of accord and satisfaction.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred because the Stock Redemption Agreement was
terminated upon dissolution.
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FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendants reserve the right to assert any and all other affirmative defenses as set forth in Rule 8,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which discovery reveals to be applicable, so as to avoid waiver of same.
WHEREFORE, Defendants Slone and Veralynn Porter hereby request that judgment be
entered in their favor and against Plaintiffs, that the Complaint dismissed in its entirety with prejudice such
that Plaintiffs take nothing thereby, and that the Court award to Defendants all costs incurred in defending
against Plaintiffs' claims in this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and together with all further
relief the court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
DATED t h i s ^ t ^ day of May, 2003
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.

Jeffery R. Price
Christopher C. Hill
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this ^ t ^ d a y of May, 2003,1 caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES upon counsel for Plaintiffs by placing
same in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first-class postage prepaid and correctly address as
follows:
E. Craig Smay
Attorney at Law
174 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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E. Craig Smay #2985
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544

I U O IN
'-' [ . WRICT COURT
v',\'<: or UTAH

' ' - V - > < CCIJJJ7 i

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

v.
Slone and Veralynn PORTER.
Case Number: 030500244
Defendants.
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr.

Plaintiffs havefiledtheir Complaint herein; defendants havefiledtheir Answer thereto. The
filings show that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Complaint asserts, inter alia, that the parties each own half of the stock of Advanced
Maintenance Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, as shown by a Stock Redemption Agreement
attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A". The Complaint asserts that the
corporation was improperly dissolved by Articles attached as Exhibit "B".
While denying the stock ownership alleged, defendants have admitted the Stock Redemption
Agreement, which plainly shows such interests. The thirteenth defense alleges that "the Stock
Redemption Agreement was terminated upon dissolution". To have been terminated, the Stock
Redemption Agreement must have existed until the alleged dissolution, which was July 22, 2002,
according to the Articles of Dissolution, Exhibit "B'\
Having entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement, defendants are estopped to deny the
issuance of the stock. Stock may be redeemed only according to the Agreement. The Agreement
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recites that the parties are "shareholders" "owning" 50% each of the stock. Issuance of the stock
certificates became a ministerial act which could have been compelled at any time by either party.1
In that case, defendants could not unilaterally dissolve the corporation over plaintiffs objection.
Because Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. had "shareholders", it could not be dissolved
without the consent of the shareholders.2 The right to consent to, or dissentfrom,dissolution of the
corporation is part of the right to the stock.
Defendants have attempted to dissolve the company under provisions relating to dissolution
of corporations without shareholders.3 Because they failed to obtain plaintiffs' consent, defendants'
attempted dissolution was invalid as a matter of law. The invalid dissolution could not have
terminated the Stock Redemption Agreement.
Both Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. and the subject Stock Redemption Agreement
remain in full force and effect, as alleged in the Complaint. Defendant's peculiar chicken-and-egg
argument that the company was properly dissolved (Eleventh Defense) because it had no stock,
because the Stock Redemption Agreement was terminated by the dissolution, is a subterfuge rather
than a defense.4
The pleadings here show that the allegations of the Complaint are true. The parties are equal
shareholders of a corporation, which defendants have attempted to dissolve without plaintiffs
1

§ 16-10a-625 (1), U.C.A (1953): "Shares may but need not be represented by
certificates. Unless this chapter or another applicable statute expressly provides otherwise, the
rights and obligations of shareholders are not affected by whether or not their shares are
represented by certificates." SttBaggett v. Cyclops Medical Systems, Inc., 935 P.2d 1265, 1268
(U. Apps. 1997).
2

§ 16-10a-1402(l)(b), U.C.A. (1953): "the shareholders entitled to vote on the proposal
must approve the proposal to dissolve
3

§ 16-10a-1401, U.C.A. (1953).

4

Defendant has alleged no facts in support of its various "alternative defenses". Many
are inapplicable on their face. The defenses denominated "second", "fourth" and "fifth" are
inappropriate tort defenses. That denominated "third" is not an additional defense. The "tenth"
defense is wrong on its face: Kerin Cowley, the wife of Tracy Cowley, has a dower right in the
subject stock which gives her standing. Defendant has asserted no facts which could support its
"defenses" denominated "sixth", "seventh", "eighth" or "twelfth".
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consent. As a matter of law, plaintiffs are entitled to accounting of and payment for their share of the
corporation, and a proper dissolution.
Advanced Maintenance Systems remains to be properly dissolved. The present proceeding
should be promptly converted into one under § 16-1 Oa-1402, or § 16-1 Oa-1430(2) et seq., Utah Code
Ann. (1953). Meanwhile, an appropriate order should be entered requiring that the company be
operated only with the participation and consent of plaintiffs, and only upon payment to plaintiffs of
their share of the income as shown by prior operations.

DATED this

^

of June, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the fr^ of June, 2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS" to be mailed by U.S. mail,first-classpostage prepaid, to:

Jeffrey R. Price (6315)
Christopher C Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ph: (801) 961-7400
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&?tack iRebemptxan AgrPFrrtFrti
(Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.)

THIS AGREEMENT is made this yL

day of May, 1998, by and between

Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley (hereinafter referred to as "shareholders") and Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., an S-Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "company") created and existing under the laws of the
Sate of Utah.
RECITALS
WHEREAS, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley are the primary
shareholders of the company, Slone Dee Porter owning fifty percent (50%) of
the stock thereof, and Tracy J. Cowley owning fifty percent (50%); and
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement believe that it is to their mutual
best interest to provide for continuity and harmony in management and the
policies of the company; and
WHEREAS, the purposes of this agreement are (1) to provide for the
purchase by the corporation of shares of an shareholder in the event of his
death, (2) to provide for the purchase of shares of a shareholder who during his
lifetime desires to dispose of any of his stock, and (3) to provide the funds
necessary to carry out such purchases;
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NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and
covenants contained herein and for other valuable consideration, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, it is mutually agreed and covenanted by and
between the parties to this agreement as follows:
ARTICLE I
DISPOSAL OF STOCK DURING LIFETIME
During his lifetime no shareholder shall transfer, encumber or dispose of
any portion of his stock interest in the company except that if a shareholder
should desire to dispose of his stock in the company during his lifetime, he shall
first offer such stock to the company at a price determined in accordance with
the provisions of Article II. Any shares not purchased by the company within
thirty (30) days after receipt of such offer in writing shall be offered at the
same price to other shareholders, each of whom shall have the right to
purchase such portion of the remaining stock offered for sale as the number of
shares owned by all other shareholders excluding the selling shareholder.
Provided however that if any shareholder does not purchase his full proportionate share of stock, the balance of the stock may be purchased by other
shareholders equally.

If the stock is not purchased by the remaining share-

holders within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the offer to them, the shareholder desiring to sell may sell it to any other person but shall not sell it without
giving the company and the remaining shareholders the right to purchase such
remaining stock at the price and on the terms offered to such other persons.
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ARTICLE !!
VALUATION OF SHARES
Unless changed as hereinafter provided, the value of each share of stock
of the company held by each shareholder shall be one dollar ($1.00) per share.
The price has been agreed upon by the shareholders of the company as
representing the fair market value of the interest of each shareholder, including
his interest in the goodwill of the corporation.
The respective shareholders hereby mutually agree to sell the stock
standing in their names and, subject to this agreement, at the value herein
stipulated, or at the value stipulated in any proper amendment to this agreement.

The shareholders and the company agree to redetermine the value of

the company and their respective interests within sixty (60) days following the
end of each fiscal year.

The value so agreed upon shall be endorsed on

Schedule "A", attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement.

If

the shareholders and the company fail to make a redetermination of valuation
for a particular year, the last previously stipulated value shall control, except
that if the shareholders and the company have not so redetermined the value
within twenty-four (24) months immediately preceding the death of a
shareholder, then the value of a shareholder's interest shall be agreed upon by
the representative of the deceased shareholder and the company through its
surviving shareholders.

If they do not agree upon a valuation within one

hundred and twenty (120) days after the death of the shareholder, the value of
the deceased shareholder's interest shall be determined by arbitration as
follows:
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The company, through the supervising shareholders and the personal
representatives of the estate of the deceased shareholder shall each name one
arbitrator.

If two arbitrators cannot agree upon a value within thirty (30) days,

they shall appoint a third arbitrator and the decision of the majority shall be
binding upon all parties.

In any determination of value made after the death

of a shareholder, the value of the insurance proceeds in excess of the policy's
cash surrender value at the time of the decedent's death must not be taken into
account.
ARTICLE Ml
DISPOSITION OF STOCK UPON DEATH OF A SHAREHOLDER
Upon the death of any shareholder, the company shall purchase and the
estate of the decedent shall sell all of the decedent's stock in the company now
owned or hereafter acquired.

The purchase price of such stock shall be

computed in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement.
If the purchase price exceeds the proceeds of the life insurance, the
balance of the purchase price shall be paid in five (5) consecutive annual
payments beginning three (3) months after the date of the shareholder's death.
Such unpaid balance of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a series of
negotiable promissory notes executed by the company to the order of the
deceased's estate with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum.

Such notes

shall provide for the acceleration of the due date on all unpaid notes in the
series upon default in the payment of principal or interest. All such notes shall
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become due and payable immediately upon default and shall give the company
the option of prepayment in whole or in part at any time, provided however,
that the personal representative of the decedent shareholder's estate shall have
the option to demand in cash, an amount at least equal to thirty percent (30%)
of the agreed purchase price.

Upon failure of the surviving shareholder(s) to

comply with such demand, this agreement may be terminated at the option of
the personal representative.
ARTICLE

IV

INSURANCE POLICIES
The company has procured insurance on the lives of shareholders in order
to fund its obligations under this agreement and made it subject hereto.
A.

Slone Dee Porter is insured under Beneficial Life insurance Com-

pany, policy number BL2013210 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof.
B.

Tracy J . Cowley is insured under Beneficial Life Insurance Com-

pany, policy number BL2013196 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof.
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. agrees to pay the premiums on the
insurance policies taken out pursuant to this agreement and shall give proof of
payment of premiums to the shareholders whenever any one of them shall
request such proof.

If the premium is not paid within fifteen (15) days after
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its due date, the insured shall have the right to pay such premium and be
promptly reimbursed therefore by the company.
The company shall have the right to purchase additional insurance on the
lives of any or all of its shareholders.

All insurance policies shall be listed in

Schedule "B", attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement,
along with any substitution or withdrawal of life insurance policies subject to
this agreement.

In the event that the company decides to purchase additional

life insurance on the life of any shareholder, each shareholder hereby agrees to
cooperate fully by performing all the requirements of the life insurer which are
necessary conditions to the issuance of life insurance policies.

The company

shall be the sole owner of the policies issued to it and it may apply any
dividends to the payment of premiums.
Upon the joint agreement of the shareholders, other policies may be
substituted for any policies made subject to this agreement or any policies made
subject hereto may be withdrawn.

If there should be no insurance subject to

this agreement on the life of any shareholder, or if such insurance made subject
to this agreement is impaired in value so that it would not provide proceeds
equal to at least fifty percent (50%) of the face amount of such insurance, such
shareholder may elect to declare this agreement terminated by giving written
notice of termination to the other shareholder(s). Any addition, substitution or
withdrawal of policies shall be endorsed on Schedule " B " attached hereto and
signed by the shareholders.

6
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ARTICLE V
PURCHASE OF NONMATURED POLICIES BY THE INSURED
If any shareholder withdraws from the company during his lifetime, or if
this agreement terminates before the death of a shareholder, such shareholder
shall have the right to purchase the policy or policies on his life owned by the
company by paying an amount equal to the cash surrender value as of the date
of transfer, less any existing indebtedness charged against the policy or
policies. This right shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days after such
withdrawal or termination.
ARTICLE

VI

ENDORSEMENT OF STOCK CERTIFICATES
The shareholders agree to endorse the certificates of stock as follows:
The shares of stock represented by this certificate may not be sold,
transferred or assigned except as provided in the corporation's certificate of incorporation, its by-laws, or agreement among the
shareholders and any amendments thereto.

ARTICLE

VII

EXECUTION OF AGREEMENT
A duly authorized officer of the company and the personal representative
of the deceased shareholder's estate shall make, execute and deliver any
documents necessary to carry out this agreement.

This agreement shall be

binding upon the company and the shareholders, their heirs, personal
representatives, successors and assigns.
7
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ARTICLE VII!
AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT
This agreement may be altered, amended or terminated by an instrument
in writing signed by the company and all shareholders.
ARTICLE IX
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
This agreement shall terminate on the occurance of any of the following:
A.

The written agreement of the shareholders to that effect.

B.

The exercise of a shareholders election to terminate this agreement
pursuant to Article IV or the exercise of a similar option by the
personal representative pursuant to Article III.

C.

Bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the company.

D.

Death of two or more shareholders simultaneously or within a
period of thirty (30) days.

E.

When there remains only one shareholder, a party to the
agreement.
ARTICLE

X

LIABILITY OF INSURER
No insurance company which has issued or shall issue a policy or policies
to this agreement shall be under any obligation with respect to the performance
of the terms and conditions of this agreement.

Any such company shall be

bound only by the terms of the policies which it has issued or shall hereafter
issue and shall have no liability except as set forth in the policies.
8
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ARTICLE

XI

GOVERNING LAW
This agreement shall be subject to and governed by the laws of the State
of Utah irrespective of the fact that one or more parties may become a resident
of another state.
ARTICLE

XII

EFFECT OF BAR AGAINST STOCK REDEMPTION
If the company is unable to make any purchase required of it hereunder
because of the provisions of the applicable statutes of its charter or by-laws,
the company agrees to take such action as may be necessary to permit it to
make such purchases and the shareholders who are parties to this agreement
agree that they will also take action as may be necessary for the company to
make such purchases.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this agreement
at the City of Midway in the Wasatch County, State of Utah on the day and
year first indicated.
advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.

Wtikh

Shareholder
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASATCH

On this

)
:
)

ss.

day of May, 1998, personally appeared before me, a Notary

Public, Veralynne C. Porter, as President of Advanced Maintenance Services,
Inc.; and shareholders, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley, all of whom duly
acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing document.

Notary Public

10
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SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE POLICIES SUBJECT TO STOCK-REDEMPTION

Insurance Company

Policy Number

Face Amount

Date of Policy

Beneficial Life insurance Co.

BL2013210

$660,000.00

Beneficial Life Insurance Co.

BL2013196

$660,000.00 JsJAl__

5/4^

19'
19,
19
19

19
19
19

Shareholder

Shareholder

12
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£( j S ) j ) DEPARTMENT OF CK MERCE
^ w ^ v fr*v*si°n °f Corporations & Commercial Code
This form must be tvpe written or computer generated

Articles of Dissolution

JUL 222002

(Prior to the Issuance of Shares)

Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the undersigned directors or
incorporators adopt the following Articles of Dissolution.
Corporation Name:

irst:
0

Advanced M a i n t e n a n c e S e r v i c e s ,

Inc»

Second:

The corporation has not issued shares A majority of its directors, or if no directors have been elected
or arc no longer serving, a majority of its incorporators hereby authorize the dissolution of this
Corporation

Third:

This dissolution was authorized by the directors or incorporators on:

i
i

^

July
TO

Fourth:

o

<

1 , 2002

The address of the corporation's principal office or other address where service of process may be
mailed:
1010 Magpie Circle, Midway, Utah 84049
City

Street Address

Slate

Zip

>f perjuxxl declare that these Articles of Dissolution have been examined by me and are,
w/edgejaod belief, tru^ correct and complete.

Under pen
to the

Title:

President

Dated; 19

Jul

-V

F R E E ! Y o u can visit o u r W e b Site to access this d o c u m e n t a n d o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n .

Mail In: S.M, Box 146705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6705
•? -rwst>WaIk In: 160 East 300 South, Mam Floor
Corporation's Information Center: (801) 530-4849
Toll Free Number: (877) 526-3994 (Utah Residents)
Fax: (801) 530-6438
Web Site: hltp'//www comma cc uU\h gov

tn tut offip* ot W$ Owsion $nd h*rti*4&ft

OMSKMOKKKX

comnKinVlbrn»\tf"orp< Artdtst
Revised 0J 2K-02 m o
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRACY & KERIN COWLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

SLONE & VERALYN PORTER,
Defendant
Case No. 030500244

The above-entitled matter came before the Court upon the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. The Court has reviewed said Motion and the Memorandum of Lawfiledboth
in support and in opposition thereto, and also the plaintiffs complaint and the Answer and
affirmative defensesfiledby the defendants.
The plaintiffsfiledtheir Motion pursuant to Rule 12 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which permits a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In deciding such a motion,
the Court can't look to anything outside the four corners of the pleadings, and the Court must
interpret the pleadings in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
The defendants in their Answer deny paragraph 2 of plaintiffs Complaint which refers to
the stock redemption agreement but acknowledges the Stock Redemption Agreement in its
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense when they state: "Plaintiffs claims against Defendant's are
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barred because the Stock Redemption Agreement was terminated upon dissolution." By such a
statement they do impliedly acknowledge the Stock Redemption Agreement and that there had
been a dissolution of the corporation. The Court still does not know by that acknowledgment
whether the dissolution was proper or improper such that the Court could award the prayer of
the plaintiffs complaint. Based upon the pleadings alone, there are still issues of material fact.
This is the type of case that would be more properly disposed of by way of a Motion for
Summary Judgment where the Court would have before it affidavits in support and in opposition
thereto and would have information outside the four corners of the Complaint and Answer, so the
Court could better determine if there were issues of material facts.
For the above reasons, the Court denies the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the
pleadings. The Court directs counsel for the defendant to prepare an Order consistent with this
decision and submit it to plaintiffs counsel for review and to the Court for execution.
Dated this r^

day of ^ M ^ f r ^ Q Q 3 .

Fourth District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 030500244 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

/

NAME
CHRISTOPHER C HILL
ATTORNEY DEF
13 9 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 32 0
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
E CRAIG SMAY
ATTORNEY PLA
174 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

»03.

day of

hDeputy Court Gler

£JJ~^

Qi
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E. Craig Smay #2985
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
I PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE
Plaintiffs,
v.
I

Case Number; 030500244

Slone and Veralynn PORTER.
Judge. Donald Eyre, Jr.
Defendants,

Plaintiffs move the Court, pursuant to Rule 16, U.R.C.P., to limit the evidence herein to (1)
such disputed question of material feet as the Court believes remains following disposition of
plaintiffs' most recent Motion for Summary Judgment and/or (2) to whether acts of the parties
constitute "partial performance", "strictly referable" to a clearly and convincingly proven oral
agreement in satisfaction of the Statute of FraudsQuestion (1) is said to concern whether the failure of Tracy Cowley to sign a document
signed by Slone Porter on June 24,2002, indicated a failure of a meeting of minds on the terms set
out in the document. If a meeting of minds occurred, the matter is at an end, as the resulting written
contract could not be altered by the subsequent oral agreement alleged by defendants, and has
otherwise been fally performed by plaintiffs.
Matters recently raised by defendants, including the claim that Quality Maintenance Services,
Inc ("QMS"), has recently been disbanded due to loss of contracts with 7-Eleven Corporation, and
that this somehow alters defendants' obligation to plaintiffs, should not be permitted to be shown.
Not only have defendants, despite a continuing request for production of documents, withheld for
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months the documents pertinent to the matter, the matter is simply irrelevant,
Defendants attach to their most recent pleadings, a letter of February 4,2004, purportedly
terminating certain contracts between QMS and 7-Eleven pursuant to particular paragraphs of the
contracts. The contracts are not submitted. The letter i$ $ubmitted as the basts of a claim that QMS
no longer exists, Despite a continuing request for all documents relating to thefinancialcondition
of QMS, neither the letter nor the contracts have been previously produced. They may not be used
now to create further claims or defenses. Rule 37, U.R.CP.
Furthermore, the terms of what defendants call an oral "contract entered into July 19,2002,
to acquire plaintiffs' interest in Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. f AMS") for $4,000/month ft>r
five years, have previously been summarized by defendants in writing, Exhibit 29, Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment. Exhibit UA" hereto. The terms do not include defendants7 present
claim that in the event they lost the 7-Eleven business their obligation to pay plaintiffs terminated.
The alleged termination of QMS is therefore wholly irrelevant to any issue herein.
The Court must also disallow evidence extraneous to the issue of the bargain made between
the parties. This includes, at least, disputation of the motives or feelings of personnel of 7-Eleven
Corporation regarding the sale to defendants of plaintiffs7 share of AMS, and any effect it may have
had on continuation of business with QMS, The admitted facts are that, upon being advised on June
27, 2002, that plaintiffs had been bought out by defendants, 7-Eleven continued the work of AMS
with QMS on a temporary basis, which was converted to a long-term contract basis in October, 2002,
Nothing further is pertinent to the nature of the business purchased by defendants and delivered by
plaintiffs The Court should therefore exclude evidence of communications between the parties and
7-Eleven on June 27, 2002 and thereafter, except for the result thereof The Court should further
exclude evidence regarding the propriety ofthe creation or maintenance of AMS (or QMS) under any
rules of conduct of 7-Eleven Corp., insofar as it is admitted that 7-Eleven sought no relief with
respect thereto, despite investigations conducted after June 27,2002 and prior to October, 2002
Insofar as it is admitted that the business relationship of AMS and 7-Eleven was continued
2
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between QMS and 7-Eleven following the purchase by defendants of plaintiffs* share of AMS,
without altering the nature or value of the business purchased by defendants from plaintiffs, all other
matters regarding 7-Eleven are extraneous and should not be admitted.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2&h day of May, 2004.

6^ ^
E. Craig Smay T
Attorney for Plaintiffs

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26* of May, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE" to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage
prepaid, to:

Jeffrey R, Price (6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK& PRICE, PC.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84 111
ph; (801) 961-7400

E. Craig Smay.
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STOCK TRANSFER AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
TfflSDBSOLimONSBTTIJEMEOTAGRBBMBOT
by and between Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy J, Cowley, Kerin Cowley, Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. CAdvanced"), Straight Line Striping, Inc. ("Straight Line"), and
Listo, Inc. ("Listo"), collectively referred to herein as the ''Parties."
WHEREAS, the Parties, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, wish to resolve their differences in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth herein.
WHEREAS, the Parties wish to memorialize their oral contract which was entered into and
agreed upon by all Parties, according to the terms and conditions set forth herein,
WHEREAS, the Parties to date have complied with the terms and conditions set forth herein,
and agree to continue to comply with the terms and conditions until all terms and conditions set forth
herein have been satisfied.
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound and in an effort to settle
claims stemming from their dispute, hereby agree as follows:
1.

The Parties hereby agree that Tracy L Cowley and Slone D. Porter each owned fifty
percent (50%) of the company known as Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc,
Federal Tax LD. # 87-0548605,

2.

Tracy J, Cowley and Slone D* Porter, the two stockholders of the company, hereby
agree to dissolve Advanced.

3.

The Parties hereby agree that one-half QA) of the cash assetsfromAdvanced shall be
distributed to Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley. This amount shall consist of
previously allocated funds used by the Cowleys in three separate checks; $25,000 on
June 27, 2002, $16,500 on July 29,2002, and $11,800 on July 31, 2002; totaling
$53>300.

4.

Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter hereby agree to pay off Tracy Cowley's 2001
F350 vehicle, VIN # 1FTSX31F11EC34760. The payment will be $1,062.57 per
month until paid-oflfta full The current balance on the vehicle is $17,314.12.

5•

The Parties hereby agree that Slone D, Porter and Veralynn Porter incorporated a pew
company on July 1,2002 known as Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("Quality"),
Federal Tax LD. # 04-3690183, Slone ownsfiftypercent (50%) of the company, and
Veralynn owns fifty percent (50%) of the company.

6.

The Partie$ hereby agree that a cash payout of $240,000 will be paid out to Tracy J.
Cowley and Kerin Cowley by Slone D, Porter and Veralynn Porter through their new
company, Qualify.

7.

The Parties hereby agree that the $240,000 will be distributed in payments of $4,000
per month for five (5) years, beginning August 1 > 2002. Each $4,000 check is to be
paid to Straight Line.
Page 1 of 4
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8.

Slone D> Porter and Veralynn Porter, through their new company> Quality, hereby
agree to pay the health insurance premiums for Tracy J, Cowley and Kerin Cowley
through December 31, 2002. The health insurance plan is known as ValueCare
Health Insurance. The monthly premium payment is $724,40.

9.

The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line, Federal Tax LD. # 844429330, was
owned by Veralynn Porter and Kerin Cowley, each owning fifty percent (50%) each.

10.

The Parties hereby agree that the entire business of Straight Line, including A/R, A/P,
equipment, and all cash on hand was valued at $41,336.96 as of June 30,2002.

11.

Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to transfer her fifty percent (50%) ownership of
Straight Line to Kerin Cowley on July 1,2002.

12.

The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line is now completely owned by Kerin
Cowley as of July 1,2002.

13.

Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to be responsible for one-half (J4) of the taxes owed
by Straight Line through June 30,2002. Veralynn Porter will be filing a final K-1 at
the end of 2002.

14.

The Parties hereby agree that Listo, Federal tax IJX # 87-0657135, was owned in
equal shares of twenty-five percent (25%) by Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy
J. Cowley, and Kerin Cowley.

15.

The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter transferred their
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in Listo to Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley,
respectively, on July 1,2002.

16.

The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J, Cowley and Kerin Cowley took complete
control of Listo on July 1,2002.

17.

The Parties hereby agree that Slone D* Porter and Veralynn Porter are responsible
for one-forth (1/4), respectively, of the taxes of Listo, Inc., through the end of 2002.
Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter will each befilingafinalK-l at the end of 2002.

18.

The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J, Cowley and Kerin Cowley, as owners of Listo
will take possession of the rental property located at 294 South Center Street,
Midway, UT 84049, which was purchased for the price of $115,000.00.

19.

The Parties hereby agree that this Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement is a
written confirmation of the verbal agreement entered into by thfc parties on or about
June 22,2002;

20.

This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties,
including their successors and assigns.

21.

The Parties agree that this Agreement in no way constitutes or infers an admission
or concession of fault or liability by any party.
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22.

The Parties warrant and represent that the individuals whose signatures appear below
have been duly authorized to enter this Agreement on behalf of each party for whom
they sign.

23.

This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be
considered an original of the Agreement The Parties further agree to warrant that
signatures made and received via telefacsimile shall, for the convenience of the
Parties,
have the same force and effect as original signatures until such time as original
signatures of all the Parties may be obtained-

24,

The Parties warrant that no promise, inducement or agreement not expressed herein
has been made to them in connection with this Agreement This Agreement
contains the entire agreement between the Parties* All prior negotiations and
discussions arc merged herein as expressed by the written terms set forth herein,
and/or in any Exhibits identified and/or incorporated herein by reference. This
Agreement may not be modified, changed, or altered in any way except in a writing
signed by the Parties or their authorized representatives, which sets forth the
change(s) to be made, and the intent of the Parties to modify or amend this
Agreement

25,

If any provision of this Agreement, by way of this lostrument or otherwise, or the
application thereof, shall for any reason and to any extent be found invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this Agreement
with all remaining clauses, directives, provisions, Parties, and circumstances, with
my application thereof, shall continue in Ml force to the maximum extent
permissible under applicable law. Concerning any successfully challenged provision
in this instrument, insofar as it is reasonable and possible, shall be GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

26,

This Parties to this Agreement hereby agree that any action on this Agreement shall
be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction located in Heber City, Utah, which
is located in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Wasatch, State of Utah.

27.

The successful party to any action arising in connection with the enforcement of this
Agreement shall be awarded its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby set their hands and
respective seals on the day and date set forth below.

ADVANCED MAINTENANCE SERVICES INC.
—

By_
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STRAIGHT LINE STRIPING, INC.
B

y.

Date
LISTO, INC.

By_

Pate

INDIVIDUALLY

By_
Date

Stone D. Porter

By.
Date

Veralynn Porter

By_
Date

Tracy J. Cowley

By.
Date

Kerin Cowley
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Defendants also assert that plaintiffs* present position is somehow illegitimately contrary to
the position stated in the Complaint. This is nonsense.
The Complaint presumes that defendants had destroyed the copy of the $10,000/month
agreement they signed. They admit an attempt to destroy it Certainly, they did not voluntarily admit
the signature, and instead routinely produced an unsigned copy, consistent with plaintiffs presumption
that they would conceal it if they could, Plaintiffs were stunned when - apparently by mistake - the
document turned up in a document production.
It was plain - and remains plain - that as a matter of plenary and unarguable local law
defendants cannot prove either that there was an oral agreement to accept $41000/month> or anything
close to "partial performance" "strictly referable" to it. See cases cited in the Reply Memorandum.
In that circumstance, it was always more direct to simply seek a judicial dissolution, and
consistent with the fact that plaintiffs' share was always worth substantially more than $ 10,000/month
in any case. Counsel did not anticipate that the Court would ignore a written and fully executed
Stock Redemption Agreement, and other written admissions that the company had stock and
stockholders, on the basis of inadmissible (under the Parole Evidence and hearsay rules) claims that
someone told defendants the documents were not what they were on their face
The matter now devolves into a defense that everything done by the parties from and after
June 24, 2002 was "part performance'* under the Statute of Frauds of either an oral agreement
reached June 24th to pay $ 10,000/month or an oral agreement reached July 19* to pay 54,000/month,
Defendants do not dispute that the behavior of the parties June 24th - July 19, 2002, is entirely
consistent with the document signed June 24, 2002 They claim only that it is also consistent with
the "agreement" they alleged occurred July 19, 2002.
Defendants have never bothered to understand that "partial performance'" "strictly referable'7
to a "clearly defined" oral agreement is not some activity which might, or might not, be related to
what might, or might not, be a requirement of what might or might not be an agreement. Thus, they
presume that the showings necessary to demonstrate performance constituting acceptance of a written
4
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the law or in fact for the Plaintiffs' third attempt at summary judgment
concerning the same facts and evidence as has been previously argued unsuccessfully to this Court.
Defendants should not have to respond time, after time, after time, to the same unmeritorious argument
because Plaintiffs and their counsel are disappointed and contemptuous of the result.
In the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, they raised the same argument about the typed
counterpart signed by Mr. Porter, which matter was already considered by the Court. The Court has again
found that their remain issues of material fact concerning whether there was a meeting of the minds
sufficient to support an agreement, and the terms of that agreement, and whether the agreement reached by
the parties is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The Plaintiffs continually emphasize that the
agreement was subject to change depending upon the continuance of the business between the Porter's
company and 7-Eleven. However, in their latest contrived argument, they seek to have the Court
conveniently ignore the totality of the record for the period between June 22, 2002 and October 21, 2002,
and have taken the signed counterpart completely out of its factual context relating to the termination of
AMS by 7-Eleven, and the conversations Mr. Cowley had with 7-Eleven representatives after June 22,2002
and prior to July 19, 2002. The Cowley's latest argument is simply a tortured, unreasonably limited
commentary on a broader complex set of undisputed facts which has already been determined - twice - by
this Court to be without merit for purposes of summary judgment. There is nothing new before the Court
to support some new ruling. The Court has ruled, and the case should proceed to trial as scheduled on these
issues.
The Court should note at this point that the Plaintiffs have completely abandoned the theories
underlying the Complaint by which they commenced this action. Plaintiffs, in the Complaint claimed that
there was no oral or other agreement reached between the parties, and based upon the lack of an agreement
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were seeking judicial dissolution of AMS. Now, without any amendment to the Complaint, they are wholly
relying on the existence of an agreement which is nowhere mentioned in the Complaint, and which is based
solely upon their spin on the facts established by this Court in denying their two prior summary judgment
requests. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways, where they simply seem to be adopting a new legal theory
of the moment as they deem convenient in order to avoid having to bring their claims to trial. The Plaintiffs'
latest attempt at summary judgment lacks credibility because the Plaintiffs' cannot evenfigureout what it
is they are claiming or suing for in this case at this point, because the record evidence and the court's prior
rulings have resulted in a finding that there was an agreement, which completely eliminates the Plaintiffs'
position set forth in the Complaint. Plaintiffs latest spin on its motion for summary judgment is merely an
inappropriate attempt at damage control where their previous theories have wholly failed to cajole
Defendants into paying them more money than was agreed to on July 19, 2002.
Plaintiffs' have completely mischaracterized the facts and Defendants' defense on those facts to
their latest theory. The alleged written agreement on which Plaintiffs now seek to rely was not signed by
Plaintiff Tracy Cowley. Not only was it not signed, but Mr. Cowley, in his own handwriting indicated his
lack of assent to its terms by stating that he had issues to discuss. Thereafter, Mr. Porter, crumpled up the
paper and threw it away. It would not exist, except for the fact that Mrs. Porter retrieved itfromthe garbage
and kept it in her ownfile,unbeknownst to either Slone Porter or Tracy Cowley. There is no evidence that
either Tracy Cowley or Slone Porter ever intended to be bound by the terms of that writing after June 24,
2002, and particularly after 7-Eleven fired Tracy Cowley and AMS after Mr. Cowley's telephone
conversation with Ann Atkin. There is no evidence of mutual assent to the terms of that writing. The
Plaintiffs now only argue otherwise for their own convenience and out of desperation having lost the issue
on whether there was some agreement. There latest argument simply begs the question as to whether there
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6.

Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter agreed to dissolve AMS.

7.

The Porters have performed part of the agreement by making monthly payments

on the Cowleys' truck, and by making payments of $4,000 per month to SLS beginning August 5,
2002, paying the Cowleys' health insurance premiums through December 31, 2002, transferring a
piece of property owned by Listo, Inc. to the Cowley Family Trust, transferring ownership of two
additional Ford trucks, and transferring Tracy Cowley's life insurance policyfromAMS to SLS.
RULING
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law," Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A corporation may be dissolved voluntarily if (1) no stock has been issued, an act of a
majority of its directors or a majority of its incorporators is sufficient to dissolve a corporation,
Utah Code § 16-10a-1401,or (2) stock has been issued, a vote of the majority of the shareholders
is sufficient to dissolve a corporation, Utah Code § 16-10a-1402. The Courtfindsthat there is a
material dispute of fact regarding whether AMS issued stock.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that a verbal buy-out agreement was reached,
but they disagree as to the materials terms of the agreement. The Courtfindsthat there is a
material dispute of fact as to which offer was accepted as the buy-out agreement between the
parties.
The Courtfindsthat all buy-out offers violate the Statute of Frauds. The Statue of Frauds
requires that any agreement regarding interests in real estate or agreements that cannot be
performed within one year to be in writing or they are void. Utah Code § 25-5-1, 4(1). Both
alleged agreements consist of the transfer of property and payments to be made over a period of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years. These agreements would be void under the Statue of Frauds unless the agreement has been
partially performed. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). The Courtfindsthat there
are material disputes of fact regarding whether sufficient part-performance has been completed
that would allow this Court to enforce the oral agreement.
CONCLUSION
The Courtfindsthat there are material issues of fact regarding the issues in this case,
therefore, the Court hereby denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for
Plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling, submit it to counsel for
Defendant, and then to the Court for execution.

DATED this ^

day of February, 2*04.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRACY AND KERIN COWLEY,
Plaintiffs,
RULING
v.
SLONE AND VERALYNN PORTER,

Case No. 030500244
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Defendants'
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. The Court has reviewed thefile,considered the
memorandafiledby the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, issues the following:
RULING
Defendants' brought their Motion to Reconsider under Rule 59 and Rule 52 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court notes that Motions to Reconsider are disfavored, however,
Rule 59 allows the Court to amend the judgment if there has been an error of law.
Additionally, the Courtfindsthat Defendant has failed to show that this Court erred as a
matter of law. This Court can grant Motions for Summary Judgment only if there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has found
and stillfindsthat there are genuine disputes as to material facts of this case, such as what
agreement was reached by the parties, whether the parties agreed to dissolve AMS, and whether
AMS issued stock. The Court's mistake on the date of additional offers does not change the fact
that are genuine issues of material fact in this case, therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
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For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider is denied, and that Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is denied. Counsel for
Defendant prepare an Order consistent with this ruling, submit it to Defendants for review, and
then to the Court for execution.

DATED this

4
/

day of February,s2004

DONALDTTEYRE,
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Fax Number (801) 539-8544

STAT."
W.V.

. J :..'Y

2KM.UM5 f'H9*

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
Slone and Veralynn PORTER.
Case Number: 030500244
Defendants.
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr.

The Court has amended its Ruling of December 17,2003, apparently concluding, as argued
by defendants, that plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was cognizable only insofar as it was
treated as a Rule 52 motion to correct mistakes infindings.Thus, the Court, regarding the Motion
as "a request to correct a mistake", "has changed the incorrect dates".
In fact, "Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their positions with
respect to any orders or decisions as long as nofinaljudgment has been rendered." Brookside Mobile
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968,973 (Utah 2002) quoting U.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen 7, Inc.,
990 P.2d 945 (Utah 1999); Hall v. Utah State Bd. Of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 962 (Utah 2001)
("[I]t is well settled law that a trial court isfreeto reassess its decisions at any point prior to entry
of afinaljudgment or order," quoting Ron Shepard, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650,654 (Utah 1994).
In Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 891 (U. Apps. 1995), it is said that
"Reviewing courts will analyze such motions for reconsideration in accordance with their substance
and purpose", and " . . . the Davis' motion to reconsider is the functional equivalent of a Rule 59
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motion requesting a new trial" Thus, a "motion to reconsider" (by that or any equivalent name) is
appropriate, not only under Rule 52, but on any of the grounds stated in Rule 59, U.R.C.P., and
suffices to alter the entire ruling.
In fact, plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was specifically brought under Rule 59, and
recited three grounds listed in the rule (Rule 59(a)(4), (6), and (7)), namely, mistake of fact, mistake
of law, and new evidence. All three grounds were either admitted or wholly uncontested. Defendants
admit that the Court's December 17thfindingscontain mistakes of fact, and that Slone Porter signed
the written counteroffer tendered by plaintiffs June 24, 2002, a fact not previously acknowledged.
They do not contest that a writing signed by a single party charged with performance satisfies the
Statute of Frauds, or that the question whether acts which are all admitted constitute "part
performance" under the Statute of Frauds is a question of law.
The reason motions to "reconsider" are not entertained unless based upon factors which allow
correction of judgments under the Rules, is to encourage finality {Davis v. Grand County Service
Area, supra); on the other hand, such motions lie where based upon such factors, at least because
otherwise such factors justify immediate amendment and re-filing of the proceeding sought to be
reconsidered.

A motion for summary judgment may always be renewed where previously

unacknowledged facts become undisputed, and the applicable law changes in response.
Insofar as the Court did not reconsider the matter in light of the admitted change of facts, and
that such facts in light of the uncontested law render the December 17th Ruling moot, plaintiffs resubmit these matters byfilingthe following further Motion for Summary Judgment.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. June 22, 2002, defendants offered plaintiff, among other things, $10,000/month for five
years for plaintiffs' share of Advanced Maintenance Systems ("AMS"). Ruling 12/17/03, Undisputed
Fact No. 14.
2. Plaintiffs did not immediately accept the terms offered by defendants. (This eliminates
2
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Disputed Material Fact No. 4, Amended Ruling of February 9, 2004.)
3. June 24, 2002, plaintiffs made a counteroffer, adding provisions relating to noncompetition and vehicle payments. Id., Undisputed Fact No. 16. Veralynn Porter reduced the
counteroffer to writing.
4. June 24, 2002, defendant Slone Porter "in anticipation of Tracy Cowley accepting the
proposal" signed the counteroffer as typed by Veralynn Porter. Defendants' Opposition to Motion
for Reconsideration at 3; Exhibit "A" hereto.
5. Plaintiffs accepted, by orally representing that the typed terms of this counteroffer were
acceptable to them. Ruling 12/17/03, Undisputed Fact No. 16; Defendants' Supplemental
Memorandum 11/14/03, Material Fact No. 3. This eliminates Disputed Material Fact No. 6,
Amended Ruling 02/09/04. Mr. Cowley indicated that he wished Mrs. Cowley, who was away, to
be present when he signed; defendants assert that no approval of Mrs. Cowley was necessary.
6. Plaintiffs then fully performed the $10,000/month agreement on their side by turning the
business over to defendants and vacating the premises, by June 29,2002, more than two weeks prior
to any alleged discussion of purchasing plaintiffs' share for $4,000/month. Defendants accepted this
performance without reservation. Second Affidavit of Slone Porter, H 111.
7. Defendants then partially performed the agreement on their side by transferring bank and
investment accounts, transferring realty, and continuing payments on vehicles and insurance, prior
to any alleged offer to pay $4,000/month. Id. atffi{109, 121, 127.
8. Defendants assert that on June 27,2002, AMS was "fired" by Johan de Besch of 7-Eleven,
its main customer. The facts underlying this assertion are:
a.

On June 25, 2002, following the agreement reached June 24, 2002, defendants

incorporated Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS"), with all ofthe stock in the names of defendants.
Id. at H 122.
b. On June 27,2002, defendants and 7-Eleven agreed that the business of AMS for 7-Eleven
would be continued by the employees of AMS, except the Cowleys, using the equipment, expertise,
3
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offices and management of AMS, under the name of QMS, on a "time and materials" basis, pending
completion of an investigation of defendants' prior behavior. This followed Cowleys' representation
to 7-Eleven that they would withdraw. That is, defendants, as QMS, received everything part of
AMS - its business with 7-Eleven, its employees, its equipment, its offices, its accounts, its goodwill except plaintiffs Cowley. Id. atffi[ 102-103, 106, 111, 134.
c. In October, 2002, upon favorable completion of the investigation, the contracts with 7Eleven previously held by AMS were renewed with QMS.
d. There is no evidence that the business of AMS transferred to QMS was worth a penny less
after June 27, 2002 than before June 22, 2002, or produced less income from 7-Eleven.
9. July 19, 2002, defendants proposed that they pay plaintiffs $4,000/month for five years,
other considerations remaining as previously agreed. Second Affidavit of Slone Porter, ]f 98, 112114. Plaintiffs assert that this was proposed and agreed as a temporary discount, until 7-Eleven
confirmed that defendants could continue to work for 7-Eleven. The latter occurred in October,
2002. Defendants claim that it was agreed by Mr. Cowley, but not by Mrs. Cowley, as a permanent
discount. Immediately upon hearing plaintiflFs' response, defendants executed andfiledArticles of
Dissolution for AMS, representing that it had no shares or shareholders. Amended Ruling 02/09/04,
Undisputed Fact No. 22. Defendants subsequently tendered to plaintiffs a written "Share Transfer
and Settlement Agreement", designating Cowley and Porter as the "shareholders" of AMS, and
purporting to set out the terms "agreed" on July 19, 2002. Defendants' Memorandum 09/29/03,
Exhibit "29".
10. Following July 19, 2002, defendants made four payments of $4,000 to plaintiffs before
plaintiffs, in October, 2002, objected that such payments were insufficient, and threatened suit.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
For purposes of the Statute of Frauds, a written contract is enforceable if it is "signed" by the

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

party against whom enforcement is sought.1 "The following agreements are void unless the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement

" § 25-5-4, U.C.A. (1953). This does not mean that the contract

is not subject to other defenses. It means that a written contract "signed" by the party against whom
enforcement is sought, and regardless of whether it is signed by the opposite party, is not within the
Statute of Frauds. Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 34 (U. Apps. 1993); cf.
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).2 That the signing party now claims that the
contract was not "executed,"or valid, or is avoidable (because not delivered after signing, or
otherwise) is a contract defense; the Statute of Frauds is satisfied by the signature. LeVine v.
Whitehouse, 109 Pac 2, 5-6 (Utah 1910).
Of course, one who signs an agreement, and thus procures full performance from the other
party, cannot then disavow the obligation to pay on the ground that the performing party did not sign
the document. Commercial Union, supra.

PERFORMANCE
A contract is not defective for lack of "mutuality" because it is only signed by one party.
LeVine v. Whitehouse, supra. A party may indicate acceptance in other ways, including orally and
may obtain specific performance so long as he is prepared to perform on his side. Id.\ Commercial
Union, supra. The latter ceases to be an issue where the non-signing party has fully performed. Id.
1

"The memorandum prescribed by the Statute of Frauds is usually required by the Statute
to be signed by the 'party to be charged' . . . [t]he quoted words are held to refer, not to the party
or parties 'charged' with the contract, but to the party or parties 'charged' in the action; that is,
the defendant or defendants. And, the fact that the plaintiff has not signed the memorandum does
not affect his right to maintain the action." LeVine v. Whitehoase, 109 Pac 2, 6 (Utah 1910).
2

"The Statute of Frauds does not reach the substance of contracts and render them valid
or invalid; it simply furnishes a rule of evidence. Whenever, therefore, any agreement is enforced
against a defendant who has signed it by a plaintiff who has not, it cannot be said that the
agreement, so far as it purports to bind the plaintiff, is a nullity. In a suit against him the statute
does no more than require a certain kind of proof, in case he avails himself of it as a defense. The
defense, however, is wholly a personal one; and, if he neglects to set it up, the agreement would
be established against him notwithstanding the statute." LeVine, supra, 109 Pac. at 6.
5
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Here, it is conceded not only that defendants signed the agreement as an acceptance presuming that
plaintiffs accepted, but that plaintiffs indicated their acceptance orally, and then fully performed,
before any demand for reduction of the price was made.
Defendants insist that Mrs. Cowley need never have accepted defendants' offer to buy; only
Mr. Cowley had anything to sell. They also insist that Mr. Cowley, on June 24,2002, "accepted" the
terms which he then proposed and which Veralynn Porter had then typed and Slone Porter had then
signed. See Exhibit "A"; Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum 11/14/03, Material Fact No. 3.
Insofar as plaintiffs did not disavow this acceptance (they have denied only acceptance of the
subsequent offer of $4,000/month), defendants cannot.3 Defendants concede that they signed
plaintiffs' counteroffer, intending to accept, and that plaintiffs then orally affirmed their acceptance.
Ifplaintiffs now choose not to assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense, defendants cannot assert it
for them. LeVine, supra, 109 Pac. at 6.
Further, the only performance required of plaintiffs Cowley under the "Partnership Buy-out",
Exhibit "A", is that implied by paragraph 1 ("Slone Porter will keep all Advanced Maintenance
Services, Inc. as it currently exists.") and required by paragraph 7 ("Cowley family telephones will
be returned July 14, 2002"). Both have been accomplished by timely surrender of the phones and by
turning over the business no later than June 29,2002. That plaintiffs fully performed in these respects
is conceded. That defendants fully accepted this performance before anyone suggested that it was
worth a penny less than $10,000/month for five years is equally conceded.
Any question that might be based upon the claim that AMS was "fired" by 7-Eleven on or
about June 27,2002, is immaterial. Whatever "fired" means in this claim, it did not prevent the work
of AMS for 7-Eleven being transferred to defendants, acting as QMS, on a temporary "time and
3

Plaintiffs have indicatedfromthe outset that, under the Statute of Frauds, a far better
case of "part performance" of an agreement to pay $10,000/month forfiveyears was shown,
since defendants admitted making this offer, and then admitted that plaintiffs had accepted it.
Until defendants admitted plaintiffs' acceptance (in proceedings on plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment) it was unnecessary to pursue "part performance": the Court could simply
value the interest co— in a judicial dissolution proceeding. To avoid a fair evaluation, defendants
claim "part performance" of a $400 deal, acceptance of which they can't prove.
6
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materials" basis. No one claims that basis produced less income for the work. No one claims that
QMS could have done the work without the employees, offices, equipment and expertise of AMS.
It is admitted that this condition was imposed by 7-Eleven as much because of questions about prior
behavior of defendants as because of questions about plaintiffs, and that such questions were resolved
in favor of AMS by October, 2002. The latter resulted in re-institution of contracts for the 7-Eleven
work. There is no claim that these contracts were upon less favorable terms. That is, there is no
question that plaintiffs performed the transfer of AMS required by the "Partnership Buy-Out", Exhibit
"A", or that the transfer resulted in any diminishment in value. It does not matter that such value was
not confirmed until October, 2002: the only performance required of plaintiffs was the transfer, which
had occurred in June, 2002.
Plaintiffs' acceptance of the $10,000/month agreement was long ago established by
performance. Commercial Union, supra, 863 P.2d at 34; R.L Daum Const Co, v. Child, 247 P.2d
817, 819-20 (Utah 1952); Walters v. Natl Beverage Co., 402 P.2d 524, 525 (Utah 1967).
The obvious fact is that, prior to plaintiffs' transfer of the business, defendants' choices were
two: insist upon an unfair price, such as $260,000, and plaintiffs would refuse to sell, devaluing the
interests of both; pay plaintiffs a fair price, and the interests of both would be preserved, as actually
occurred. Having obtained a transfer by trick, defendants now attempt to enforce a cheap price by
trick; but the law declines to enforce such agreements, either as without consideration or as contracts
of adhesion.

APPLICABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The agreement between the parties to buy and sell plaintiffs' share of AMS for $ 10,000/month
for five years fully satisfies the Statute of Frauds. It is shown by a writing signed by the party
charged, and has been fully performed by the charging party. It is fully enforceable.
A prior agreement on the subject being shown, a subsequent agreement could only function
as a modification. Any modification - such as the alleged July 19,2002 agreement to buy and sell at
7
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$4,000/month for five years - was also required to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. S.C.M. Land Co.
v. Watkins&Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986).
More importantly, even a subsequent modification which satisfied the Statute ofFrauds would
have to be supported by a new consideration. That is, in the present case, some diminishment in the
value of the interest conveyed resulting from the behavior of plaintiffs, justifying a decrease in the
amount payable to plaintiffs. Mclntyre v. AjaxMining Co., 60 Pac. 552, 556 (Utah 1899); Brodie
v. Gen. Chemical Corp., 934P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1997); Shanghai Investment Co. v. AltekaCo., Ltd.,
993 P.2d 516 (Ha. 2000); Bennett v. Farmers'Ins. Co., 26P.3d 785 (Or. 2001). In fact, defendants
do not even claim that the value of AMS changed between June 24, 2002 and July 19, 2002.
Thus, while it might be said that questions of fact remain regarding what happened on July
19, 2002, and thereafter, they are not substantial questions. Whatever happened, it could not have
resulted in the contract alleged by defendants.

CONCLUSIONS
Defendants orally proposed to purchase plaintiffs' interest in AMS for $ 10,000/month for five
years, with supplementary terms. Plaintiffs made some oral additions to the supplementary terms, and
counter-offered. Defendants orally accepted the changes. Defendant Veralynn Porter then typed the
agreement, and defendant Slone Porter signed it. Plaintiffs orally indicated their acceptance.
All of that occurred on June 24, 2002, before the parties met on June 27, 2002, with Mr. de
Besch, of 7-Eleven, and any decisions were made regarding a continuing relationship between 7Eleven and the parties.
Mr. de Besch, on June 27th or thereafter, decided that, in view of plaintiffs' prior agreement
to withdraw from AMS, the business of 7-Eleven could continue to be done by the employees,
equipment and management of AMS. Defendants, on June 25, 2002, immediately following the
agreement with plaintiffs, had incorporated QMS, to which they then transferred the employees,
equipment, offices and, after June 27,2002, the remaining accounts of AMS, including the 7-Eleven
8
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account. QMS then performed the work of AMS for 7-Eleven. In October, 2002, contracts for the
7-Eleven work were re-issued to QMS.
By June 29, 2002, plaintiffs had performed the agreement of June 24,2002, on their side, by
relinquishing the business to defendants. Defendants accepted this performance without reservation
and commenced compliance on their side by transferring funds and realty. Defendants could not have
complied with their agreement to carry on the 7-Eleven work after June 27, had plaintiffs not then
fully performed.
Defendants assert that on July 19, 2002, they offered to pay plaintiff only $4,000/month for
five years. They do not deny that they had previously offered $10,000/month for five years, nor do
they withdraw their assertion that plaintiff had previously accepted the $10,000/month offer. They
do not deny that, by July 19, 2002, plaintiffs had fully performed under the $10,000/month
agreement. There is no evidence that the parties had left it open to defendants to bargain to lower
the price after the transfer.
Instead, it appears that they claim that they retained a right to rescind the prior agreement,
and to substitute for it a different, $4,000/month agreement, so long as plaintiffs accepted. Thus,
Slone Porter asserts, without support of other evidence, that Tracy Cowley on July 19, 2002,
accepted the $4,000/month offer. Tracy Cowley denies it.
The simple and complete answer to any claim of rescission and replacement is that even if
defendants' claims about what happened on July 19,2002, were true, it would not suffice to rescind
the prior agreement, or to substitute a $4,000/month agreement. Rescission of an old agreement and
replacement with a new agreement must be supported with new consideration.
Defendants at first seemed to assert that after June 27, 2002, AMS had disappeared; thus, it
was generous of them to pay plaintiffs anything. QMS, they claimed, was a wholly new thing. The
undisguisable fact, however, is that QMS at the outset had no employees, equipment, premises,
management, expertise, goodwill, or accounts which had not immediately previously belonged to
AMS. Moreover, the change in name, while convenient, was not required.
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Defendants now seem to assert that consideration for reducing the payment requirement of
the June 24th agreement was provided by a reduction in value of the interest conveyed, due to AMS
being "fired" by 7-Eleven on June 27, 2002. The word "fired", however, is defendants', and merely
reflects that the willingness of 7-Eleven to continue the business it had done with AMS required the
withdrawal of plaintiffs. As the Cowleys' withdrawal was fully comprehended - indeed, required by the agreement to sell at $10,000/month, the coincidence of 7-Eleven's requirement did not alter
the agreement of the parties.
There is no evidence that what transpired between QMS and 7-Eleven after June 27, 2002,
was different in any degree from what would have happened between them had defendants not
brought 7-Eleven into the matter. (Indeed, it seems plain enough that defendants went to 7-Eleven
simply to create pressure to enforce their demand to buy plaintiffs' share of AMS, and that they
would never have done so had they supposed that the result would be to diminish the value of what
they got.) In particular, there is no evidence that QMS earned a penny lessfromwork for 7-Eleven
than it would have earned had 7-Eleven not been informed, or not objected to any past employment
of any party.
In short, the evidence shows no diminishment of any kind in the value of the interest for which
defendants agreed to pay $10,000/month, and which they received. While defendants insinuate that
plaintiffs were forced, on July 19, 2002, to "fire sale" their interest, this simply begs the question
whether plaintiffs had not previously sold the interest by an enforceable agreement. Plaintiffs then
had neither need nor obligation to "fire sell". Defendants then had no excuse for refusing to pay what
they had agreed to pay. Defendants, moreover, cannot show that they would not have been pleased
to enforce their prior bargain, had plaintiffs then put the interest on the open market.

10
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this / / ^ day of March, 2004.

/

1

ralg Smay1
Attorney for RJamtifk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
"7*
I hereby certify that on the / / - - day of March, 20041 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT" to be mailed by U.S. mail,first-classpostage prepaid, to:

Jeffrey R. Price (6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, PC.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ph: (801) 961-7400
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E. Craig Smay #2985
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH,
WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kertn COWLEY,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiffs,
V

Slone and Veralynn PORTER
Defendants.

Case Number' 030500244
Judge- Donald Eyre, Jr

THE RULING OF DECEMBER 17, 2003. SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED
The Ruling of the Court herein December 17,2003, should be reconsidered pursuant to Rules
52 and 59, U.R C P. for three readily established reasons*
1. The Court has mistaken the dates of certain events, which are clearly admitted,
2 The Court has treated as a dispute of material fact the applicability to certain admitted facts
of the Statute of Frauds. Applicability of the Statute of Frauds is a question of law.
3. Defendants have finally produced the signed writing which voids defendants* claims of an
agreement of plaintiffs to accept $4>000/month for their half of Advanced Maintenance Services
(UAMS"X and establishes a contract of defendants to pay $I0,000/month
The position of defendants here appears to be that while defendants, on June 22,2002, orally
offered to pay plaintiffs SlO^OO/month for five years ($600,000) for their half interest in AMS, and
while plaintiffs orally accepted this offer on June 24, 2002, any agreement resulting was revoked and
superceded on July 19, 2002, when defendants orally offered, and plaintiffs orally accepted,
$4>000/month for five years ($240,000). The latter agreement is said to be outside the Statute of
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Frauds because thereafter defendants made, and plaintiffs accepted, several payments of
$4,000/month.
Thus, the Court identifies the issue in the matter as "which offer was accepted as the buy-out
agreement between the parties." Ruling 12/17/03 at 5.
The truth, however, is that:
1. June 22, 2000, defendants offered $10,000/month for five years,
2> June 24, 2000, plaintiffs advised defendants that they would accept this offer, with some
modifications.
3. Defendants then (June 24,2002) accepted the changes proposed by plaintiffs, reduced the
agreement to writing, and executed the writing, See Exhibit "A" hereto*
4. Plaintiffs did not execute the writing because Mrs. Cowley was not able to be present.
They re-affirmed their acceptance, however, and thereafter fully performed their pari of the
agreement before defendants, on July 19, 2002, proposed to pay only $4,000/month.
Since the Statute ofFrauds (§§ 25-5-1,25~5~4( 1), U.C. A, 1953) requires only that the writing
setting out the agreement be signed by the party to be bound, Exhibit "A" hereto satisfies the Statute
of Frauds, and is fully binding upon defendants. Plaintiffs' acceptance has been shown by full
performance on their part. See CommercialUnion Association v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29,34 (U.Apps,
1993), Plaintiffs, therefore, are entitled to fully enforce Exhibit "A".
An agreement subject to, and which satisfies the Statute ofFrauds, can only be revoked or
superceded by an agreement which satisfies the Statute ofFrauds. SwSCMLandCo.

v. Watkins&

Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986), citing numerous cases. Even if there were an exception to
this rule for revocations said to be outside the Statute ofFrauds because of partial performance,
defendants* claim of an agreement to accept $4,000/month cannot succeed.
As only the $4,000/month payments made by defendants after July 19, 2002, and before
plaintiff protested them in October, 2002, could be regarded as "exclusively referable*' to an
agreement to revoke the earlier agreement to pay $10,000/month, they could not constitute "partial
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performance" avoiding the Statute of Frauds, See below. The Court is bound to so rule, as
applicability of the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. Spears v. Warr% infra

THE RULING CONTAINS MISTAKES OF FACT AND LAW
In concluding that there is a dispute of material fact which offer was accepted, the Court has
confused the admitted dates of offers and acceptances in this matter.
It is admitted that defendants, on June 22,2002, offered to pay plaintiffs $ 10,000/month for
five years ($600,000) for their half of ("AMS"), and that, on June 24, 2002, plaintiffs accepted this
offer. Undisputed Material Facts Nos. 14, 16, Ruling 12/17/03 Defendants cite Tracy Cowley's
deposition testimony in admitting the latter fact (Defendants' Supplemental Statement of Material
Facts, 11/24/03, No 3), and the testimony is unequivocal that the date of acceptance was June 24,
2002.l There was not then pending defendants' subsequent offer to pay only $4,000/montlv
It is admitted that the second offer of $4,000/month was not made until July 19, 2002 2 The
Court's Disputed Material Fact No. 6 is simply mistaken in this respect. The Cowleys' acceptance
ofJune 24,2002 could not have applied to this later offer. Nevertheless, defendants claim that Tracy
called later the same night (July 19, 2002) and told Slone Porter that the $4;000/month offer was
accepted. Neither the offer nor the acceptance are in writing A writing (denominated "Stock
Purchase .. , v ) was submitted by counsel months later, but not signed.
The Court has indicated that, in the absence of signed documents, and in view of the Statute
of Frauds, there remains a question which proposal - the one for $10,000/month, or the one for
$4>000/month - was accepted, In fact, by conceding Tracy Cowley's testimony on the point,

1

See the pages of Deposition of Tracy Cowley 11/18/03, attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" It is admitted that Veralynn Porter then typed out the agreement, inserting terms sought by
Cowleys, and tendered it to Tracy Cowley. Affidavit of Slone Porter 09/29/03, pgs. 92-93;
Affidavit of Veralynn Porter 09/29/03, pgs. 79-81. Undisputed Material Fact No 16, Rulmg
12/17/03,
2

Affidavit of Slone Porter 09/29/03, pgs, 112-114; Affidavit of Veralynn Porter 09/29/03,
pgs, 100-103.
3
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defendants admit that the first $10,000/month proposal was accepted before the second,
$4,000/month> proposal was made That leaves only a dispute about whether the $4,000/month
proposal was also "accepted", or whether the conversation about paying $4,000/month could have
revoked the agreement at $10,00Q/month.

DEFENDANTS HAVE CONCEALED A CRITICAL FACT. RECENTLY DISCLOSED
What defendants have concealed is that the $!0,000/month offer transcribed by Veralynn
Porter was signed by Slone Porter. The document attached to defendants' prior responses is an
unsigned copy.
Tracy Cowley's testimony, cited by defendants, is that when he met with the Porters on June
24, 2002, he advised the Porters that Mrs. Cowley was away on a prior engagement, but that they
had discussed the $10,000/month offer, and would accept it, with certain changes The Court has
noted these changes' $30,000 for a new truck and no non-compete clause Undisputed Material Fact
No. 16, Ruling 12/17/03. The Porters accepted the changes, and Veralynn Porter typed the
agreement Slone Porter then signed the agreement. See Exhibit *A» attached hereto; Deposition
of Tracy Cowley U/18/03, pgs. 190-197,199-200 (pages attached as Exhibit "B" hereto),
Mr Cowley then said that he would prefer to sign when Mrs. Cowley returned shortly, citing
the example of William Berg, the original third partner, who had offended his wife by signing a buyout agreement without informing her,
The parties next meet with the representatives of 7-Eleven Corporation ("7-Eleven") on June
27, 2002, It does not appear that even defendants claim an agreement on this date, except to perform
an inventory, The Court's Disputed Material Fact No. 5 is also mistaken. Defendants have
frequently asserted that Tracy Cowley advised 7-Eleven in these meetings of the June 24th agreement
Mr. Cowley testifies that Slone Porter said he had shown the agreement to the 7-Eleven
representative, Mr. de Besch Tracy Cowley Deposition at 200. In reliance upon an agreement
having been made to buy out Mr Cowley, 7-Eleven agreed to continue doing business with AMS
4
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(now re-incorporated as Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS")), dependant on a further
investigation of any past wrongdoing by AMS,
Plaintiffs then fully performed their part of the bargain* before defendants claim that they
offered only $4,000/month. Plaintiffs turned over the employees, equipment, premises and business
of AMS to defendants no later than June 29, 2002. Affidavit of Slone Porter 09/29/03, pg. 111,
Plaintiffs, however, retained only the handwritten draft ofthe agreement prepared by Veralynn
Porter prior to typing the agreement. When defendants thereafter denied the agreement, and
produced only an unsigned copy, plaintiffs assumed that all signed copies had been lost or destroyed.
In fact, the document signed by Slone Porter was preserved by defendants. It was not produced or
disclosed before now. It was included in documents finally produced by defendants December 15,
2003.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES ONLY DEPENDANTS SIGNATURE
The applicable Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-4(1), U.C.A (1953) is as follows.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, sigftecfby the party to be charged with
the agreement: (1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one y e a r . . . .
(Emphasis added,) (Section 25-5-1 requires the signature of "the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring" an interest in realty.)
To avoid the Statute of Frauds, the agreement need only be in a writing signed by the "party
to be charged". Where oral acceptance by the other party is acknowledged, and full performance by
the other party has occurred, a writing signed by the party to be charged with the remaining
performance suffices. Commercial Union Assoc, supra. 863 P.2d at 34 Here, acceptance and
performance by plaintiffs is acknowledged, The production, at last, of the agreement signed by
defendant Slone Porter, the party to be charged with the remaining performance, is, therefore,
conclusive,
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MODIFICATION OF A WRITTEN AGREEMENT MUST BE IN WRITING
But defendants will say that whatever happened on July 19, 2002, when theyfirstproposed
to pay only $4,000/month, constituted a modification of the original $10,000/month agreement.
Utah law is entirely clear that a contract subject to the Statute of Frauds can only be rescinded
and replaced where the new agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be bound. SCbALand Co.
v. Waikim & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986); Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29
(U. App. 1993). No such writing reflecting an agreement at $4>000/month exists, In fact, the
evidence here establishes a written agreement to pay $10,000/month forfiveyears ($600,000), fully
enforceable against the Porters.

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS A QUESTION OF LAW. NOT OF FACT
The Court's "disputed material fact" number 8 regarding part performance of a $4>000/morrth
agreement by defendants, is neither a question of fact, nor disputed. The occurrence of the various
acts and payments listed is not disputed. Whether such acts constitute "part performance'* satisfying
the statute of frauds, is not a question of fact. It is unequivocally a question of law. "The
applicability of the statute of frauds is a question of law

. ." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751

(Utah 2002).
It is an undisputed fact that the only performance by defendants not related to an earlier
"promise" to pay $10,000/month, is four payments of $4,000/month apiece That is because (a) it
is impossible to show that "performance** - transfer of realty, payment of insurance, etc, - agreed
upon in connection with an earlier promise to pay $ 10,000/month, and not thereafter altered, was in
exclusive reliance upon a later "promise" to take $4,000/month; and (b) once such payments were
contested in October, 2002, defendants could avoid "detrimental reliance" by declining to make
further payments (and returning the business).
As a matter of law, a short series of payments which can be refunded is not sufficient part
performance to take an oral agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. It must be shown thatvt
6
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the

failure to perform on the part of the promisor [Cowleys] would result in fraud on the performer
[Porters] who relied, since damages would be inadequate,7 Id Where damages in the form of a
refund are available, specific performance is not
"Part performance** is a term of art, which does not signify any performance which can be
claimed to reflect an agreement.3 The Court is not at liberty to submit such evidence to a jury (which
cannot exercise equity jurisdiction) to make a determination in equity whether it is sufficient to avoid
the statute of frauds. Where the entirety of what is claimed to be part performance is admitted, the
decision, in equity, of applicability of the statute is for the court.

THE RULING OF DECEMBER 17™ DOES NOT DISPOSE OF THE MOTION FOR SUMM ARY
JUDGMENT
The Court has failed to determine plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, The claim of
disputed questions of fact has never been a sufficient defense to summary judgment in this case since
all facts related to "part performance* are undisputed. Conceding the occurrence of everything
defendants can claim as acts exclusively referable to the alleged promise to accept $4>000/month,
revoking the admitted agreement to pay $10,000/month, for plaintiffs' share of AMS? it is plain that
they do not constitute "sufficient partial performance'* under the Statute of Frauds.
Defendants are bound by a written agreement to pay $10,000/month for five years. Such an
agreement could only be revoked by a writing signed by plaintiffs. Even if there were a partial
performance exception to the latter rule4, defendants cannot satisfy it, and the Court must so hold.
3

Spears v. Wan, 44 P 3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002):
The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is as follows. [1] the oral
contract ami its terms must be clear and definite, [2] the acts done in performance of
the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in reliance on
the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been
performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of
the promisor would result infraudon the performer who relied, since damages would
be inadequate. Reliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which could refer
exclusively to the contract..
4

White v. Fox 665 P,2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983), indicates that a fully executed oral
modification may be enforced where one party has induced the other to change position in
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Nor do the admitted facts permit a claim that somewhere in the process defendants withdrew
the $10,000/month offer. Defendants have recited their story many times without so claiming.
Moreover, the performance of plaintiffs' acceptance occurred immediately upon its oral
pronouncement, and was complete by June 29, 2002, when plaintiffs vacated the AMS premises.
Defendants could not have accepted this performance while withdrawing the offer which induced it
and making no new offer which could have been consideration for such performance until July 19,
2003.
Defendants have withheld a central fact from the Court, and the Ruling contains a mistake of
fact regarding dates of offers, and a mistake of law regarding applicability of the Statute of Frauds.
The Court should incorporate the fact that the agreement between the parties at $ J 0,000/month was
signed by defendants, and accepted orally and by fall performance by plaintiffs This constitutes a
binding written agreement, which could not have been revoked by defendants' alleged oral agreement
at $4,000. The latter, moreover, conceding everything defendants claim a$ "part performance" is
plainly unenforceable as a matter of law under the Statute of Frauds. The Court should so rule.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29* day of December, 2003.

2
E. Craig Smay
T~
Attorneyfor Plaintiffs
reliance upon on oral modification, then attempts to void the oral promise by insistence upon the
prior writing. There, plaintiffs real estate agents had induced their client to execute an irrevocable
one-for-one exchange of properties by orally promising not to assess realtor's fees. Defendant
would not have made the exchange, which produced no income with which to pay fees, except
upon waiver of the fees. Plaintiffs then sought to enforce the original broker's commission. Here,
defendants do not even claim an irrevocable change of position following the alleged promise to
accept $4,000/month: they simply paid money, which is readily refundable.
8
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Nor do the admitted facts permit a claim that somewhere in the process defendants withdrew
the $10,000/month offer. Defendants have recited their story many times without so claiming.
Moreover, the performance of plaintiffs' acceptance occurred immediately? upon its oral
pronouncement, and was complete by June 29, 2002, when plaintiffs vacated the AMS premises.
Defendants could not have accepted this performance while withdrawing the offer which induced it
and making no new offer which could have been consideration for such performance until July 19,
2003.
Defendants have withheld a central fact from the Court, and the Ruling contains a mistake of
fact regarding dates of offers, and a mistake of law regarding applicability of the Statute of Frauds.
The Court should incorporate the fact that the agreement between the parties at $10,000/month was
signed by defendants, and accepted orally and by full performance by plaintiffs- This constitutes a
binding written agreement, which could not have been revoked by defendants' alleged oral agreement
at $4,000. The latter, moreover, conceding everything defendants claim as "part performance" is
plainly unenforceable as a matter of law under the Statute of Frauds The Court should so rule,

RESPECTFULLY submitted (his 29th day of December, 2003

E, Craig Smay
Attorney for Plamtijffs
reliance upon on oral modification, then attempts to void the oral promise by insistence upon the
prior writing. There, plaintiffs real estate agents had induced their client to execute an irrevocable
one-for-one exchange of properties by orally promising not to assess realtor's fees. Defendant
would not have made the exchange, which produced no income with which to pay fees, except
upon waiver of the fees. Plaintiffs then sought to enforce the original broker's commission, Here,
defendants do not even claim an irrevocable change of position following the alleged promise to
accept $4,000/month; they simply paid money, which is readily refundable.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3 I s day of December, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION" to be mailed by U S mail,first-classpostage prepaid, to

Jeffrey R Price (6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK& PRICE, P.C.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ph: (801) 961-7400

;

c

'7
n.

/
s7

C^

E Craig Smay

j
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Partnership Buy-out
Stone Portet**»'f*acy Cowley have come to an agreement to split their partnership of
Advanced Mau&oancJ Services, inc. and Straight Line Striping, Inc.
Hate term? of this agufenent are as follows:
1. Stone Porter will keep all Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc, asftcurrently exists. *
2. Tiaey Cowfcy will keep ail of Straight Line Striping, Inc. as it currently exists-*
if,Tracy O w t e v ^ b e f a i d $<W0,000VOJW* 60 months^l0,000 perriftrah with NO interest,
due and payable 1o fast o i the S* of each month beginning Jury 2002.
4< ttmqtM&fcy

wflVbe paid $30,000 cashforpurchase of a new vehicle for SLS.

5r Tracy Cowley w&Vbwh the property through List©, Inc. (a ifaird corpotatio^md by**ah
parties) located at 294&faxh Center Street, Midway, Utah. The Articles of l a c o r p f c d for
Ltsto,*lnc. will he cha^ee8"/bUowing the Deed process with Founder's Title
6. Tracy OjvvkiyVKeaita insurance wfli be paid through July 31,2002.
7. C o v ^ f e m i i y telephones v ^ be returned Jufy 14,2092.
8. Skmc Porter and Tra4y Cowley have agreed to not seek legal counsel arxi this dojonnent will
Serve as"&4ege! and bindiig contract
Parties have agreed &> have NO nun-compete clause.
Passes have:«^reed $ rib confidentiality clause.
fAll ^T^e^b*x»gpotatkm wiB be changed to reflect this agreement Al$ash and hard assets,
bquytfoetnV vaaclcsiik^S, telephone numbers wiS remain the property of said 'corporations.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY
-00O00-

TRACY and KERIN COWLEY,

Civil No. 030500244
DEPOSITION OF:
TRACY COWLEY
(Volume II)
TAKEN: November 18, 2 003

Plaintiffs,
v.
SLONE and VERALYNN PORTER,

Judge Donald Eyre, Jr.
Defendants.
-oo0oo«

COPY

Deposition of TRACY COWLEY, taken on behalf
of the Defendants, at the offices of Bostwick & Price/
One Thirty Nine East South Temple St., Suite 320, Salt
Lake City, Utah, before Jill C. Dunford, Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State
of Utah/ pursuant to Notice,
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couple of times.
Q, What was your relationship on June 22nd, what
was your relationship like with Ann Atkin?
A. You know, not terrible. I read her affidavit
and it puzzled me. Because at the time we had been
going — we had had one of those brand new gas pumps
backed into by a car and just wrecked. I was working
through either A, replaceraent; B, replace the parts,
replace the whole part or just replace the parts. And I
know we had had a — we had sent some E-mails back and
forth the prior week/ right up to and including the
Friday,
I had updated her that Christy •- I was waiting
on the parts from Christy at West Tech who was the
Gilbarco distributor that we had to buy parts for the
pump from. And I had sent her an E-mail I believe it was
on the Thursday. On the Friday I got quite a pleasant
E-mail back saying, *No big deal. Let ne know when they
get the parts/
And I think I sent her a response on Monday, the
24th, saying, "The parts are in and we'll get it taken
care of this week/
So I realize now that certainly over the year and
a half that I have been gone that relationship has turned
quite sour. And obviously/ the time up to the 22nd/
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proof of that,
Q. Okay,
A, At the time when this all happened, I had no
idea that Ann had some big grudge. I didn't know. So
yes, when we had Our conversation on the 22nd, ! did not
know the extent of what they hid done to make Ann feel a
particular way about m
Throughout the time after I left 7-11, Ann called
ae at least for the first six months pretty regular on
every situation that came up, "What do' 1 do? How do I
handle it? what should 1 do here? How should I do this?
How should I do that? We had regular conversations
helping her adjust to her new job.u
Q, Okay, When after the evening of th* 22nd was
your next communication with the Porters?
A. On a Sunday*
p. On the 23rd of June?
A, That would be correct.
Q . Do you know what tit&c of day?
A. In the afternoon/ evening.
Q. Was that another meeting face-to-face?
A. It was face-to-face,
Q* Where did that meeting occur?
A. At the AMS. office.
Q. Who contacted who about tnat meeting?

190

1
A* I believe I called then* to find out what time
those situations have changed where she didn't want to
2 we were going to meet that day.
deal with ne or whatever she wants to say. But that
3
Q. Describe fcr me as you did with the previous
recollection of E-mail didnft — at least to me I didn't
4 meeting, describe for me what happened,
have any indication that Ann was really unhappy with ne.
5
A. Ohf we went to the office. I believe the
But I also would say that I was not present on
6 first thing they said was, "You know, we decided that we
most of Sione's meetings with Ann, I had no idea the
7 are going to go — we'were going to go and tell Ann. We
aiaount of daiaage that Slone and Vera were in the process
of doing to roe personally.
8 called Ann last night and are having a meeting today. We
9 have already told her everything about AMS, its
0, What do you mean by that?
A* The aiaount of things they were blaming on me
10 inception/
11
Q. Let me stop you so we can keep track of —
or whatever — I had no idea that they were in the
12
A. I'm sorry. He is Slone. When I say he, that
process of this personal character sabotage they were in
13 will refer to Slone. If 1 say she, that will refer to
the ttiddle of.
14 Veralynn,
0, Describe for roe what you mean by that.
15
Q. I apologize. 1 just need to roake sure the
A* I aean -by that/ I would refer to the
statements on the meeting between Johan and Ann and Slone
16 transcript gets ail that correctly when we read it later.
and Vera later on*
17
A, Absolutely.
Q. It happened on June 27th, correct?
18
Q, $0 you and the Cowleys show up at the office?
A. That's correct* That's after that. But I
19
A. Yes.
guess that helps M understand. If they are willing to
20
Q. Who was present?
say the things they said to Johan and to Ann then,
21
A, Slone and Veralynn.
certainly there were lots of things being said in their
22
Q. Arid Tracy and Karen Cowley?
private meetings with Ann.
23
A. That's correct, Tracy and Kerin Cowley,
Q. By the Porters?
Q. Anybody
there?
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1
Q. Just with that little instruction, you can
2 help me keep the record straight, Tell m what happened.
3
A. I prefer the record to be straight4
They then proceeded to tell us that following my
5 conversation with theft on the Saturday, that they had
6 felt it imperative that they go down and talk to Ann and
7 make sure she knew how AMS was started, everything that
8 had happened, and cleared their chest of any wrongdoings
9 that they felt we had been a party to.
[10
It always struck ae as odd that thsy waited until
11 a year and a half after the conflict of interest was over
12 to need to clear that, But that's their call,
13
Q. ffhen you say conflict of interest in the year
14 and a half, what are you talking about?
15
A. They felt that there was a huge conflict of
16 interest* At least that's what they said that Sunday,
117 That was all fairly new conversation as well. We had
talked about it in the past. But it had never been a
119 point of heavy contention or heavy something needs to be
[20 done about it.
21
And we felt like » in fact, I remember when I
22 quit we were tickled pink that that conflict of interest
j 23 was over. I was no longer in a decision making role with
j 24 7-11. We were going to then survive on solely what we
[25 were able to do versus what I was able to procure for as.
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Q. But there had in fact been a conflict of
interest problem with AMS; isn't that right?
A. It could oe perceived as that, absolutely,
Q. In ('act, AMS went M t of its way to make sure
that Tracy Cowley's name and picture didn't show.up
anywhere on AMS while you woriced at 7-U; isn't that
right?
A. I — you know — 1 didn't ever have my
picture taken with the AMS guys, no.
Q. Why not?
A, I didn't really feel it was necessary,
Q. Bat you were a part of the company, weren't
you?
A, I was, absolutely,
Q, Finish telling me about the meeting on the
23rd. 1 think you told me they had gone to talk to Ann?
A. They had told us that he had gone and talked
to Ann. We questioned their need tc do that at this
particular point, "Why no: finish what we had started,
and then if you want to talk to Ann, fine."
They assured us that Ann was going to continue to
do business with them and that we would still be able to
stripe at that point. And I think —
Q. tfho said that? Was that Vcralynn? Was that
Slone? Whc was speaking for the Porters?

1S4

Q. In that 18-month time frame that you are
1
A. Both of them at odd tines, I don't recall
talking about that shows up in 7-11's policy, isn't that
2 which one specifically said i t , I believe it was Sione
where that 18-aonth time frame comes from?
3 at the time that said Ann had assured them through this
A, No,
4 breakup that we would continue to stripe. That striping
Q. Where did that come from? Why was that
} contract would remain in place, Everything would be
significant, 18 months?
i fine.
A. I'm missing something,
7
Kerin and I Mtt^ both fairly upset because we
Q, You told m a timite ago that it was
8 didn't see a need at that juncture, at that point to go
convenient that it came up at 18 months.
$ talk to 7-11 and tell the whole thing. But we left at
A. No, it surprised me that they needed to clear
10 that point and scheduled a meeting the following morning.
their chest 18 month* after I had left 7-11 and there was
11
Q. How long did the meeting last?
no conflict of interest,
12
A. Not very long; laaybe 15 minutes,
13
Q, Eight months, why is 18 months significant?
J L . PJf*il-Jilli?. y o ^ s c h ^ l e d a meeting for
14 Moncay7~the24 t h ? " "
A. I have.no idea. You would have to — that's
the time.
15
A. Correct.
16
Q. Were there any other communications between
Q, You brought it up,
17 you and either of the Porters on the 23rd; on Sunday/
A. That's the tint* frame from when I quit 7-11
18 after that meeting?
to when they decided that we have got to tell 7-11 about
19
A, I don f t believe so. r m not certain, but 1
our conflict of interest.
20 don't believe so.
Q. And prior to that the, during the whole time
21
Q. So there were no further communications
at AMS there had never been a conflict of interest?
22 between the Cowleys and the Porters until Monday, the
A. frior to that time we had never had a
23 24th; is that correct?
discussion about needing to go talk to 7-11 to let them
24
A. I believe so*
know that there was a conflict of interest. Never, not
25
Q, What happened on Monday, the 24th?
once.
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A. Monday, the 24th, I came into the office. I
believe I handled a few E-mails that had been going on.
The one that comes to mind is the one on that damaged
pump I was working on for Ann, I made a couple of phone
calls and then we closed the door. I believe Gail was
out in the outer office and it was Slone and Vera and L
Kerin had been scheduled to go to a Latter-day Saint
girls' camp. And she had already committed to that and
they didn't have enough leaders to have her not go. So I
encouraged her and told her she needed to go fulfill
that.
Q, She left early, 1 think her testimony was
early in the morning?
A* At 5:00, yes.
Q. So at some point later in the morning do I
understand then —
A. toh.
Q, •• you were in this closed door meeting
with —
A. Yeah.. And I failed to recall, both on Sunday
night that meeting was also recorded as well as Monday
morning when we shut the doors and went into our
discussions. First thing turned on was the recorder and
Slont I believe just clarified irto the recorder that
this meeting was between Vcraivnr. Porter and Slone Porter
ltf
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A, %le are willing to do this."
Q. Okay, Speaking on behalf of the Cowle/s?
A. Speaking on behalf of the Cowleys, Slone
reiterated again that he had spoken with Ann Atkin that
niorning and that both the general - both the maintenance
business would stay intact and that I would be able to
hold the striping contract, but that we would end up
having meetings with Johan later that week to discuss it.
Q. Okay.
A. And I asxedl specifically that as we were
finishing this, whatever you want to call it, I saic, "So
we are going to be able to keep the striping contract?"
And he said, "According toton,you will."
Q. This was at your meeting?
A, HOndayQ. T i calling it a meeting.
A. Moncay morning at the AMS office.
Q. Okay. How long did that meeting last?
A. Oh — you know — not that long. I don't
recall how long exactly. It wasn't a long, length/
meeting. As soon is we — as soon as 1 said, "We are
willing to do this/ Vera wrote down all the terns that
we had discussed on a sheet of paper.
Q. Did she write it down by hand?
A. YeSiShecid.
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1
Q. Okav.
and myself.
2
A. She\hen took it over to the computer and
Q« Okay.
3 typed it all and put signature blames on it for Slo^and
A, At that point Vera had said -* you know — "I
4 myself,
don't know if this is going to go right/
5
I did not want to sign it until Kerin was back/
And I said, Must hear me out/ And I told her
i because I remembered when Bill and Slone and I split up_
Kerin and I had discussed it on Sunday night# and that at
7
initially .years earlier^ I continued to deal with Bill in
this point we were willing to accept the offer and move
8 my capacity w.th 7-U and 1 recalled his devastation over
on with our lives.
i j l l J O a d gone tnrough at aome, because he did his deal
Q, When you say accept the offer, you are now
10 and signed everything without ever talking to his wife.
talking about the terms of what was a demand, which I
1i
And I said, T U be happy to sign.it when Kerin
think you described the demand?
A. I did describe it as a demand. And on
tt q e U back from girls* camp, but i want her to physically
Monday, I did label i t a$ an offer.
I) read all of this so she knows what we are signing off on
Q. And I don't mean to make anything of
It at the front end/
distinction. I just wanted to make sure when you talk
15
Q. I'm sorry for looking away. I was just
about the offer you are talking about the same terms as
15 thinking what would happen if I did that kind of thing
you described from the —
1) without my wife.
A. Absolutely.
IB
A. Dead. That's how it — honestly In a
0, — from the Saturday meeting.
19 business that we had all been involved in since the
A. Absolutely.
20 onset, $h^ deserved that courtesy.
Q. Okay,
21
Q. Ho disagreement. I'm picturing Bill Berg all
A, Vera made it very clear in Saturday's meeting
22 of a sudden getting confronted with that*
that, "It was my way or the highway,* which is not really
23
A, That was brutal. And it went on for months.
a change of personality for Vera.
2< But so that's why I didn't sign it. Slone had actually
Q. And so then you communicated to them?
25 signed the paper. When I said, "I'll sign it when Kerin
199
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oetg back/ they wadded it up and threw it away.
Q. And why cid they say they did that?
A.„ Because 1 wasn't going to sign it right then,
They didn't say jt's nil. They just said! "We'll deal
with it when she gets back,*
Q. Okay. So did the paper stay in the garbage?
Did it ever come out of the garbage?
A, I didn't get the paper. I believe they got _.
the paper. In fact, after our meeting with Johan later
that week, Slone and Vera's and nine solely with Johan
and Anny Slone indicated to me that he had actually
showed Johan that agreement.
Q. Okay, So we have the meeting on the morning
of the 24th that you have just described. Is there
anything else about thatfleetingyou haven't told me
about?
A. It struck me funny that that morning they had
all the doorknobs out. They were changing all the locks
on the building.
Q* Okay. Anything else?
A. That's the size of it.
Q* Anything else?
A. They had my computer disk — actually they
had Allen come over later to di$connect my computer and
take it over to my house.
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AMS offices'
A, In any kind of an official capacity,
absolutely, yes. From that point forward the locks were
changed. I didn't have access to that office.
Q. Was the sign changed at the office as of that
day'
A. I con't recall the exact date the sign came
down. I believe it was that day, but I'm not certain.
And I don't know when they got the new sign up. In fact,
you know what7 As I think about it, they were there.
Jared was changing the locks on the doors and I believe
one of Clay's guys was there scraping the AMS logo off
the windows.
Q, Off the wiidcw of the office?
A. The door to the otfice. But I'd not certain
on the time frame on that,
0. That's Jared Porter you are talking about.
And Clay would be Ciay Coleman who is VeralynrTs brother;
is that correct?
A. Tnat is correct.
Q, And Clay Coleman own? a Sign company called I
thifk CRC Signs or something to that effect?
A. CRC Design.
0. And his office is located conveniently right
next to the -202

A- Pink Palace, yes, the rental property.
Q, — to the Midway property?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is about a block away from the AMS
office?
A, That is correct.
Q. If I measured thhgs correctly?
A. That is correct.
Q, Eetween the AMS office and Gary and Card
Coleman's house, then a pasture?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Khat other communications, if ^ t &4 you
have with either Slone or Veralynn Porter on the 24th?
A. 1 remember going home and thinking, okay, I'm
jus: going to touch base with Ann to verify that what
Slone has told me is correct.
And I called her and she was very explicit that
same data there?
not only would I not retain the contract, I would no
A. Oh, stupid roe. Yes.
longer do any work for 7-11, if she had any control over
5. That was later in the day on the 24th?
that.
ft. I believe JO.
Q. Okay. You say a telephone conversation with
Q. Did you take any personal effects with yoo
Ann Atkin?
out of the office that day?
A. Uh-huh.
A. feah. That was all kind of boxed up.
Q. And do you recall what time of day that
Q. Was that the last day that you were at the
203
occurred?
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Q. Who was Allen?
A. Alien is the guy that runs computer works in
Heber. He had done our computer work in the past.
Q. U he sort of the computer service technician
for AMS?
A. Yeah, that would be a good way to put it.
Q. So at some point he came and disconnected
your computer and brought it to you at your home?
h Yes.
Q. Was there anything different or changed about
your computer?
A. Sot that I recall.
Q . You later at soae point l assun.e booted it up
or turned it on?
A. Yeah, at turned on. It was the oldest
computer in the office.
Q, Vas it still configured the sane and had the
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH,
WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,

MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiffs,
v.
Case Number: 030500244
Slone and Veralynn PORTER.
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr.
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 59, U.R.C.P., respectfully move the Court to reconsider its ruling
herein dated December 17, 2002, upon the grounds that:
a.

the Court has mistaken the dates of events clearly admitted;

b.

the Court has treated applicability of the Statute of Frauds as a dispute of material
fact, rather than a question of law; and

c.

defendants havefinallyproduced the dispositive signed writing.

This Motion is supported by a Memorandum of authoritiesfiledherewith.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2003.

It-

E. Craig Smay
Attorney for f\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of December, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION'to be mailed by U.S. mail,
first-class postage prepaid, to:

Jeffrey R. Price (6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, PC.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ph:(801) 961-7400
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paid at $4,000 per month, that the Porters would pay the Cowleys' health insurance costs through
December 31, 2002, that the Cowleys would receive three trucks, that the Porters would pay the
remaining balance on one of those trucks, that ownership SLS would be transferred to the
Cowleys, and that the Cowleys would receive one of two properties owned by Listo, Inc. The
Cowleys verbally accepted this offer during a phone conversation between the parties.
7.

Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter agreed to dissolve AMS.

8.

The Porters have performed part of the agreement by making monthly payments

on the Cowleys5 truck, and by making payments of $4,000 per month to SLS beginning August 5,
2002, paying the Cowleys' health insurance premiums through December 31, 2002, transferring a
piece of property owned by Listo, Inc. to the Cowley Family Trust, transferring ownership of two
additional Ford trucks, and transferring Tracy Cowley's life insurance policyfromAMS to SLS.
RULING
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A corporation may be dissolved voluntarily if (1) no stock has been issued, an act of a
majority of its directors or a majority of its incorporators is sufficient to dissolve a corporation,
Utah Code § 16-10a-1401,or (2) stock has been issued, a vote of the majority of the shareholders
is sufficient to dissolve a corporation, Utah Code § 16-10a-1402. The Courtfindsthat there is a
material dispute of fact regarding whether AMS issued stock.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that a verbal buy-out agreement was reached,
but they disagree as to the materials terms of the agreement. The Courtfindsthat there is a
material dispute of fact as to which offer was accepted as the buy-out agreement between the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ruling Page 5

parties
The Courtfindsthat all buy-out offers violate the Statute of Frauds The Statute of
Frauds requires that any agreement regarding interests in real estate or agreements that cannot be
performed within one year to be in writing or they are void. Utah Code § 25-5-1, 4(1). Both
alleged agreements consist of the transfer of property and payments to be made over a period of
years. These agreements would be void under the Statute of Frauds unless the agreement has
been partially performed. Spears v. Wan, 44 P.3d 742, 751(Utah 2002) The Court finds that
there are material disputes of fact regarding whether sufficient part-performance has been
completed that would allow this Court to enforce the oral agreement.
CONCLUSION
The Courtfindsthat there are material issues of fact regarding the issues in this case,
therefore, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment The Court directs
counsel for Defendants to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling, submit it to counsel for
Plaintiffs for review, and to the Court for execution.

DATED this 17th day of Dece:

••asrv

Ruling Page 6
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH,
WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
Slone and Veralynn PORTER.

Case Number: 030500244

Defendants.

Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr.

INTRODUCTION
The question presented by plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is whether defendants
can present any evidence which could carry defendants' burden of proof to substantiate their denials
to date that the corporation, the subject of the action, was never dissolved. The basis of defendants'
denials is now conceded to be a claim of part performance of an otherwise void oral agreement. This
is combined with a claim that a fully executed written Stock Redemption Agreement doesn't really
mean the corporation had stock.
Though it is utterly irrelevant to any defense to the Motion for Summary Judgment,
defendants provide, by way of "Introduction", a nutshell history of what they call "the demise of a
business association". The account is a fairy tale. Only the toads are real. To correct this obvious
attempt at diversion, the facts (more fully elaborated, with citations to the record, pg. 12 infra), at
last admitted (some inadvertently), are as follows:
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THE FORMATION
In December, 1995, defendant Slone Porter, a discharged employee of 7-Eleven, and plaintiff
Tracy Cowley, a continuing employee of 7-Eleven, together with William Berg, a non-employee of
7-Eleven, formed Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. ("AMS"), to provide maintenance services
to 7-Eleven and others. AMS then purported to be owned by William Berg.

THE TRICKERY
The 7-Eleven Code of Business Conduct ("CBC"), adopted in January 1996, supposing it was
applicable to a company formed in 1995, forbade 7-Eleven's relationship with AMS because of the
ownership of former employee Slone Porter. It did not forbid the relationship with a current
employee, Tracy Cowley.

THE SUCCESS
AMS prospered. In March, 2001, Tracy Cowley left 7-Eleven to work for AMS. This fact,
and Cowley's ownership in AMS, was then disclosed to the powers-that-be at 7-Eleven.
The relationship of 7-Eleven with Cowley, now a former employee, then became forbidden
by the CBC. The former employee prohibition lasts five years; thus it had then lapsed for Slone
Porter. Despite Cowley's status, 7-Eleven continued and expanded the relationship with AMS.

THE BUY-OUT
Eighteen months later, defendants offered to buy out plaintiffs' half of AMS. The main term
of the offer was payment of $10,000/month for five years ($600,000). Plaintiffs suggested instead
that they buy out defendants on the same terms.
To avoid the latter result, and believing that the prohibition against relationships of 7-Eleven
with former employees lasted only two years, defendants wasted no time in complaining of plaintiff
Cowley to 7-Eleven. 7-Eleven determined inter alia, to investigate all past transactions with AMS
2
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for improper charges.

THE INVESTIGATION
7-Eleven never "fired" AMS. It took the position that it could not publicly continue the
relationship with AMS under the same name, but that, if Cowley sold-out, AMS was re-incorporated
under another name, and the investigation proved negative, 7-Eleven would continue with the reincorporated company. If the investigation proved positive, 7-Eleven would terminate and seek
redress against both Cowleys and Porters.
Cowleys then agreed to discuss the $ 10,000/month offer with changes proposed by Cowleys.
Tracy Cowley moved out of the AMS offices.

QMS ("Quality Maintenance Systems") was

incorporated by defendants and the business of AMS was transferred to it. The "A" in the logo on
equipment was changed to "Q".
Defendants then asserted that until the 7-Eleven investigation was completed, and they were
assured of the 7-Eleven business, they could only pay $4,000/month. Plaintiffs agreed to accept that
sum temporarily, and resume discussion of the price when 7-Eleven completed its investigation.
The 7-Eleven investigation was completed with a negative result by October, 2002 and the
business relationship was fully restored.

Plaintiffs then sought resumption of the buy-out

negotiations.

THE BAIT-AND-SWITCH.
Defendants then claimed that plaintiffs' acceptance of $4,000/month from July to October
constituted an enforceable oral agreement to sell for $4,000/month forfiveyears ($240,000). The
result of the transfer of the business of AMS to QMS, therefore, would be that Porters received 100%
of the value of their half of AMS, plus 60% of the value of Cowleys' half, and Cowleys received no
more than 40% of the value of their half.

3
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STRUT YOUR MUTT
This transparent bait-and-switch, tricked out infreshlipstick and high heels, is now paraded
by defendants as a "fraud" and "a pattern and practice of deceipt (sic), coercion and manipulation of
the Porters by the Cowleys." Defendants do not even attempt to show the elements of fraud, or
anything that could reasonably be called "coercion".

UNDISPUTED FACTS
Defendants seem to suppose that so long as the word "genuinely" is used before the word
"disputed", it is permissible to assert, in response to a properly supported statement of facts on
summary judgment, the bare, unsupported denials of their Answer. Rule 56 (e) forbids such a course.
Defendants have "genuinely disputed" nine of twelve facts set out in plaintiffs' Motion,
without disclosure of a basis for any denial. Many of the facts "genuinely disputed" are simply
recitations of the contents of documents which are admitted. The remainder follow from facts
previously admitted.
The following observations, set out with each fact"genuinely disputed", show that, once again,
defendants' denials are wholly irresponsible and in bad faith.
"2. Exhibitc A' to the Complaint was in full force and effect as of July 1, 2002". Exhibit "A"
is the admitted Stock Redemption Agreement for AMS. As defendants now claim that their alleged
agreement to buy plaintiffs' share of AMS was not made until July 19, 2002, Exhibit "A" must have
been in effect July 1, 2002.
"4. On or about July 19, 2002, Slone Porter, purporting to be the President of Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc., signed and, on or about July 22, 2002, filed with the Utah Department
of Commerce the Articles of Dissolution for Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a copy of which
is Exhibit 'B' to the Complaint." This statement simply reflects the contents of the document, the
filing of which was previously admitted. Porter clearly denotes himself "President", and dates his
signature July 19, 2002. The filing date is shown as July 22, 2002.
4
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"5.

Insofar as Exhibit 'B' purports to reflect an action taken by "the directors or

incorporators" of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. on July 1,2002, it reflects the action of Slone
Porter only." The document plainly purports to be on behalf of the directors and incorporators of
AMS. The only signature on it is Slone Porter's, and it is otherwise admitted that Slone Porter was
then the only director of AMS.
"6. As of July 1, 2002, plaintiff Tracy Cowley was the owner of 50% of the stock of
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation." Cowley's 50% ownership of AMS is
otherwise admitted; that AMS had issued stock is shown by Exhibit "A".
"7. Unless terminated by the execution andfilingof Exhibit CB', the stock ownership of AMS
from and after July 1, 2002, was as shown by Exhibit CA'." It is admitted that no other dissolution
of AMS than Exhibit "B" was ever filed. If Exhibit "B" was ineffective, Exhibit "A" necessarily
remains in effect.
"8. A majority of the shareholders of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. has never
approved the filing of the Articles of Dissolution, Exhibit 'B'." Exhibit "B" purports to be the act
of directors and incorporators of AMS. There is no evidence that the matter was ever submitted to
shareholders.
"9. Defendants have solicited the approval, by plaintiffs, of a written agreement to dissolve
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., upon terms approved by defendants, but plaintiffs have
declined to execute such agreement." The submission of two proposed writings by defendants to
plaintiffs, one reflecting an offer of $10,000/month and one reflecting an offer of $4,000/month, is
otherwise admitted. The drafts are not signed by plaintiffs.
"11. As of July 1, 2002, Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation, was a
going concern." Insofar as defendants assert an agreement to dissolve AMS not reached until July
19, 2002, this must be true.
"12. Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., has not been administratively, or judicially
dissolved." As defendants admit No. 10 ("Except for Exhibit 'B', no articles of dissolution for
5
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Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., have been filed."), they cannot truthfully deny No. 12.
Where some extraordinary basis is claimed for denying facts which on their face are true, or
where denial is made to avoid an extraordinary reading of the fact asserted not readily apparent on
its face, a factual basis for denial must be stated. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. It does not avoid
the rule to merely reiterate denials in the Answer under the rubric, "This statement by the Cowleys
is genuinely disputed by the Porters."
Defendants' "genuine disputes" are inadequate as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' statement of
material facts must be affirmed in its entirety.

"MATERIAL FACTS"
The vast bulk of the statements defendants denote "material facts" are wholly immaterial and
irrelevant to any issue raised on the Motion. These include at least those numbered 5-11,13-26,2838,40-54,58-78,83,93-95,99-100,148-149,154-171. It is unnecessary to respond formally to any
of these claims. Many, in addition to being irrelevant, are "scandalous" within the meaning of Rule
12(f), U.R.C.P. - e.g. 5, 19-20, 43-45, and 157-158.
Of the assertions which have general relevance, the vast majority are supported only by the
self-serving affidavits of defendants, including at least those numbered 26,39,79-80,85-90,98,105113, 116-117, 119, 122, 124-126, 128, 130-133, 135, 141-142, 144-147, and 151-152. Insofar as
any of these attempts to assert that plaintiffs agreed to accept payments of $4,000/month for their
interest in AMS, they have been denied by the previous affidavit of Tracy Cowley.
Some of the relevant assertions have some support in addition to the affidavits of defendants.
These include 81, 84, 96-97, 104, 114-115, 118, 121, 127, 129, 134, 137-140, 143, 150 and 153.
These are generally uncontroversial, and to the extent corroborated by an independent source,
6
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uncontroverted. Of the remainder, 102 and 123 are entirely unsupported by the material cited.
The first sentence of the last statement, No. 172, is a conclusion of law, based upon the
second sentence, an argument purporting to be a fact. The statement summarizes defendants'
position in its entirety: "disputes of material fact" regarding whether the parties made an oral
agreement to dissolve AMS are sufficient to overcome the Statute of Frauds rendering any such oral
agreement void; thus, defendants properly denied that AMS had not been dissolved. The difficulty
with this position is the long-standing Utah rule that disputes of fact are never sufficient to overcome
the Statute of Frauds. See infra, pg. 18 et seq. Defendants' assertion that its denials are based
merely upon "disputes of fact" whether an oral agreement of dissolution existed is a confession that
the denials are without basis and in bad faith.
As a general proposition, defendants' Statement of Material Facts is rife with hearsay and
generally lacking in adequate foundation. It is unnecessary, however, to particularize these and
similar objections, since the Statement of Material Facts is not cited even once in the "Argument".
It is sufficient, with respect to the limited "facts" recited in the "Argument", to address them in
addressing the argument itself.

AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF SOUGHT
For reasons not apparent, defendants claim that plaintiffs have failed to cite the authority
under which they seek judicial dissolution of AMS. In fact, plaintiffs have repeatedly cited Sections
16-10a-1430 and 1431, U.C.A. (1953), which govern judicial dissolution. Presumably, defendants'
oversight in this regard reflects their claim that wilful ignorance of the obvious is a proper basis for
denial.

ARGUMENT
Defendants' ponderous filing prompts two questions: (1) is any of the material attached as
exhibits relevant to the issue raised on the Motion for Summary Judgment (i.e., was AMS properly
7
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dissolved); and (2) was any relevant material unavailable at the time defendants made a Rule 56(f)
motion? The plain answers are "very little" and "no". The question that next arises is whether
anything in the Opposition justifies defendants' denials to date that AMS was never properly
dissolved. Again, the answer is "no".
Defendants by their filing raise two objections to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The
first is that, while a half interest in a corporation having shares to issue was admittedly conveyed to
plaintiffs, plaintiffs lacked the right of shareholders to object to defendants' unilateral dissolution of
the company, because stock certificates were not issued. The second, as predicted, is that there has
been partial performance of an oral agreement to sell plaintiffs' interest to defendants.
Thefirstground is wrong as a matter of law. See infra, pg. 10 et seq. Quite literally none
of the materials attached to defendants' Opposition, except Exhibit "10", the Stock Redemption
Agreement, and Exhibit "29", a "Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement", bears upon this
question.
The only material relevant to the second issue is parts of the affidavits of defendants, which
are repetitive, part of the affidavit of Ann Atkin, the deposition of Andrew Garcia, and plaintiffs'
admissions and responses to interrogatories. The Court must wade though a surplusage of gossip,
innuendo and hearsay in the affidavits tofindthese parts, only to discover that they duplicate what
plaintiffs otherwise have long conceded. Once found, they do not even show an oral agreement, let
alone performance of one. All of this material was readily available from the outset.
Further, since "part performance" is an exception to the statute of frauds (§ 25-5-4, U.C. A.
(1953)) rendering any oral agreement "void", defendants' claim of part performance in the present
case was always an affirmative defense. Defendants have the burden of presenting positive,
undisputed proof, in order to maintain the claims. That is, the mere denials that the corporation was
properly dissolved previously proffered by defendants were insufficient on their face to raise this
defense. The simple assertion of an oral contract was deficient on its face, and would have entitled
plaintiffs to judgment on the pleadings pursuant to their Motion, because the contract alleged is void
8
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under the Statute of Frauds. To demonstrate the good faith of defendants' denials, it was necessary
for defendant to assert what they claimed by way of "part performance", and to submit their evidence
to a test by summary judgment. This evidence was readily available at all times.
Further, defendants claim only "disputes of material fact" regarding the making of an
"agreement of dissolution". It does not show part performance taking an oral agreement out of the
statute of frauds, however, for defendants to simply dispute, or "genuinely dispute", plaintiffs'
assertion that they made no contract. Under Utah law, the statute resolves all disputes whether a
contract existed. Relief is available only where there is unequivocal evidence of substantial change
of position in exclusive reliance upon an agreement the terms of which are indisputable. See infra,
pg. 18 et seq. Defendants do not even claim such evidence exists.
The long and short of this is that defendants have known or should have known, from the
outset that, to make the denials (which are not made upon information and belief), or their positive
assertion that AMS was properly dissolved, upon which they have insisted in this case, they had to
have in hand indisputable evidence of the terms of an oral agreement, together with direct, clear,
convincing evidence that defendants substantially changed their position in ways explained only by
reliance upon such an agreement. Defendants could never have supposed that they were in
possession of such evidence, or that they could obtain such evidence. The delay obtained by their
Rule 56(f) motion was not used to depose plaintiffs in the hope of obtaining a useful admission.
Defendants knew what plaintiffs would say. It was used to assemble a cacophony of unfounded
suspicions and peevish accusations (i.e., if Mr. Porter had a notorious extramarital affair, it was all
Mr. Cowley's fault), in the hope of distracting attention from the undeniable: there has never been
a basis for defendants' denial that AMS was never dissolved.

ONLY A MAJORITY OF SHAREHOLDERS COULD DISSOLVE AMS
Section 16-10a-626(2) U.C. A. (1953) provides that a corporation which does not provide its
shareholders certificates evidencing their shares shall nevertheless provide them in writing within a
9
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reasonable time the information listed in section 16-10a-625(2)U.C.A. (1953). (For purposes of the
present case, all of this information is contained in the admitted Stock Redemption Agreement, and
plaintiffs do not dispute its timely delivery.) Defendants now claim that corporations which violate
this statute, may also violate the right of those entitled to stock to consent or withhold consent to a
dissolution of the corporation.
The rights of a shareholder attach as soon as he acquires an equity interest in a stock
corporation (§16-10a-621(4), U.C.A. (1953)), and persist whether or not the corporation issues
stock. Section 16-10a-625 (l)U.C. A. (1953). Such a person has a right to compel issuance of stock
and appropriate certificates. His rights cannot be diminished by refusal to recognize them.
Furthermore, say defendants, a Stock Redemption Agreement for AMS, signed by both
defendant Porter and plaintifFCowley, and acknowledging both as shareholders, should be discounted
as "executed ... for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of the insurance company which issued
life insurance policies for the benefit of the Cowleys and Porters." The Parole Evidence Rule (§ 7825-16, U.C.A (1953)), forbids any evidence of the content of the writing except the writing itself.
Here, the writing (Exhibit "10", Article IV) plainly provides, "The Company has procured insurance
on the lives of shareholders in order to fund its obligations under this agreement...." In short, the
insurance was bought to implement the prior Agreement; the Agreement was not made, as alleged,
to fake a basis for obtaining insurance.
Counsel choose to ignore their own draft of a Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement,
Exhibit "29", purporting to be the agreement reached by the parties, which specifically acknowledges
in paragraph 2 that "Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter [are] the two stockholders of the company
. . . ." It is disingenuous at best for counsel to now invent diversions from a fact they otherwise
openly acknowledge.
It is preposterous to read the Utah statutes on dissolution of corporations to allow unilateral
dissolution by one minority owner of a stock corporation having many owners. The rule cannot be
subverted by failure to issue stock certificates. Defendants' revisionist interpretation of the Stock
10
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reasonable time the information listed in section 16-10a-625(2) U.C. A. (1953). (For purposes of the
present case, all of this information is contained in the admitted Stock Redemption Agreement, and
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and appropriate certificates. His rights cannot be diminished by refusal to recognize them.
Furthermore, say defendants, a Stock Redemption Agreement for AMS, signed by both
defendant Porter and plaintiff Cowley, and acknowledging both as shareholders, should be discounted
as "executed . . . for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of the insurance company which issued
life insurance policies for the benefit of the Cowleys and Porters." The Parole Evidence Rule (§ 7825-16, U.C.A (1953)), forbids any evidence of the content of the writing except the writing itself.
Here, the writing (Exhibit "10", Article IV) plainly provides, "The Company has procured insurance
on the lives of shareholders in order to fund its obligations under this agreement.. .." In short, the
insurance was bought to implement the prior Agreement; the Agreement was not made, as alleged,
to fake a basis for obtaining insurance.
Counsel choose to ignore their own draft of a Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement,
Exhibit "29", purporting to be the agreement reached by the parties, which specifically acknowledges
in paragraph 2 that "Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter [are] the two stockholders of the company
. . . ." It is disingenuous at best for counsel to now invent diversions from a fact they otherwise
openly acknowledge.
It is preposterous to read the Utah statutes on dissolution of corporations to allow unilateral
dissolution by one minority owner of a stock corporation having many owners. The rule cannot be
subverted by failure to issue stock certificates. Defendants' revisionist interpretation of the Stock
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Redemption Agreement is contrary to the face of the document. Defendants' convenient description
of the Stock Redemption Agreement cannot disguise the fact that it confers enforceable shareholder's
rights upon plaintiff Cowley, which cannot be discounted at whim.
AMS, a stock corporation, had two equal owners. It was not within the power of one of them
to dissolve the corporation without the consent of the other. The only evidence defendants offer of
plaintiffs' consent to the dissolution of AMS is an alleged oral agreement to purchase plaintiffs'
interest over five years. Defendants concede that such an agreement is void on its face under the
Statute of Frauds. "A contract is within the statute, as a general rule, if the time for the full
performance of the contract exceeds a year." 72 AmJur2d, Statute of Frauds §11; Goldstein v. Abco
Construction Co., Inc., 334 So.2d 281 (Fla.App.1976).

THE ADMITTED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ELIMINATES ANY CLAIMS OF ORAL
AGREEMENT
Challenged to produce evidence supporting their denial that Advanced Maintenance Services,
Inc. ("AMS") was never properly dissolved, defendants, following a thirty day extension pursuant
to Rule 56(f), have produced a ponderous compendium of gossip, hearsay and innuendo, most of
which is utterly irrelevant to the matter in issue. The scintilla of relevant material was readily
available to defendants from the outset, without resort to Rule 56(f). That the latter material was not
previously produced is explained by the fact that, as a matter of law, and on its face, it is insufficient
to substantiate defendants' denial. That this inadequate needle is now produced in a haystack of the
impertinent and the scandalous, is explained only as desperate distraction.
Stripped of the merely meretricious, the record presented by defendants shows a chronology
which eliminates defendants' denial:
1. November, 1995, defendant Slone Porter left the employ of 7-Eleven. Defendants'
Statement of Material Facts ("MF") 1. December, 1995, AMS was formed, intending to provide
maintenance services to 7-Eleven. MF 7,12. Plaintiff Tracy Cowley was then an employee of 7Eleven (MF 10,12), leaving its employ to work full time for AMS in March, 2001. MF 5 5. Cowley
11
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and Porter were owners of AMS from the outset. MF 12.
2. Saturday, June 22, 2002, defendants volunteered to buy plaintiffs' half interest in AMS.
MF 79. Defendants offered to split corporate property and funds not essential to the business, to
divest to plaintiffs Straight Line Striping ("SLS"), a small related pavement striping company, and
to pay plaintiffs $10,000 per month for five years ($600,000). Id. Plaintiffs declined, and proposed
instead that defendants take the deal defendants offered and plaintiffs take the business. MF 80. The
matter was left for further discussion. Id.
3. The latter "threat" induced in defendants a crisis of conscience: after more than seven years
of benefitting from their co-owner's relationship with 7-Eleven Corporation ("7-Eleven"), which
provided "95%" of the business of AMS, defendants suddenly saw that this was a despicable "conflict
of interest". MF 81, 83. They determined to bear their breasts at once to a friendly ear at 7-Eleven.
Id. They did so Sunday, June 23, 2002. MF 94.
4. Andrew Garcia, a 7-Eleven executive, and Johan de Besch, the pertinent senior manager
of 7-Eleven, had known for the eighteen months since plaintiff Tracy Cowley left 7-Eleven that
Cowley was an owner of AMS and, of course, a former employee of 7-Eleven. MF 56, 58;
Deposition of Andrew Garcia, 09/19/03, at 24-26,38-39. Nevertheless, 7-Eleven had continued over
that period to send AMS an increasing amount of 7-Eleven business. MF 68. Defendants, however,
say that they believed that 7-Eleven would be angry to discover that Cowley had been an owner of
AMS since its inception in 1995 and while Cowley was an employee of 7-Eleven, which defendants
style a "blatant conflict of interest". MF 81-83.
5. Defendants' contact at 7-Eleven, Ann Atkin, contacted the man who made decisions in
such matters, her superior Johan de Besch. MF 84, 91; Affidavit of Atkin, ^| % 34, 35. Meanwhile,
Atkin suggested that if Tracy Cowley was prepared to sell his interest in AMS, defendants could keep
the 7-Eleven business, but that they should re-incorporate under another name. MF 84, 96; Atkin
Affidavit, 1f 41.
6. June 24,2002, Monday, plaintiffs indicated that they were prepared to consider with some
12
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changes defendants' offer to pay $10,000 per month for five years for plaintiffs' interest and invited
further negotiations. MF 88. The $10,000/month for five years offer was then promptly reduced to
writing and submitted to plaintiffs for signature. Id.; MF 90; Exhibit "14".
7. June 25,2002, the first day they could do so, defendants incorporated Quality Maintenance
Systems ("QMS") to take over the business of AMS. QMS is wholly owned by defendants. MF 98,
100,117, 118.
8. June 27, 2002, Mr. de Besch met with plaintiffs. MF 101. His chief concern was that the
work of AMS for 7-Eleven not be interrupted. Atkin Affidavit, ^ 45; Exhibit "4", pg. 6. Tracy
Cowley told de Besch that he believed he could negotiate a fair break-up of AMS, and that AMS
could continue to work for 7-Eleven. Exhibit "4" pg. 2. Mr. de Besch indicated that an investigation
would be done to determine whether any transaction between 7-Eleven and AMS had taken
advantage of 7-Eleven. Exhibit "4", pg. 1. Cowley assured de Besch that he would find no such
transactions. Exhibit "4", pg. 2.
9. Later the same day, Johan de Besch met with defendants. Exhibit "4" pg. 3. He sought
assurances that the employees of AMS would continue to do the work of 7-Eleven, but said that 7Eleven could not continue to do business with AMS as then constituted. He thought the formation
of a new corporation with a new name at least useful. He also indicated that an investigation of
improprieties in prior AMS/7-Eleven transactions would be made, and that if any were found,
defendants could not be associated with the new corporation doing the 7-Eleven business. Exhibit
"4",pgs. 6,7; MF 105.
10. The business of AMS was then transferred to QMS, which has continued to do the 7Eleven business in the ordinary course, ever since, under the management of defendants. Exhibit "4",
pg. 7; MF 105.
11. The parties then agreed to split the properties and accounts of AMS not essential to its
business, and arranged for temporary continuation of health and insurance policies, without
acceptance by plaintiffs of defendants' offer to pay $10,000/month to complete the transaction. MF
13
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106. Straight Line Striping ("SLS") was transferred to plaintiffs. MF 107, 145. Some transfers (a
Merrill-Lynch account, ownership of SLS) were completed by July 1, 2002. MF 145; Exhibit "15".
Tracy Cowley closed his office at AMS the week-end of June 29, 2002. MF 107. Discussions of the
price to be paid plaintiffs were deferred. MF 109.
12. July 19, 2002, the parties again met to discuss the price of plaintiffs half of AMS. MF
109. Defendants claim that they then, for thefirsttime, indicated that they intended to pay plaintiffs
only $4,000 per month for five years ($240,000), not $10,000 per month ($600,000). MF 110.
Defendants claim that by evening Tracy Cowley had telephoned Slone Porter to accept this hitherto
unannounced 60% reduction. MF 111. Defendants have no other witnesses to this alleged phone
conversation. Id. Tracy Cowley denies that it occurred. Affidavit of Tracy Cowley 10/15/03, \ f
9-12; Exhibit "6", Answer No. 19. (Mrs. Cowley testifies that on the evening of July 19th, she heard
Mr. Cowley's end of a phone call in which Tracy Cowley informed Slone Porter that Cowleys would
accept $4,000 per month temporarily, pending completion of 7-Eleven's investigation, but that,
presuming 7-Eleven continued to do business with the company under the name of QMS, the parties
should then settle an appropriate price, not less than $10,000 per month.) The $4,000/month
proposed was not reduced to writing until months later, after plaintiffs threatened suit. Exhibit "29".
13. In October, 2002, plaintiffs confronted defendants asserting that plaintiffs were entitled
to at least $10,000 per month insofar as 7-Eleven's investigation, then complete, had resulted in no
diminishment of work. MF 146. Defendants then claimed an "oral agreement" to pay $4,000 per
month. MF 147.
14. The 7-Eleven "Code of Business Conduct" ("CBC") adopted after the incorporation of
AMS, and said by defendants to prohibit as a "conflict of interest" Tracy Cowley's continued
employment by 7-Eleven while owning AMS, provides by way of prohibition only:
Unless prior written approval has been obtained ... the Company shall not engage in
any form of business relationship with &former employee or family member thereof,
or with a business controlled by or affiliated with such former employee or family
member.
CBC Exhibit "2", pg. 7, §2. (emphasis added). This prohibition lasts forfiveyears (not two years
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as alleged by Slone Porter) after a person leaves the employ of 7-Eleven. Id, pg. 8. There are no
direct prohibitions against business dealings with current employees.
15. 7-Eleven can waive any "conflict" with a company owned by a former employee, by
writing in advance of work to be done. Exhibit "2", pgs. 6-8. Mr. de Besch had effectively done this
for the past eighteen months with respect to Tracy Cowley; but he had not done so in writing as
required by the CBC. He could have done so in future with respect to Tracy Cowley. Upon
questioning Cowley, de Besch learned that Cowley was prepared to sell out voluntarily, rendering
consent to future work by AMS moot. Exhibit "4", pg. 2.
16. Despite an investigation, 7-Eleven never found evidence of a disadvantageous transaction
between AMS and 7-Eleven during Tracy Cowley's tenure with either company. As a result, it fully
resumed with QMS the work formerly done by AMS. Deposition of Chad Coleman, 09/19/03, at 6365. 7-Eleven has never made a claim of "conflict of interest" or any other wrongdoing against AMS
or Cowley.
17. There is only one sufficient reason shown by the record for Mr. de Besch's requirement
that, to continue working for 7-Eleven, AMS be re-constituted without Tracy Cowley. It is that,
once defendants had exposed the matter to Mr. de Besch's inferior, Ann Atkin, Mr. de Besch could
no longer wink at the fact that Tracy Cowley was a former employee, employed within the last five
years. Slone Porter's employment with 7-Eleven was then more than five years old, and de Besch
had ignored Cowley's more recent employ for eighteen months; but the rule of the CBC was that 7Eleven was prohibited from doing business with a company which had among its owners someone
employed by 7-Eleven within five years. There is literally no admissible evidence of behavior of
plaintiffs Cowley (exploited equally by defendants Porter) injurious to 7-Eleven, which caused 7Eleven to decline to do business with either of Cowleys or Porters.
One conclusion that must be drawn from this is that defendants' Epiphany about "conflict of
interest" with 7-Eleven was simply a ploy to force plaintiffs to accept a buy-out, while defending
against plaintiffs' demand that defendants take the buy-out. Porter had been gone from 7-Eleven
15
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more than five years; Cowley had not. Porter could stay with AMS and not lose the 7-Eleven
business; Cowley might not. Though neither Porter nor 7-Eleven could divest Cowley of his half of
AMS, the most direct means of protecting the value of plaintiffs' interest was to accept a fair buy-out.
If Cowley refused to sell, he might prevent AMS serving 7-Eleven, or reforming under a new
name to do so, de-valuing the interests of both Porters and Cowleys. If Cowley voluntarily sold out,
the value of both interests was preserved. If Porters insisted on discounting the value of the Cowleys5
interest, they risked similar devaluation of their own interest.
After Cowleys agreed to sell upon a price to be negotiated, preserving the value of both
interests, Porters demanded that Cowleys accept at least a 60% reduction in value, which necessarily
escheated to Porters, who had already seized the business. It is this devil's bargain of 40% of original
interest to Cowleys, 160% of original interest to Porters, which defendants now claim as an "oral
agreement". In short, defendants' claim of "conflict" had no effect on the value of Cowley's interest,
so long as he agreed to sell it. Other necessary conclusions, equally anathema to defendants, are
discussed below.

THE CLAIM OF "PART PERFORMANCE" OF AN "ORAL AGREEMENT" IS DEFECTIVE ON
ITS FACE
Defendants have seriously misapplied the rules regarding claims of "part performance" of oral
"contracts".
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite, second, the acts done
in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and, third, the acts
must be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they
would not have been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to
perform on the part of the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who
relied, since damages would be inadequate.
Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983), quoting Randall v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust
Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956), quoted in Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 743, 751 (Utah 2002).
Part performance to be sufficient to take a case out of the statute must consist of
clear, definite, and unequivocal acts of the party relying thereon, strictly referable to
the contract, and of such character that it is impossible or impracticable to place the
parties in status quo, mere non-action being insufficient.
16
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Martin v. Scholl, supra, 678 P.2d at 275. See also Spears v. Warr, supra, 44 P.3d at 751.
[A]cts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract.... The
reason for such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is based
on estoppel and unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the
contract there is nothing to show that the plaintiff relied on it or changed his position
to his prejudice....
Martin v. Scholl, supra, 678 P.2d at 277 quoting In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah
1994); Spears v. Warr, supra, 44 P.3d at 751.
Apparently, defendants are unaware that the conduct which they must show was in
detrimental reliance upon the alleged agreement to sell plaintiffs' interest in AMS for $4,000 per
month for five years was defendants' "change of position" in seizing the business of AMS and
transferring it to a corporation owned by them, QMS. Plaintiffs1 "change of position" would be
relevant only to an attempt by plaintiff to enforce the alleged "contract".
Defendants openly admit that defendants' demand that plaintiffs accept $4,000 per month did
not occur until long after defendants had sought, without prompting from plaintiffs, to acquire
plaintiffs' share of the business for $10,000 per month for five years, and that, during the pendency
of the $10,000 per month offer, defendants had incorporated a replacement company, QMS, and had
the business of AMS transferred to it following the ejectment of plaintiffs from the business. In short,
defendants admit that any "change of position" on defendants' part had occurred while the only offer
that had been discussed was $10,000 per month, and long before an offer of $4,000 per month had
even been made. Defendants' "change of position" could not possibly have been in reliance upon the
alleged acceptance of an offer that hadn't yet been made, or even suggested. The only viable claim
of "change of position" in detrimental reliance adhering in these facts, is plaintiffs' vacating the
business in reliance upon the offer of $10,000 per month.
All that defendants could have relied upon was plaintiffs' expression of willingness to sell for
an appropriate price, not less than $10,000 per month for five years. That is all that was on the table
when defendants "changed position". As that continues to be plaintiffs' position, defendants have
suffered no injury at all. The equitable doctrine of "part performance" taking the alleged contract out
17
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of the Statute of Frauds (§ 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953)) does not apply. All that is presented here is
defendants' attempt to get for $4000/month what they had already seized under guise of an offer to
pay$10,000/month.
Defendants presume that, having dispossessed plaintiffs of their business and income under
false pretenses of discussing a fair price, and having persuaded plaintiffs to take temporarily, in order
to live, a fraction of what defendants represented was due, defendants can rely upon plaintiffs' receipt
of the reduced sum to bind them to a permanent reduction. The only evidence which defendants
assert shows that this otherwise transparent circumstance was the result of a sudden abandonment
of self-interest, is the testimony of Slone Porter, already denied by Tracy Cowley, that he alone heard
Cowley say by phone that the offer was accepted.1 Defendants concede that, having started the
$4,000/month payments in August, 2002, they were confronted in October, 2002, with a demand by
defendants that the negotiation of a fair price be promptly completed.
"The critical observation to make in reading these delineations of what constitutes sufficient
part performance is that it must be proved by strong evidence." Martin v. Scholl, supra, 678 P.2d
at 275. Other cases routinely recite that the evidence must be clear and convincing, reasonably
explicable only by reference to the alleged oral contract. E.g., Montgomery v. Barrett, 121 Pac. 569,
570 (Utah 1912); Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982); Coleman v. Dillman, 624
P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981); Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953); Price v. Lloyd, 86 Pac.
767 (Utah 1906); Downtown Athletic Clerk v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 279-80 (U.Apps. 1987).
Defendants' "strong evidence" of the terms of an agreement is a single phone call, to which
defendants claim a single witness, at radical variance from an admitted prior course of conduct, and
denied by both witnesses on the other side. Not only had defendants offered $10,000 per month
1

Defendants will say that the affidavit of their sister-in-law, Lisa Coleman, recites an
admission of Kerin Cowley that an "agreement" existed. The affidavit, however, lacks
foundation, and does not disclose which "agreement", if any - including one to attempt to work
out a fair price - was in reference. It is of doubtful admissibility if only because Lisa Coleman was
not listed in defendants' Rule 26(a) disclosures. Further, of course, even if Slone Porter's claim
of prompt agreement to accept a fait accompli for 60% less than previously offered were true, it is
doubtful that it could show more than a classic, voidable contract of adhesion.
18
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before they attempted to raise trouble with 7-Eleven, it is known that the parties were then awaiting
completion of a 7-EIeven investigation to determine whether defendants' trouble-making had actually
diminished the value of AMS's business. The $10,000/month offer was promptly put in writing and
a signature solicited; the $4,000/month offer was not. Defendants produce no evidence of their
reliance upon the alleged agreement except a short series of payments, which even defendants admit
were promptly protested. Having seized th business, defendants had to make some payments. These
payments are readily explained as temporary, short payments against a fair price remaining to be
finally negotiated, while an investigation was completed which could confirm the propriety of a
previously offered higher price. They were received of necessity, and contested legally as soon as
defendants disavowed further negotiations. If there is any other rational explanation for the amount
of the payments except contractual obligation, no contract can be found. Such evidence - a dispute
as to the terms of the alleged "agreement", supported by a paucity of equivocal evidence of
"performance" - as a matter of law, never suffices as a defense to the Utah Statute of Frauds.
Montgomery v. Barrett, supra; Coleman v. Dillman, supra.
Had Tracy Cowley not volunteered to sell his interest in AMS, 7-Eleven could have enforced
its rule against dealings with companies owned by recent former employees. It is speculation whether
they would have done so, given 7-Eleven's dependence upon AMS. Had it done so, the effect would
have been to devalue the interests of both Porters and Cowleys in AMS, due to the loss of business
There might have been what Porters feared, a struggle over AMS and an attempt by either or both
parties to re-constitute it in order to service 7-Eleven. Presumably, this was feared because it was
unlikely to work. Plainly, Porters could not force Cowleys to sell out, except upon terms acceptable
to Cowleys, and 7-Eleven (had it been inclined to do so) could not force Cowley's withdrawal from
AMS except with consequences either equally detrimental or equally beneficial to the Cowleys and
Porters, within the discretion of Cowleys.
Plainly, Tracy Cowleys' voluntary withdrawal from AMS, leaving the company intact and able
to continue serving 7-Eleven, was a matter to be bargained for, not coerced, and for which he could
19
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insist upon being paid fair market value for his half of AMS. It was plainly not within any legal power
of Porters to insist that Cowley withdraw, then pay him 40% of the value of his half, while Porters
took 100% of the value of Porters' half plus 60% of Cowleys' half.

CONCLUSIONS, RULE 11
Defendants have supposed from the outset that, because this is a Motion for Summary
Judgment, they had only to show some dispute of material fact to avoid it. They have been wrong
from the outset. The Statute of Frauds fixes on the defendants the burden, on their claim of part
performance of an oral contract, to provide unequivocal evidence of agreement upon clear terms
sought to be enforced, and unequivocal evidence of substantial acts of defendants explicable only as
strict reliance upon such terms, raising an equity that compels enforcement. Mere dispute of facts
regarding any of these matters, or paucity of evidence of reliance, dictates a ruling as a matter of law the Statute of Frauds - that no enforceable agreement exists. Here, defendants assert mere dispute
of facts regarding the existence of a sudden agreement to accept $4,000/month for what defendants
had offered $10,000/month, and a short series of payments, timely disputed in the circumstances,
unsupported by any change of position which raises any equity in favor of defendants.
Any "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" would have fully informed defendants'
counsel that their denial that AMS was dissolved, and their positive assertion that AMS was properly
dissolved, were not "warranted on the evidence". Rule 11(b), U.R.C.P. Moreover, this cannot be
justified on the basis of an excusable mistake of law.
The pleadings filed by counsel certify that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." Rule 11(b)(2), U.R.C.P. The law of
Utah respecting part performance sufficient to negate the Statute of Frauds has been clear and
unchanging for 100 years. Counsel admit to being warned of the effect of the Statute of Frauds long
20
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before this action was commenced.
Defendants' wholly unwarranted denials and assertions have prevented the Court moving
promptly to dissolve on fair terms a corporation which, in the meanwhile, defendants have operated
to provide themselves 160% of their prior interest, while reducing plaintiffs to 40% of theirs. It has
caused delay and expense to plaintiffs, who have been at a grave disadvantage since being
dispossessed of the business which provided their support and the support of their family. It raises
serious questions about the intent of defendants and their counsel to use delay and obfuscation in this
proceeding to compel acquiescence in what amounts to theft of a business.
The Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. As a matter of law, AMS has never
been properly dissolved. The only issue remaining in this matter is assessment against defendants of
the value of plaintiffs' half of AMS.
Plaintiffs are entitled, under Rule 11(c), U.R.C.P., to an award of their fees and costs in
presenting their Motion for Summary Judgment and in resisting defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion.
Defendants have knownfromthe outset that they lacked any colorable basis for denying that AMS
had not been dissolved, and that further time for discovery could not reasonably have been expected
to disclose pertinent evidence not presently readily available. Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah
2000); Hudemcm v. Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491 (U.Apps.1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973
P.2d 932 (Utah 1998).

J
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ?

day of November, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

#fof

I hereby certify that on the /% *" of November, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT " to bemailodby
UrSrWtlTHftrst^ass-rKJStage-pfepatd, to:

Jeffrey R. Price (6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ph: (801)961-7400

-C~ ^
E. Craig Smay
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1

A.

No, I'm not aware of that.

2

Q.

As far as you were aware, was the business

3

that Quality Maintenance Systems I think it's called, the

4

business that they did for 7-11

5

that AMS had previously done for

6

A.

less than the business
7-11?

There was -- from my understanding, there was

7

a reduction in the value of the contracts that Quality

8

Maintenance had with 7-11 as opposed to what the original

9

contracts that AMS or Advanced Maintenance did have with

10

7-11.

11

Q.

Where did you obtain that

information?

12

A.

From Veralynn from the nature of what had

13

gone on at 7-11.

I am aware they did require -- Johan

14

DeBesche required a reduction of what Quality was able to

15

do based on what had occurred.

16

Q.

Who told you that?

17

A.

I believe that conversation was had between

18

Johan and I in many of those hit and miss

19

we had as well as the Porters.

conversations

20

Q.

And what was the nature of the reduction, as

21

you understand it?

22

A.

23

striping business.

24

had a gasoline image contract that was taken away at the

25

time.

I believe that the nature was some of the
I believe Advanced Maintenance had

I believe that there were some

electrical
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1

contracts or lighting type contracts or something that

2

was reduced and given to another vendor.

3

be all, but that's a few of what I am aware of.

That might not

4

Q.

What on earth is a gasoline image contract?

5

A.

Similar to a general maintenance and image

6

contract as it pertains to the gas island at a

7

convenience store, the stickers on the pumps, the handles

8

that you hold onto when you fill your car.

9

obviously filled your car at a fuel station that doesn't

You have

10

change the hand warmers very often and they are very

11

dirty and very greasy.

12

those clean and tidy.

13
14
15

Q.

And gasoline image is to keep

Do you have any idea what the value of that

contract had been when it had been at AMS?
A.

I don't.

It was lucrative.

7-11 at the time

16

was spending a substantial amount of money to gain a

17

share of the market in gasoline and, therefore, they were

18

spending some serious money upgrading the gas islands.

19

worked on those projects during that period of time.

20
21
22

Q.

Do you know who picked up that contract when

AMS lost it?
A.

I believe that 7-11 basically had done a

23

reduction, and I don't know that that contract has been

24

let again to a specific

25

Q.

company.

They simply reduced what they were doing by
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I

way of gasoline image?

3J
4
5

A.

Yes.

Q.

What about the lighting contract?

Do you

know what the value of that may have been?
A.

I really don't have a specific on that.

But

6

I believe they went to either a local electrical vendor

7

or Sylvania which they had a national contract with.

8

Those may be spotty facts, but I know that that was --

9
10
11
12
13

Q.

Sylvania is the company we all know who makes

the light bulbs?
A.

Yes, they also have a service division that

does contractual electrical work.
Q.

Do you have any view whether or not those

14

reductions that you have discussed would have reduced the

15

value of quality below what the value of AMS had been?

16

A.

In signed contractual agreements it would

17

have reduced the value of potential earning power.

18

the basic earning potential of the company I guess is

19

untapped.

20

Q.

But

I mean it's kind of a variable.
So that you couldn't put your finger upon any

21

particular reduction in value of that company as a result

22

of those reductions?

23

A.

No, no, sir.

24

Q.

Did you tell us what it was that Mr. DeBesche

25

now does for Trugreen?

I may have missed making a note
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Q.

You were the market manager or -- is that

2| what you called it?
3

A.

Yes, market manager.

4|

Q.

Was he the regional maintenance manager or

something?
A.

For me.

7|

Q.

No, Jim Craig?

8

A.

Yeah, he was like a regional maintenance

9

manager.

So he had -- the people that reported to him

10

would be like somebody in Tracy Cowley's position, but

11

they were in Colorado.

12

folks in Texas as well.

13

Q.

Tracy was in Utah and then he had

So he had responsibility for a number of

14

stores in various

15

A.

states?

Yes, and he would coordinate all the repairs

16

and maintenance.

17

at the same job that I had only he was over all the

18

repairs and maintenance folks.

19

operations folks.

20
21

Q.

And he would go in and basically he was

I was over all the

Were you still employed at 7-11 when

Mr. Cowley left?

22

A.

Yes, I was.

23

Q.

Do you know why Mr. Cowley left the

24
25

employment of
A.

7-11?

Because he -- I'm going from what he told
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1

me -- he had become a part owner with Slone Porter and

2

Advanced Maintenance Systems.

3

Q.

When did he tell you that?

4

A.

I don't remember.

5
6
7
8
9

was kind of a surprise to me.
Q.

It was before he left.

It

I didn't see it coming.

Why was that a surprise?

Or why is it

significant to you that you didn't see it coming?
A.

Because AMS was doing a number of repairs and

bidding a number of projects for 7-11.

And to me when he

10

left the company, it appeared like it could have been a

11

conflict of interest, that AMS is getting all these bids

12

and the guy that's over it is now a partner with them.

13

Q.

Do you know when he left?

14

A.

I do not.

15

Q.

Did you voice any concern to anybody within

16

7-11 about that issue?

17

A.

Yes, I did.

18

Q.

To who did you talk?

19

A.

I'm not sure.

It wasn't Jim Craig because he

20

had passed away.

But Tracy's -- in fact, Tracy's new

21

boss, Johan DeBesche, he came over and talked to me and

22

we visited about that.

23

some investigation.

And I know that Johan was doing

24

Q.

Do you recall when that was?

25

A.

I don't recall the dates.
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1

Q.

Do you recall when in relationship to when he

2

left it was?

3

Five months?

4

A.

Was it a month after?

Two months?

A week?

Well, on the phone call Johan called me and

5

asked me some questions about it.

And I said yeah, it --

6

you know -- it raised some concern and I recommended that

7

Johan go through all the invoices and bids to see if, in

8

fact, they were true just to make sure that there was

9

nothing that would have been a questionable practice

10

going on while Tracy was in position.

11

through all that stuff.

12

Q.

I think Johan went

Prior to Mr, Cowley leaving, were you aware

13

of any concerns by anybody else about Mr. Cowley and his

14

work at 7-11 as it related to AMS?

15

A.

I know that Gary Tibbetts who was a field

16

consultant expressed a concern to, and I believe it was

17

Jim Craig at the time, when Tracy Cowley had his new home

18

built in Heber.

19

getting free services from some of the vendors, repairs

20

and maintenance vendors from 7-11 to help Tracy build his

21

home because he was doing the bids for 7-11.

22

investigated by Jim Craig, I believe.

23
24
25

Q.

Gary Tibbetts 1 concern was that he was

That was

Were there other maintenance vendors other

than Advanced Maintenance Systems?
A.

Yeah, there were a number of maintenance
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/

A.

The maintenance.

2

Q.

-- Mr. Cowley's position once he left?

3

A.

Yes, uh-huh, because she had access to all

I

4

the records then that were going on

5

the bids and everything.

6

Q.

in maintenance, all

My understanding from my investigation of

7

this case is that Mr. Cowley's last day at 7-11 was March

8

the 31st of 2001.

9

Do you have any reason to dispute that?

10

A.

No, I don't.

11

Q.

Does that sound about right to you?

12

A.

Spring?

March of 2001?

I'm trying to

13

remember when I took over the whole state, because I

14

don't think I had the whole state at the time he left.

15

But again, I have no

16

I can't remember.

17

Q.

18
19

reason to dispute that, just because

And when he left, is that the first time that

you became aware he was an owner or part owner in AMS?
A.

I was aware right before he left, because

20

when he gave his notice he told me what he was doing and

21

I -was very surprised.

22
23

Q.

I think you talked about then you had the

conversation with Mr. Johan DeBesche.

24

A.

Uh-huh.

25

Q.

Telephone conversation,

Is that correct?

correct?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And the reason I tell you about the March

3

31st date is I want to see if that helps you at all to

4

place in time when your conversation with Mr. DeBesche

5

took place.

6

A.

It would have been very shortly after that.

7

Because he did not have a maintenance manager and he had

8

to get somebody in that position to take his place.

9

we had a few people applying like Gary Tibbetts and Ann

10

Atkin, so forth.

11

And

And I highly recommended Ann.

Q.

Ann ended up with that position; is that

13

A.

Yes, she did.

14

Q.

Do you recall how long after Mr. Cowley left

12

15

correct?

that Ann Atkin took that position?

16

A,

I don't recall.

17

Q.

Is she still in the same position today?

18
19

Do

you know?
A.

She was in that position when I left.

And

20

again, I have not been in contact with those folks, so I

21

don't know.

22

two weeks ago that a manager that had worked for me was

23

retiring and she wanted me to give them a call.

24

Q.

25

A.

I did receive a call from Jill Abbott

Who is Jill Abbott?
She is in human resources at 7-11.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

about

Partnership Buy-out
Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley have come to an agreement to split their partnership of
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. and Straight Line Striping, Inc.
The terms of this agreement are as follows:
1. Slone Porter will keep all Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. as it currently exists.*
2. Tracy Cowley will keep all of Straight Line Striping, Inc. as it currently exists.*
3. Tracy Cowley will be paid $600,000 over 60 months at $10,000 per month with NO interest,
due and payable to him on the 5th of each month beginning July 2002.
4. Tracy Cowley will be paid $30,000 cash for purchase of a new vehicle for SLS.
5. Tracy Cowley will own the property through Listo, Inc. (a third corporation owned by both
parties) located at 294 South Center Street, Midway, Utah. The Articles of Incorporated for
Listo, Inc. will be changed following the Deed process with Founder's Title.
6. Tracy Cowley's health insurance will be paid through July 31,2002.
7. Cowley family telephones will be returned July 14,2002.
8. Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley have agreed to not seek legal counsel and this document will
serve as a legal and binding contract.
Parties have agreed to have NO non-compete clause.
Parties have agreed to NO confidentiality clause.
•All Articles of Incorporation will be changed to reflect this agreement. All cash and hard assets,
equipment, vehicles, logo's, telephone numbers will remain the property of said corporations.

Slone Porter

Date

Tracy Cowley

v^
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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW

ONE THIRTY MINE EAST

DARREL J. BOSTWICK

SOUTH TEMPLE ST., SUITE 320

JEFFERY R. PRICEf

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

MICHAEL E. BOSTWICKJ
ROBERT K REYNARD

TELEPHONE 801-961-7400

CHRISTOPHER C. HILL

TELEFAX 801-961-7406

fAiso ADMITTED I N PENNSYLVANIA
$ALSO AOMfTTED IN IDAHO

www.bostwickpnce.com

December 17,2002
VIA TELEFAX (531-9926^ and U.S. MAIL

Scott E. Savage, Esquire
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC,
SAVAGE & CAMPBELL
50 S. Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City', Utah 84144
Re:

f lit WM

Slone and Veralvnn Porter and Kevin and Tracv Cowley

Dear Mr. Savage:
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation yesterday, I and thisfirmrepresent
Mr. and Mrs. Porter in connection with the issuos raised by your clients Mr. and Mrs. Cowley.
All further communications regarding this matter should be made to my attention at the Salt Lake
City address and telephone number indicated above. This letter serves to follow up on our
telephone conversation yesterday concerning issues raised by your clients.
Early in the summer of this year, there were detailed discussions between our respective
clients concerning the transfer of ownership in certain business enterprises as a means of
discontinuing the business relationship between the Porters and the Cowleys. Those discussions
resulted in an agreement, the details of which provided for the distribution of assets, and for
payment of cash in specified amountsfromthe Porters to the Cowleys. That agreement was
reached during June and July 2002. From that time, Porters have paid substantial sums of cash to
the Cowleys as the parties had agreed. The Porters continue to make monthly payments toward
the remaining balance due under the agreement, in accordance with the terms to which the parties
agreed.
Inexplicably, the Cowleys have lately determined to request more moneyfromthe Porters
contrary to the terms which were agreed to, and under which the parties have been operating now
for several months. At the Porters' request we have prepared a written document which contains
the terms and conditions of the agreement reached between the Porters and the Cowleys, which
are the terms and conditions under which the Porters have been making payments to the
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Decedmber 17,2002
Page 2
Cowleys, and will continue to make payments to the Cowleys until the now remaining balance of
the initial $240,000 is paid in full. A copy of the agreement is enclosed. The Porters request the
Cowleys to execute the document and to return it to us signed at their convenience.
In our telephone conversation, you indicated that the Cowleys believe they are entitled to
50% of "the business" value. I am not clearfromyour comments as to what the Cowleys believe
constitutes the 50% that they are entitled to as compared with what has been agreed to by the
Parties. In the process of reaching an agreement, the various companies were evaluated and
valued and an appropriate price agreed upon. In that process, the cash assets were split equally,
and the Cowleys5 share paid out to them already. On or about July 9,2002, a complete inventory
of all capital assets of the companies was conducted,fromwhich it was determined the value of
the vehicles, shop tools and materials and other miscellaneous property was $208,000.00. Fifty
percent of that amount would have been $104,000.00 to be paid to the Cowleys. The Cowleys
wanted more to settle with the Porters over the stock transfer issues. In order to reach an
agreement, the Porters agreed to pay a total of $240,000 by way of monthly payments to the
Cowleys. In addition, the Porters agreed to be responsible for the debt associated with the
vehicles, which at that time totaled approximately $135,000.00. Normally, the debt would have
been split equally as well, resulting in a liability to the Cowleys of approximate $65,000.00.
You did not indicate in our conversation that the Cowleys were interested in being responsible
for any of the debt of the business enterprises as part of the distribution.
The agreement as set forth with this letter, reflects that the Cowleys have received more
than 50% of the value of the companies in the distribution agreement the parties have reached.
Our review of the information relating to the valuation supports that conclusion. We suggest that
in lieu of commencing the threatened legal proceedings, the Cowleys should review the
agreement and provide us with information as to why or how it does not represent the agreement
of the parties pertaining to the assets and liabilities as distributed by the parties' agreement, and
the Porters will review and respond to that position. As I indicated, whether this matter ends up
in litigation is your clients' choice at this point. We have no information to suggest that any
court ordered distribution would be any more favorable to your clients than the agreement the
parties have already reached. In light of the existing liabilities, we believe any result in litigation
would only serve to dissipate the resources available for payment to the Cowleys and in the end
serve no useful purposes. Nonetheless, please be advised that should the Cowleys determine to
pursue legal action, the matter will be vigorously defended by the Porters to enforce the terms of
the agreement the parties have already reached, and under which they have been operating for
several months. We look forward to hearingfromyou on behalf of the Cowleys.
Sincerely^
^1——*^
BOSTWipC ^ M C E , P ^ V f

JRP:c/md/5031/Ltr.01.1217
enclosure
cc. Veralynn Porter (w/encl.)

/
"

IIjr
/
/
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STOCK TRANSFER AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS DISSOLUTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is hereby entered into
by and between Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy J. Cowley, Kerin Cowley, Advanced
Maintenance Services, Inc. ("Advanced"), Straight Line Striping, Inc. ("Straight Line"), and
Listo, Inc. ("Listo"), collectively referred to herein as the "Parties."
WHEREAS, the Parties, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, wish to resolve their differences in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth herein.
WHEREAS, the Parties wish to memorialize their oral contract which was entered into and
agreed upon by all Parties, according to the terms and conditions set forth herein.
WHEREAS, the Parties to date have complied with the terms and conditions set forth herein,
and agree to continue to comply with the terms and conditions until all terms and conditions set forth
herein have been satisfied.
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound and in an effort to settle
claims stemmingfromtheir dispute, hereby agree as follows:
1.

The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter each owned fifty
percent (50%) of the company known as Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.,
Federal Tax LD. # 87-0548605.

2.

Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter, the two stockholders of the company, hereby
agree to dissolve Advanced,

3.

The Parties hereby agree that one-half (Vi) of the cash assetsfromAdvanced shall be
distributed to Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley. This amount shall consist of
previously allocated funds used by the Cowleys in three separate checks; $25,000 on
June 27, 2002, $16,500 on July 29, 2002, and $11,800 on July 31, 2002; totaling
$53,300.

4.

Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter hereby agree to pay off Tracy Cowley's 2001
F350 vehicle, VIN # 1FTSX31F11EC34760. The payment will be $1,062.57 per
month until paid-off in full. The current balance on the vehicle is $17,314.12.

5.

The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter incorporated a new
company on July 1,2002 known as Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("Quality"),
Federal Tax LD. # 04-3690183. Slone owns fifty percent (50%) of the company, and
Veralynn owns fifty percent (50%) of the company.

6.

The Parties hereby agree that a cash payout of $240,000 will be paid out to Tracy J.
Cowley and Kerin Cowley by Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter through their new
company, Quality.

7.

The Parties hereby agree that the $240,000 will be distributed in payments of $4,000
per month for five (5) years, beginning August 1,2002. Each $4,000 check is to be
paid to Straight Line.
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8.

Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter, through their new company, Quality, hereby
agree to pay the health insurance premiums for Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley
through December 31, 2002. The health insurance plan is known as ValueCare
Health Insurance. The monthly premium payment is $724.40.

9.

The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line, Federal Tax ID. # 84-1429330, was
owned by Veralynn Porter and Kerin Cowley, each owningfiftypercent (50%) each.

10.

The Parties hereby agree that the entire business of Straight Line, including A/R, A/P,
equipment, and all cash on hand was valued at $41,336.96 as of June 30,2002.

11.

Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to transfer her fifty percent (50%) ownership of
Straight Line to Kerin Cowley on July 1,2002.

12.

The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line is now completely owned byKerin
Cowley as of July 1,2002.

13.

Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to be responsible for one-half (Yi) of the taxes owed
by Straight Line through June 30,2002. Veralynn Porter will be filing afinalK-l at
the end of 2002.

14.

The Parties hereby agree that Listo, Federal Tax ID. # 87-0657135, was owned in
equal shares of twenty-five percent (25%) by Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porta-, Tracy
J. Cowley, and Kerin Cowley.

15.

The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter transferred their
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in Listo to Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley,
respectively, on July 1,2002.

16.

The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley took complete
control of Listo on July 1,2002.

17.

The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter are responsible
for one-forth (1/4), respectively, of the taxes of Listo, Inc., through the end of 2002.
Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter will each befilingafinalK-1 at the end of 2002.

18.

The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley, as owners of Listo
will take possession of the rental property located at 294 South Center Street,
Midway, UT 84049, which was purchased for the price of $115,000.00.

19.

The Parties hereby agree that this Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement is a
written confirmation of the verbal agreement entered into by the parties on or about
June 22,2002.

20.

This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties,
including their successors and assigns.

21.

The Parties agree that this Agreement in no way constitutes or infers an admission
or concession of fault or liability by any party.
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22.

The Parties warrant and represent that the individuals whose signatures appear below
have been duly authorized to enter this Agreement on behalf of each party for whom
they sign.

23.

This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be
considered an original of the Agreement. The Parties further agree to warrant that
signatures made and received via telefacsimile shall, for the convenience of the
Parties,
have the same force and effect as original signatures until such time as original
signatures of all the Parties may be obtained.

24

The Parties warrant that no promise, inducement or agreement not expressed herein
has been made to them in connection with this Agreement. This Agreement
contains the entire agreement between the Parties. All prior negotiations and
discussions are merged herein as expressed by the written terms set forth herein,
and/or in any Exhibits identified and/or incorporated herein by reference. This
Agreement may not be modified, changed, or altered in any way except in a writing
signed by the Parties or their authorized representatives, which sets forth the
change(s) to be made, and the intent of the Parties to modify or amend this
Agreement.

25.

If any provision of this Agreement, by way of this Instrument or otherwise, or the
application thereof, shall for any reason and to any extent be found invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this Agreement
with all remaining clauses, directives, provisions, Parties, and circumstances, with
any application thereof, shall continue in full force to the maximum extent
permissible under applicable law. Concerning any successfully challenged provision
in this instrument, insofar as it is reasonable and possible, shall be GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

26.

This Parties to this Agreement hereby agree that any action on this Agreement shall
be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction located in Heber City, Utah, which
is located in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Wasatch, State of Utah.

27.

The successful party to any action arising in connection with the enforcement of this
Agreement shall be awarded its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby set their hands and
respective seals on the day and date set forth below.

ADVANCED MAINTENANCE SERVICES INC.
By_
Date
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STRAIGHT LINE STRIPING, INC.

By
Date

LISTO, INC.

By
Date

INDIVIDUALLY

By^
Date

Slone D. Porter

By
Date

Veralynn Porter

By
Date

Tracy J. Cowley

By
Date

Kerin Cowley
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT
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WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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5
6

<P
7 TRACY COWLEY

Et al,
Plaintiff,

8
9
10
vs

11

Case No: 030500244
Bench Trial
Judge Donald J. Eyre

12
13
14 SLONE PORTER Et al,
Defendant.

15
16
17

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE FIRST DAY

18
19
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the first day of June, two

20

21 thousand four, the bench trial in the matter of Tracy Cowley Et
22 al vs Slone Porter Et al was electronically recorded before the
23 Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre of the above entitled court at
24 the Fourth

Judicial Court building, Heber, Utah,

25
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1 thirty.
2

Q.

What d i d you say a t t h a t meeting?

3

A.

Nothing.

Slone s a i d what d i d you need, what e l s e do

4 |you want? And he s a i d .
5

Q.

Who i s he?

6

A.

Tracy said we have an insurance situation.

We want

7 |you to pay our insurance through the end of December two
8 thousand and two and possibly further because we've checked
9 into it, I guess, I assume during that last month, we checked
10 into it and we're going to have a hard time getting insurance.
11 |And I told him I'll call Kyle Fuller, our insurance agent and
12 see what we can do.

Right now we've agreed because we had

13 agreed earlier to cover their insurance not through July as it
14 Ihad said previously but through December and I'll see what Kyle
15 Fuller has to say and then he asked if he could have the Skagg
16 lawnmower and we said sure.
17

Q.

Okay.

Anything else you recall that was said at that

18 [meeting?
19

A.

That's when he said, Tracy was probably more relieved

20 than I'd seen him and he said just get it drawn up Veralynn,
21 call me and I'll get it signed.
22

Q.

And what, if anything, did you say after that?

23

A.

That was it.

24

Q.

How long did that meeting last?

25

A.

That was not a very long meeting.

Two or three
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1 {minutes, four minutes.
2

Q.

Is there anything else that transpired at that meeting

3 [|you haven't told us about?
4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Okay.

I would like, if you would, to turn to two

6 [exhibits laying side by side.

The first one being Plaintiffs

7 Exhibit Number Seven.
8

A.

Okay. Alright.

9

Q.

And what has been marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit Number

10 (Three.
11

A.

Plaintiffs Three?

12

Q.

Excuse me.

Plaintiffs Five.

Plaintiffs Five and

13 Plaintiffs Seven.
14

A.

You have them laying side by side?

15

Q.

(inaudible)

16

A.

Seven and three.

Okay.

Got them.

17

THE COURT: Five, excuse me, Five and Seven.

18

THE WITNESS:

Five and Seven.

Okay.

Got them.

19 |BY MR. PRICE:
20

Q.

Looking first at Exhibit Number Five.

21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

It's got some numerated items, one through eight and a

23 couple that we've heard some testimony about.

Correct?

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

With respect to number one it says, "Slone Porter will
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1 keep all Advanced Maintenance Services Inc as it currently
2 exists."

Do you know if that happened?

3

A.

It didn't happen.

4

Q.

Okay.

We got fired.

Number two, it says "Tracy Cowley will keep all

5 |of Straightline Striping Inc. as it currently exists."

Did

6 that happen?
7

A.

It did happen.

8

Q.

Number three, "Tracy Cowley will be paid six hundred

9 thousand over sixty months at ten thousand dollars per month at
10 ino interest due and payable to him on the fifth of each month
11 [beginning July of two thousand two."
12

A.

That did not happen.

13

Q.

Okay.

Number four, "Tracy Cowley will be paid thirty

14 thousand dollars cash for purchase of a new vehicle for
15 Straightline Striping."
16

A.

That did not happen.

17

Q.

Same question for number five, "Tracy Cowley will own

18 fproperty through Lis to Inc."
19

A.

That did happen.

20

Q.

And he chose the Midway property.

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

Number six, "Tracy Cowley's health insurance will be

Correct?

23 |paid through July thirty-first, two thousand and two."
24 Correct?
25

A.

That did not happen.

We paid it through December
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1 thirty-first.
2

Q.

Number Seven, "Cowley family telephone will be

3 returned July fourteenth, two thousand two."
4

A.

That did happen.

5

Q.

Are those the cellular phones?

6

A.

Those were the cell phones.

7

Q.

Okay.

Did they return the phones or did they transfer

8 the account?
9

A.

They transferred the account.

We were going to have

10 them return the phones but then he wanted to just transfer and
11 keep the numbers and so that's, he filled out the paperwork for
12 [Verizon to do that.
13

Q.

Number eight says "Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley have

14 agreed to not seek legal counsel and this document to serve as
15 a legal and binding contract.".
16

A.

That did not happen.

17

Q.

Okay.

With respect to the next item, "Parties have

18 agreed to have no non-compete clause."
19

A.

That did happen.

20

Q.

Okay.

Did that happen?

We compete and they compete.

"Parties have agreed to no confidentiality

21 clause."
22

A.

That did happen.

23

Q.

Okay.

Everybody knows everything.

And then the next asterisk says "All articles

24 [of incorporation will be changed to reflect this agreement.
25 ffi.ll cash and hard assets, equipment, vehicles, logos, telephone
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1 [numbers will remain the property of said corporations."
2

A.

That did not happen.

We split the cash of AMS with

3 them and some of the hard assets.

They took three pickup

4 trucks.
5

Q.

Now I'd like you to look at Exhibit Number Seven if

6 |you would.
7

A.

Okay.

I'm there.

Is that the one that's titled Stock

8 Transfer and Settlement Agreement?
9

Q.

Right.

I think you testified that this was an attempt

10 to summarize what had been agreed to on July the nineteenth.
11 Correct?
12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

Albeit subject (inaudible) your attorney?

(inaudible)

14 the same (inaudible)?
15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

With respect to number one, let's see.

17 let's start with number two.

Number two,

Did that happen?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Were articles of dissolution filed because of number

21

A.

They were.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

That did happen.

24

Q.

How about number four?

25

A.

That did happen.

20 two?

Number three, did that happen?
Yes.
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1

Q.

Okay.

Number f i v e ?

2

A.

That d i d happen.

3

Q.

Number s i x ?

4

A.

That is currently happening.

5 thousand per month every month.

I've paid them four

I'm not in breach of that.

6 Yes.
7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

That's, that's ongoing and continuing.

9

Q.

Number eight?

10

A.

That is, that did happen.

11

Q.

How about number nine?

12

A.

That did happen.

13

Q.

Number ten?

14

A.

That did happen.

15

Q.

How about number eleven?

16

A.

That did happen.

17

Q.

How about number twelve?

18

A.

I think it happened.

19 name.

How about number seven?

I don't know.

Yes.

I think she put it all in her

But I transferred mine to her.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

How about fourteen and fifteen?

23

A.

There again, it happened.

How about number thirteen?
That did happen.

24 they put everything in.

25

Q.

Yes.

I don't know whose name

The transfer happened, yes.

How about number seventeen?
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1

A.

That did happen.

2

Q.

How about eighteen?

3

A.

That did happen.

4

Q.

You testified that you made some audio recordings of

5 these various meetings.

Yes.

Do you recall that?

6

A.

We did.

Yes.

7

Q.

You also testified that you threw them into the

8 Jordanelle Reservoir.

Do you recall that?

9

A.

I did.

10

Q.

Do you recall when you did that?

11

A.

It was the twenty-fourth of July.

12

Q.

Why do you recall that?

13

A.

Because we had agreed on the nineteenth.

Slone and I

14 [went for a picnic lunch that day and I took them with me and
15 chucked them at the bottom of the lake.
16

Q.

Can I have just a second, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Okay.

17

18 |BY MR. PRICE:
19

Q.

Your Honor, at this time I have no further questions

20 but as a matter of keeping the records straight we would offer
21 [Exhibits Five, Seven and Seventeen.

That is Plaintiffs Exhibit

22 Five, Seven and Seven and also Exhibit Number Seventeen.
23

THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Smay?

Five and Seven

24 are your exhibits.
25

MR. SMAY: Exhibits Ten, Eleven, Twelve should also be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 232

1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Did you and Mrs. Cowley have any further discussion?

3

A.

We had a lot of discussion that night.

4

Q.

One result of that discussion must have been, as Mrs.

Absolutely.

5 Porter's testified, you came in the next day and said you'd
6 take the offer?
7

A.

Absolutely.
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor.

8

That's leading and

9 suggestive.
10

THE COURT: Sustained.

11

MR. SMAY: I'd like to rephrase, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT: Sustained.

13 IBY MR. SMAY:
14

Q.

Mr. Cowley, describe for me then, if you would, your

15 discussions with Mr. Cowley on the night of the twenty-third.
16

A.

My discussions with Kerin that night were that at that

17 [point any option of me staying with Advanced Maintenance
18 Services and make that work was over. With 7-Eleven having
19 full knowledge of my involvement from the inception, there was
20 no option for me to be able to stay.
21 relationship with Ann.

I had not had a great

Part of that was based on the fact that

22 [when I left 7-Eleven with Ann digging real hard into AMS's
23 stuff I had always said look, if you need a scapegoat or
24 somebody to blame stuff on, I'm a good guy to blame it on
25 because they are already unhappy with me.

I want to keep them
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1 really happy with Slone and Vera.

So if we need somebody to

2 tell, messed things up, it's probably Tracy, if there's issues
3 that come up.

So I knew when they had told Ann that the option

4 for me to go talk to Johan or 7-Eleven or anybody else about
5 continuing to be able to move forward with Advanced Maintenance
6 Systems or any kind of a maintenance company with 7-Eleven was
7 effectively over and having discussed with her we arrived at
8 the decision that the best option at this point would be to
9 take the offer without any further squabble or fight and move
10 on with our lives.
11

Q.

And what did you do about that?

12

A.

X went to the office Monday morning to have that

13 discussion.

It took a little while longer to have the

14 [discussion than was indicated.

I went into the office and

15 actually checked my voice mail and answered a couple of e16 (mails.

One specifically to Ann Atkin that morning about an

17 issue that had been ongoing and then I sat down at the table
18 Iwith Vera and Slone.
19

Q.

Was the matter you discussed to Miss Atkin by E-mails

20 germane to any of the rest of this (inaudible)?
21

A.

Not really.

We had had a gas pump and I was the guy

22 in charge of getting it fixed and back on line and repaired and
23 it was just giving her a heads up when that was going to be
24 done.
25

Q.

Those errands out of the way, did you then have a
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1 Idiscussion with the Porters?
2

A.

I did.

And as with Saturday's and Sunday's meeting,

3 the very first thing they did before we could proceed was start
4 the tape recorder and enunciate who was going to be at the
5 [meeting that morning.
6

Q.

And did they tell you on that occasion what the

7 [purpose of the taping was?
8

A.

No.

Although we had requested copies of the tape both

9 Saturday, Sunday and again on Monday, we requested copies and
10 Slone assured us each time that we would get copies of those
11 tapes.

He just not had time to make copies for us.

Each time

12 |he assured us that that would be the case. No problem.
13

Q.

Did you give the Porters any indication about your

14 reaction to their offer?
15

A.

I did.

16

Q.

What did you tell them?

17

A.

I told them at that point that we were, we were

18 [willing to accept the offer and move on and even, you know,
19 it's pretty naive, even at that meeting, Slone had assured that
20 in their conversations with Ann that Ann was prepared to allow
21 |me to continue to do striping for 7-Eleven and maintain that
22 contract.

But I told them that we were ready to take the deal

23 and that we just, we had a couple of issues that Vera wrote
24 {down.
25

Q.

Can you recall (inaudible) a couple of additional
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1 terms you wanted to add were?
2

A.

No.

We had to deal with cell phones. We had to deal

3 with health insurance.

We were struggling with whether or not

4 to have a no compete clause or that double negative you keep
5 talking about, the no non-compete clause.
6

Q.

The no non-compete clause.

7

A.

Just those few, just a couple of things like that.

8

Q.

Did you suggest the no non-compete?

9

A.

I did.

10

Q.

Or the no, no, non-compete?

11

A.

I suggested that we both be able to pursue options in

12 {whatever field.
13

Q.

Mr. Cowley, let me have you take a look at some

14 (exhibits that have been, they're all still here.
15 Plaintiffs Three.

This is

Would you take a look at that document?

16

A.

Number Three?

17

Q.

Yes.

18

A.

These are the things Vera wrote down that morning when

Those, well, tell us what they are?

19 we sat there in the office.
20

Q.

This is what you dictated to her.

21

A

Absolutely,

22

Q

(inaudible) correctly?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Look them through, if you would Mr. Cowley, just for

25 [purposes of refreshing your recollection and tell me if they
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1 accurately reflect what your discussion was with Mrs. Porter at
2 the time?
3

A.

They do accurately reflect that.

4

Q.

There is a, as I recall, a note in the upper corner,.

5 July one?
6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You see that?

8

A.

That signified that it would be done by July first in

Tell me what that signifies.

9 conjunction with Vera's wishes that it all be done before the
10 end of the second quarter.
11

Q.

At the point that that document was written up by Mrs.

12 Porter, had you been told that Mr. de Besche was planning a
13 trip to town and wanted to speak to?
14

A.

No.

15

Q.

With you and the Porters?

I had not.
Was Mrs. Cowley present on

16 that occasion?
17

A.

She was not.

18

Q.

Why was she not?

19

A.

It's my fault.

She was in the young women's and they

20 had their young women's camp that week all scheduled.

And she

21 had agreed to be one of the camp directors and I just didn't
22 feel like she could deal on that with them and we did come to
23 an agreement on Sunday night that we were going to put the deal
24 to bed and move on.
25

Q.

Had you discussed with Mrs. Cowley the additional
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1 terms that you wanted (inaudible) Veralynn to add at that time?
2

A.

Yes. We had discussed it.

3

Q.

So that when you expressed to the Porters that this

4 [was an arrangement acceptable to you, you were speaking for
5 [both of the Cowleys (inaudible) ?
6

A.

Absolutely.

7

Q.

Did the Porters then suggest to you that they wanted

8 to add or alter any of the terms that they had expressed to you
9 on the twenty-second?
10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Did you make the choice at that point between the two

12 [(properties of Listo that you wanted?
13

A.

I did.

We chose the Midway property due to the fact

14 that we had acquired the St. George property through Vera's
15 family was selling it and we just felt like the decent thing to
16 [do was let them keep the family property.
17

Q.

Upon transcribing the arrangement in handwriting as

18 |you have (inaudible) Mr. Cowley, what transpired next?
19

A.

Vera wanted to get it typed up and signed and sealed

20 so she went on over to the computer and typed it up.
21

Q.

Let me have you look on down at the next (inaudible)

22 stack?
23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And if you'll look over here, perhaps this one doesn't

25 Ihave (inaudible) . You may want to look at those two then
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1 (possibly.

Let me have you look at Exhibits Number Five and

2 dumber Four in the Plaintiffs Exhibits if you would Mr. Cowley?
3

A. Yes.

4

Q.

Tell me what those are if you know.

5

A.

This is what Vera typed up that morning.

6

Q.

The underlying typed material is identical.

8

A.

It is correct.

9

Q.

Two copies of the same thing?

10

A.

Yes sir.

11

Q.

Alright.

Is it

7 not?

Yes.

Do you recall, did you observe Mr. Porter

12 sign his copy?
13

A.

I did.

14

Q.

Did he say anything to you at that point?

15

A.

Not that I recall.

16

Q.

He and Veralynn apparently left if I'm understanding

17 correctly.
18

A.

Yes. Before they left I indicated to them that I

19 |would not sign it until Kerin was back.

Kerin, my wife, and

20 just a precursor why I wouldn't sign it without her there when
21 |we bought up the third partner, he had failed to tell his wife
22 anything about leaving the company and I still did business
23 [with Bill for years after that and she was pretty ticked at him
24 for a long, long time that he hadn't told her that he was
25 leaving AMS and moving on so.
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I

MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor.

That's hearsay.

2 (Move to strike.
3

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

4

THE COURT: It's always (inaudible).

5

THE WITNESS:

It is.

It absolutely is.

I just, I

6 [didn't want to sign it without Kerin there.
7 |BY MR. SMAY:
8

Q.

You didn't say to the Porters you weren't going to

9 sign it period?
10

A.

Absolutely not.

11

Q.

In point of fact, you had told them up to that point

12 that it was all agreeable to you?
13

A.

14

Q.

Yes.

I had.

Did you indicate when you thought Mrs. Cowley might

15 |be back to do that?
16

A.

No.

17 seventh.

I don't believe she got back until the twenty-

I'm not positive of that but yes.

I indicated that's

18 Iwhen she'd be back.
19

Q.

What then became of your copy of the document?

20

A.

After they left, I called Kerin to talk to her.

She

21 |had indicated that she was nervous about a no non-compete
22 clause because she felt like as soon it was done, the Porters
23 [would go buy striping equipment and then we would also lose the
24 7-Eleven striping account as well.
25 up.

They'd start picking that

And she wanted that changes so they wouldn't go into the
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1 striping business.

And I wrote Vera a note and left it on the

2 desk.
3

Q.

And the note says?

4

A.

Vera, call me.

5

Q.

And did Vera call you?

6

A.

She did.

7

Q.

And did you express to her that you had some concern

With my initials.

That's my writing.

8 about the no non-compete?
9

A.

10 |ways.

I did.

And she basically said you can't have it both

You're either going to compete or you're not going to

11 compete.

And at that point I told her you know what, leave it

12 as a no non-compete clause then.
13

Q.

Did you have any further discussion on the subject of

14 the document that night?
15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Let me be clear about that.

When did Mrs. Porter call

17 |you back?
A.

It was in the afternoon, that afternoon she had called

20

Q.

Within a few hours of leaving?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Was anybody else attendant on that phone call?

23

A.

There was no one around me when she called.

18
19 |me.

Within a few hours of leaving.

My boys

24 were gone to my grandma's and I was home alone.
25

Q.

At that point, Mr. Cowley, who had the written copies
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1 of that document, the one (inaudible) Mrs. Porter and the one
2 (inaudible)?
3

A.

Vera had both of them.

I left both of them at the

4 office.

I'm not sure who had them in their possession.

5

Q.

And did you keep the handwritten copy?

6

A.

I did.

7

Q.

I may have asked you Mr. Cowley but just very quickly,

Yes.

8 las far as you recall did the meeting of the twenty-fourth was
9 [also tape recorded?
10

A.

Yes.

It was.

I believe I said that in my testimony.

11

Q.

Thank you and I just let it slip.

Did Mr. Porter ever

12 tell you thereafter what he had done with his copy of the
13 [document that he had signed?
14

A.

In our meeting on the twenty-seventh after his

15 visiting with Johan and Ann in the office he specifically told
16 [us that he had showed Ann and Johan that agreement.
17

Q.

Well, let's go forward then to that, to those

18 [discussions.

If you wouldn't mind Mr. Cowley, when did you

19 learn that there was going to be that discussion with Mr. de
20 iBesche?
21

A.

Monday afternoon when I spoke with Slone.

22

Q.

And what did he say (inaudible) do you recall?

23

A.

He said that we had a meeting on Thursday.

Johan was

24 coming to town to investigate the whole matter.
25

Q.

And did anyone at 7-Eleven call and tell you to be
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1

Q.

You asked Mr. de Besche for some sort of coy of that

2 (you said.
3

A.

I wanted a transcript.

By then I kind of wanted to

4 |hear what other people were telling 7-Eleven about me.
5

Q.

Did you ever get one?

6

A.

Finally through this case we got one. Yes.

7

Q.

Okay.

Where did you go then, Mr. Cowley, following

8 the meeting with 7-Eleven on June twenty-second?
9

A.

I went home.

10

Q.

Did you have nay further contact then on the twenty-

11 seventh with the Porters?
12

A.

We did. Yes.

13

Q.

Tell me how that occurred.

14

A.

We met at the office to discuss what had happened,

15 (where we were both at.

Four of us met at the office.

Vera,

16 Slone, Kerin and myself.
17

Q.

Alright.

18

A.

I believe it was early evening.

19

Q.

What, was there a particular purpose for having that

About what time of day would that have been?
I'm not certain.

20 |meeting?
21

A.

Just, an informational meeting to see, you know, where

22 everybody was at following our meeting with Johan.
23

Q.

At any time during the course of that meeting, Mr.

24 Cowley, did the Porters suggest to you that what had transpired
25 Iwith 7-Eleven earlier in the day had any effect whatever upon
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1 the arrangement you had made with them on the

twenty-fourth?

2

A.

They d i d n o t .

3

Q.

Did they suggest to you that they were withdrawing any

4 |of that?

Altering any of that?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Did you receive any funds from the Porters on that

They did not.

7 occasion?
8

A.

You know, I don't recall when we received funds for

9 certain.
10

But I know we did get funds from AMS's accounts.

Q.

Presuming that Mrs. Porter's testimony was correct

11 that that was on the twenty-seventh, do you recall how much you
12 got?
13

A.

I believe it was twenty-five thousand dollars.

14

Q.

And do you recall what the purpose of that was?

15

A.

She has testified that it was to give us operating

16 [money.
17

Q.

That's what I probably ought to leave it at.
Well, did you have an assessment of what it was for at

18 the time?
19

A.

Do you remember?
Yes.

I think they need money to relogo all the vans

20 [and change the names and get new paperwork in hand and
21 effectively make QMS open for business.
22

Q.

When, Mr. Cowley, in any of your visits to the AMS

23 office as you've described, did you observe anything that
24 indicated a change between, excuse me, AMS and QMS?
25

A.

I believe it was, I'm not sure which night it was,
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1 the bidding process.

MR. SMAY: As it eventually turned out, yes she was.

2

3 |The question of whether there was anyone else who was likely to
4 succeed in that.

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection,

5

6 (inaudible)
7 IBY MR. SMAY:
8

Q.

Mr. Cowley, tell us which contracts you understood AMS

9 jhad before it became QMS, the business it was doing for 710 feleven?
11

A.

General maintenance contract, fast food contract,

12 (gasoline contract for hanging hardware, those are the major
13 ones.
14

Q.

Thereafter, after the contracts were renewed with QMS,

15 did you become aware of any changes in (inaudible)?
16

A.

My understanding was they, they picked up an

17 additional contract on beverage and Slurpee at that point.
18

Q.

So they are actually doing more business?

19

A.

It would appear so.

20

Q.

Going back to the discussions that you apparently had

21 |with the Porters on the twenty-seventh of June, two thousand
22 two, did the question of performing an inventory of , what we
23 call, hard assets, I take it equipment and so on, supplies of
24 |AMS enter into those discussions?
25

A.

Yes.

It did.
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1

Q.

How did that occur?

2

A.

Slone and I were going to perform it together, get the

3 [guys' equipment list off their trucks and figure out what we
4 [actually had.
5

Q.

Why did you want to do that?

6

A.

Well, I knew we had stripers and we had stencils and

7 stuff like that sitting at the shop and it was just, I was
8 curious.
9

Q.

Stripers and stencils are things that would have been

10 used in the striping business?
11

A.

Straightline Striping, yes.

12

Q.

But is there anything in the documents that Mr. Porter

13 (had signed and you had initialed which you understand to
14 indicate that an inventory of that type was going to be
15 required?
16

A.

No.

17

Q.

There is a sentence at the bottom to which I'm

18 referring which seems to say that you're going to split the
19 [equipment between the two companies.

That's my reading of it,

20 |you (inaudible), do you find that sentence, Mr. Porter?
21

MR. PRICE: Excuse me, which document?

22

THE WITNESS: The partnership buy out.

23

MR. SMAY: These, Your Honor, are the two document

24 that are the agreement (inaudible).
25

THE COURT: (inaudible)
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THE WITNESS: I can r e a d t h a t l a s t s e n t e n c e i f

1

you'd

2 like?
3 |BY MR. SMAY:
4

Q.

Go a h e a d .

5

A.

"All Articles of Incorporation will be changed to

6 {reflect this agreement.

All cash and hard assets, equipment,

7 [vehicles, logos, telephone numbers will remain the property of
8 said corporation."
9

Q.

Could you separate the property between the two

10 corporations in that way without performing this inventory?
11

A.

I think it would be pretty tough to not go through the

12 shop and know what was there so you knew if you got it all.
13

Q.

Did the Porters ever suggest to you on that occasion,

14 |Mr. Cowley, that the purpose of performing this inventory was
15 to make some determination of what they'd give you for your
16 share of AMS?
17

A.

No sir. We believed we already had agreement.

18

Q.

Did you ever suggest to them that you would accept an

19 inventory for that purpose?
20

A.

I did not.

21

Q.

When, in fact, did you move out of the AMS premises?

22

A.

You know, there is some discrepancy there because I

23 [believe I moved, I believe that Computer Works Inc in Heber
24 City took my computer out of the office on Monday the twenty25 fifth to install it at my home and I believe I took all my
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PROCEEDINGS ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE TRIAL

15
16
THE COURT: Go ahead.

17
|BY MR. SMAY:

18
Q.

Alright.

Mr. Cowley, we had gotten to the subject of

19
|an inventory yesterday.

Do you recall that?

20
A.

I do.

Q.

And you had told us when, in your recollection, you

21
22
Jhad left the AMS offices, taking your property away.

In the

23
time between June twenty-second and your taking your property

24
lout and leaving AMS, had anyone mentioned to you any other

25
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1 [price for your interest in AMS except ten thousand dollars a
2 (month for a total of six hundred thousand dollars?
3

A.

No sir.

4

Q.

Had anyone suggested to you in any of that time that

5 those kind of terms were going to be withdrawn or changed in
6 any way?
7

A.

They had not.

8

Q.

Once you had left AMS on that morning, can you think

9 of anything besides yourself that AMS had had which was not now
10 under the control of QMS?
11

A. No.

12

Q. Were you aware of anything that QMS had at that point

13 Miich had not come from AMS?
14

A.

No.

I was not.

15

Q.

With respect to that, Mr. Cowley, about what business

16 |QMS was to be doing (inaudible) tell us what you knew about
17 that.
18

A.

My understanding of the business was they were working

19 on a time and materials basis with 7-11 to do the same work we
20 [had always done previously.

I know they were still working for

21 Resort Retailers in the Park City- Heber area and the other
22 (minor things that were going on.
23

Q.

Just briefly Mr. Cowley, what was Resort Retailers?

24

A.

That's a licensee for 7-11.

The only licensee in the

25 State.
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1

Q.

They bought the 7-11 stores in Park City?

2

A,

They did.

3

Q.

And what was your understanding about future 7-11

It's not corporate 7-11.

It's a licensee.

4 (business with QMS?
5

A.

My understanding was that it would be time and

6 (materials following an investigation was conducted and once the
7 investigation was conducted and the contracts were then open
8 for bid that QMS would be allowed to bid based on the findings
9 lof the investigation and would have the opportunity to pick the
10 (work back up again.
11

Q.

Did you ever learn that an investigation had been

12 [completed by 7-11?
13

A.

I did not ever get any results of the investigation.

14

Q.

Let's move forward then if we can to a meeting

15 (reportedly on the nineteenth day of July in two thousand two,
16 [Mr. Cowley.
17

A.

Do you recall a meeting on that day?

I'm not positive on the date but I do recall a meeting

18 that part of the month.

Yes.

19

Q.

Where was it?

20

A.

At the old AMS offices, then QMS offices.

21

Q.

And who attended?

22

A.

Slone and Vera, Kerin and myself.

23

Q.

And what was the purpose of the meeting as you

24 [understood it?
25

A.

The purpose of the meeting as I understood it was to,
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1 [was t o f i n i s h t h e d e a l and t i e e v e r y t h i n g up i n a n i c e n e a t
2 (bow.
3

Q.

Were you t o d i s c u s s t h e i n v e n t o r y a t t h a t p o i n t ?

4

A.

Yes we w e r e .

5

Q.

And is that what you mean by finishing the deal?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

What again Mr. Cowley was your understanding of the

8 |need for the inventory?
9

A.

Just to make sure we had everything in the right

10 categories and to get a feel for what we actually had.
11

Q.

How then did the discussion on that occasion begin?

12

A.

We sat around the table, started discussing the

13 inventories, applying some dollar figures for the inventories
14 so we can kind of get a feel for what was there.
15 forth a lot on what we thought.

Went back and

I wasn't really clear on what

16 the worth of parts and stuff were so there was a lot of
17 discussion.
18

Q.

Were you, Mr. Cowley, attempting to fix a precise

19 |value of any of that material?
20

A.

I don't think anything was precise.

I think it was a

21 (pulling off the top of your head number.
22

MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor.

That's non-

23 responsive to the question.
24

THE COURT: That's a yes or no question.

25

THE WITNESS: Repeat the question.

I'm sorry.
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1 |BY MR. SMAY:

2

Q.

The q u e s t i o n was were you a t t e m p t i n g t o d e t e r m i n e a

3 [[precise v a l u a t i o n o f any o f t h a t equipment o r m a t e r i a l s ?
4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Apparently there came a point at which Mrs. Porter

6 suggested you take half of the value of two hundred eight
7 thousand dollars.

Do you recall that?

8

A.

I do recall that.

9

Q.

How did that come about?

10

A.

We were adding up the parts and stuff.

11 look at the list, they're not completed.

I think if you

Certainly there were

12 a couple of lists but I don't think you'd find them complete.
13 They ran a total.

14 that.

And Vera said that'll be, you'll get half of

I at that point, I believe I got kind of angry because I

15 really didn't believe that that's what we were there to change
16 the whole deal. And I think if you look at the sheet I wrote
17 final on it with the numbers they gave me and had Slone sign it
18 [because I was just really surprised that that was the, what
19 they were, they were trying to change the deal from what had
20 [been agreed to, to a new number.

And I took a copy of that

21 Iwith me.
22

Q.

Did, was there a discussion about debt at that point?

23

A.

There was.

24

Q.

How did the figure of debt come up?

25

A.

That, Vera arrived at the debt figure.
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1 [actually agreed with it.

I thought it was less than what she

2 had said.

Q.

And why did she suggest that you should take half the

A.

Because I was half owner of AMS and that was AMS's

3
4 debt?
5

6 debt.
7

Q. What was the debt attached to at that point?

8

A. Vehicles.

9

Q.

And who was going to keep the vehicles?

10

A.

I was keeping one vehicle that had debt on it.

They

11 (were keeping the other.
12

Q.

How did you and Mrs. Cowley then react to the

13 suggestion that you ought to be satisfied with half of two
14 (hundred eighty thousand less some debt?
15

A.

We disagreed with that completely.

16

Q.

Mrs. Porter had suggested that you were carrying with

17 krou at the time the handwritten note that she had made
18 expressing or outlining a transaction for ten thousand dollars.
19 pid you have the note with you at the time?
20

A.

I don't recollect having that note with me.

No sir.

21

Q.

How did the conversation then turn to, or if it did,

22 turn to the company being able to pay four thousand dollars a
23 Jmonth?
24

A.

Very much the way they discussed it, that they arrived

25 at a figure that they thought the company could bear at that
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1 (point.
2

Q.

And why did they suggest that that was the figure that

3 the company could bear at that point?
4

A.

I don't know how they arrived at that figure other

5 than it, just it's a number that they pulled out of their head.
6 (Much less than they were obligated to.
7

Q.

Based upon what AMS had made in the past, did the

8 figure four thousand dollars seem to you a fair estimate of
9 [what the company could afford to pay?
10

A.

Absolutely not.

11

Q.

Did you have any reason to believe at that point, Mr.

12 Porter, Mr. Cowley, that four thousand dollars a month was all
13 that QMS could afford to pay for the next five years?
14

A.

I did not.

15

Q.

Did the Porters suggest to you any reason why they

16 thought the four thousand dollars a month was all that QMS
17 could afford for the next five years?
18

A.

They suggested it because they were on time and

19 [materials and they did not have the contracts back, that that
20 |was all they could muster until that was resolved.
21

Q.

Until they had the contracts back?

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

Did you suggest, did you discuss at that point, Mr.

24 [Cowley, when that issue about having the contracts back might
25 be resolved?
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1

A.

We did.

2

Q.

And when did you?

3

A.

They indicated that they felt the contracts would be

4 (resolved in the fall.
5

Q.

And did you suggest then something to do about that in

6 the fall?
7

A.

I did.

8

Q.

I gather at that point or shortly after that point you

I suggested we meet again in the fall.

9 and Mrs. Cowley left?
10

A.

We did.

11

Q.

But there is alleged to have been a phone call.

12

A.

There was a phone call.

13

Q.

Later on that evening?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And by a phone call, tell me what you mean, Mr.

16 Cowley.
17

A.

I called Slone.

18

Q.

And what did you call him about?

19

A.

To tell him that we would take the four thousand

20 [dollars a month to allow them to get on their feet until the
21 fall.
22

Q.

Did you suggest to Mr. Porter at that point that you

23 would be happy to take four thousand dollars a month for five
24 |years for your entire interest in AMS?
25

A.

No sir.
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1 for four thousand dollars and volunteer to sign such a thing?
2

A.

I did not.

And had I asked her to write it down or

3 type it up it would have been very similar to the meeting on
4 the twenty-fourth of June.

I'd of sat there till it was done

5 and signed it.
6

Q.

Did anything transpire between the meeting on the

7 nineteenth of July and a subsequent meeting in October as I
8 understand by which you understood the Porters to withdraw or
9 qualify the earlier arrangement, that six hundred thousand
10 dollars?
11

A.

No sir.

12

Q.

Do you happen to recall what the date was of your next

13 |meeting with the?
14

A.

I really don't recall the actual date.

15

Q.

How did you come to choose the time in October to go

16 land see them?
17

A.

It was fall.

I had actually, either I or Kerin, I

18 jdon't recall who had called the office and spoke with Gale
19 Stout, the secretary, to inquire as to whether or not the
20 contracts had been renewed.
21

Q.

And what did you learn?

22

A.

Gale.
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor.

23

It calls for

24 |hear say.
25

THE WITNESS: Okay.
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THE COURT: Sustained.

1

2 fcY MR. SMAY:
3

Q.

What did you believe Mr. Cowley when you came away

4 from the, the discussion with Mrs. Stout?
5

MR. PRICE: Same objection, Your Honor.

6

MR. SMAY: I'm simply asking (inaudible) for a

7 (meeting, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, just ask, if you ask what he did in

8

9 response to that.
10 IBY MR. SMAY:
11

Q.

Okay.

What did you do in response?

12

A.

In response to that I called Slone and asked for a

13 (meeting.
14

Q.

Did you tell Slone what you wanted the meeting for?

15

A.

I told him we needed to meet about finishing up.

16

Q.

And Mr. Porter said fine, let's have a meeting, I take

18

A.

He did.

19

Q.

Tell me where this meeting took place.

20

A.

At the QMS office.

21

Q.

And who was there?

22

A.

Slone and Vera, Kerin and myself.

23

Q.

Did you take to that meeting, Mr. Cowley, the

17 it.

24 handwritten note about the ten thousand dollar agreement?
25

A.

Not that I recall. No.
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1

Q.

And tell me then Mr. Cowley what conversation

2 transpired at your meeting in October.
3

A.

We told them at that point that we needed to get the

4 (monies up to what the agreement was.

At that point they, we

5 also discussed some tax information, we pulled some, Vera had
6 bulled some reports to, that we could turn into Gary Ward for
7 our taxes and they said they would consider that and let us
8 know.
9

Q.

I just asked Mrs. Porter yesterday that they didn't

10 say to you sorry, we have a four thousand dollar deal?
11

A.

They did not.

12

Q.

And when you came away from that meeting, Mr. Cowley,

13 ^rtiat did you expect to happen next?
14

A.

I expected to get a phone call and have it resolved.

15

Q.

Did you get such a phone call?

16

A.

I did not.

17

Q.

What did you do about that?

18

A.

I called Vera myself.

19

Q.

And what did you find out?

20

A.

At that point Vera made me aware that they had sought

21 legal counsel and that they felt they had a binding verbal
22 agreement because they had made three payments in August,
23 September and October.
24

Q.

Did she tell you whether they were going to then bring

25 the payments up to the ten thousand dollars?
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1

A.

She said absolutely not.

They were standing by a four

2 thousand dollar verbal agreement.
3

Q.

At that point, Mr. Cowley, in addition to the

4 (handwritten note that you had, did you have any written or
5 signed documents respecting?
6

A.

No.

As, as per my testimony yesterday as well as

7 IVeralynn's testimony yesterday, those, those printed copies of
8 |our original contract remained in their possession.
9

Q.

Didn't have any of the tapes?

10

A.

I did not.

We never could get the copies of the

11 tapes.
12

Q.

Did you have anything else with which you thought you

13 |(might be able to prove existence of the ten thousand dollar
14 contract?
15

A.

The only thing I had that, that was at least any proof

16 to myself about our contract was the handwritten paper that
17 [Vera had written.

It's the only thing I had in my possession.

18

Q.

You then sought counsel I assume?

19

A.

It actually took me a week after that conversation to

20 [get where I would go seek legal counsel.

But yes, I did.

21

Q.

And you spoke first to Mr. Savage?

22

A.

I was, I was referred to Scott Savage by a friend in

23 town that said he'd be good to go talk to.
24

Q.

And you're friend was right.

Did you explain to Mr.

25 Savage the series of events about which you testified here ir
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1 court?
2

A.

I did.

3

Q.

Did you explain to him your absence of papers in your

4 (possession?
5

A.

I.

6

Q.

In that conversation?

7

A.

I did.

In fact I took the handwritten note with us

8 [for our first meeting so that he could see the one piece of
9 evidence I had for what my claim was.
10

Q.

And did Mr. Savage give you any advice about whether

11 |you could at that point, given what you had, prove an
12 agreement?
13

A.

He told me that that handwritten note would not stand

14 [up in court.

It had no signatures on it and that the case

15 [would need to pursue, be pursued a different direction.
16

Q.

Mr. Savage then referred you to me?

17

A.

He did.

18

Q.

Did you have a similar conversation with me?

19

A.

I did.

21

Q.

And received, I take it, the same advice?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

You should have there on your desk, Mr. Cowley, a set

I had almost the identical conversation with

20 [|you.

24 of exhibits.

Received the same information.

I'm just going to ask you to turn over to number

25 thirty-three.
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1

Q.

Do you find anything in Mr. Porter's affidavit that

2 alerts The Court to that set of circumstances?
3

A.

No.

Based on his affidavit you would think after that

4 date they.
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor.

5

This is total

6 speculation about what Mr. Porter knew or didn't know and
7 (inaudible).
MR. SMAY: This had nothing to do about what Mr.

8

9 Porter knew, it's what he said.
THE COURT: How is it helpful to The Court, Mr.

10
11 Cowley?
12

MR. SMAY: Well, it's.

13

THE COURT: Interpretation.

14

MR. SMAY: By way of showing what Mr. Cowley then

15 (inaudible) taken , there's going to be lots of cross
16 [examination because Mr. Cowley thereafter said we didn't have
17 ian agreement.

Well, obviously the fact that he couldn't prove

18 it and couldn't make the Porters confess to it (inaudible) that
19 seems to be as important to The Court to know that.
THE COURT: Well, you have elicited that information

20

21 [based upon his conversation with his attorneys.
22 IBY MR. SMAY:
23

Q.

Mr. Cowley, let me refer you down to one further

24 |question here, look at paragraph fourteen.
25

A.

Okay.
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1

Q.

"One June twenty-fifth my wife and I incorporated a

2 new business under the name of Quality Maintenance Systems and
3 [proceeded from that time to attempt to find work for Quality."
4

A.

Is that true in your understanding?

5

A.

That is not.

It's true that, it's true they formed

6 [Quality Maintenance on that date but they immediately went to
7 [work doing the same work Advanced Maintenance Services had done
8 in the past.
9

Q.

Come down then to the last of the paragraphs we were

10 |discussing before, Mr. Cowley.

"The Cowleys have no ownership

11 interest in Quality nor are they entitled to any of the
12 [business proceeds obtained by Quality."

How did you understand

13 the Porters had told you that you were going to be paid
14 [whatever it was you were going to be paid?
15

A.

The payments that we received in August, September and

16 October all came from Quality Maintenance.
17

Q.

And did, Mr. Cowley, the fact that you had thus been

18 apprized of what the likely position of the Porters is going to
19 |be in August affect your testimony for example in depositions
20 later on in the year?
21

A.

It absolute did.

Yes.

22

Q.

Mr. Cowley, as of today have you ever doubted that you

23 [had an agreement with the Porters?
24

A.

No.

I have not.

25

Q.

To pay you six hundred thousand dollars over five
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1 |years for your interest in AMS?
2

A.

I have not.

3

Q.

Just out of curiosity, Mr. Cowley, do you think that's

4 [a fair price for your interest in AMS?
5

A.

Yes.

I do.

6

Q.

That's all I have for Mr. Cowley.

7

THE COURT: Cross, Mr. Price?

8

MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor.

We would move to

9 |publish a deposition of both Mrs. Cowley and Mr. Cowley at this
10 time.
THE COURT: (inaudible) have published depositions

11

12 (inaudible).
13

MR. PRICE: As long as that's true.

I'm sorry.

We

14 Iwill have it.
15

THE COURT: You can use them though.

16

MR. PRICE:

17

UNIDENTIFIED:

18

MR. PRICE:

19

THE COURT: Yes.

(inaudible)
(inaudible)

May I approach Mr. Cowley?

20
21

CROSS EXAMINATION

22
23 |BY MR. PRICE:
24

Q.

I ask you, if you would Mr. Cowley, to turn to Exhibit

25 iNumber Twenty-six, in the black binder.
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1

A.

Yes s i r .

2

Q.

Take a look a t those documents contained i n E x h i b i t

3 Twenty-six and I ' l l ask you a couple of q u e s t i o n s about t h a t .
4

A.

Okay.

5

Q.

Have you seen those documents before today?

6

A.

I have.

7

Q.

These documents are a letter from me to your attorney,

8 |your then attorney Mr. Savage.

Correct?

9

A.

That is correct.

10

Q.

And it contains the draft of the agreement that we

11 |were turning over for you to sign which the Porters have
12 asserted constitutes a summary of the agreement that was
13 reached in July of two thousand two.

Correct?

14

A.

That is correct.

15

Q.

You had that document, did you not, prior to filing

16 [your lawsuit?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Well, you had that document prior to going to see Mr.

19 Smay.

I did as a matter of fact. Yes.

Isn't that correct?

20

A.

I believe Scott Savage sent it directly to Mr. Smay.

21

Q.

So it wasn't really correct when you said all you had

22 lin hand when you filed your lawsuit regarding what was going to
23 (proved and what was going to be asserted about this was merely
24 the written documents of June that had been typed up by her.
25 Isn't that correct?
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MR. SMAY: Objection.

1

2 testimony.

It mis-characterizes the

This obviously is not a proof of a contract.

This

3 is an unsigned document.
4

THE COURT: Well, overruled.

5

THE WITNESS: Okay.

I had this document in my

6 [possession but did not feel it accurately, accurately reflected
7 the contract that we had arranged.
8 |BY MR. PRICE:
9

Q.

You didn't feel it accurately reflected, reflected the

10 {contract?
11

A.

Reflected.

Yes.

12

Q.

But you did believe you had a contract as of the time

13 tyou got this letter?
14

A.

I did.

15

Q.

Okay.

That's not what showed up in the pleadings.

16 IWas it?
17

A.

No sir.

18

Q.

I'd like you to turn now to Exhibit Twenty-nine.

19

A.

Okay.

20
21 Honor.

MR. SMAY: I also object to Exhibit Twenty-nine, Your
It's a (inaudible).

22

THE COURT: Is it Mr. Price?

23

MR. PRICE: It isn't, Your Honor.

They just offered

24 testimony about this letter and his conversation.

In fact they

25 Iwaived their attorney client privilege in talking about
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1 conversations that he had with their attorney, Mr. Savage.
MR. SMAY: Please let me know as soon as possible if

2

3 (your clients have any interest in negotiating the settlement
4 (inaudible).

THE COURT: Well, what's your intention to use it for,

5
6 (Mr. Price?
7

MR. PRICE: My intent to use it is to establish what

8 their position was in this case as of February fifth two
9 thousand three and it has to do with the issues with respect to
10 two hundred and forty thousand, a payment of four thousand
11 dollars per month and what they knew that to be which was there
12 |was no agreement reached.
13

THE COURT: Well, the pleadings in this case I think

14 speak for themselves.

If it is discussions of potential

15 settlement then it is.
16

MR. PRICE: There were no discussions of potential

17 settlement, Your Honor.

They've already testified and used

18 this letter for what they see to be their own benefit and now
19 they want to preclude us from using it to put the entire record
20 down.
21

THE COURT: Well, if they asked a question about it.

22

MR. SMAY: We've never mentioned the letter, Your

23 Honor.
24

It's clearly a (inaudible).
THE COURT: Well, you did go into, you did go into

25 [discussions that he had had with Mr. Savage.
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1 [discussions that he had had with you so.
2

MR. SMAY: Well, we could ask Mr. Cowley (inaudible) .

3

THE COURT: Overruled.

4 |BY MR. PRICE:
5

Q.

Mr. Cowley, may I ask you to turn to the first page of

6 that Exhibit Number Twenty-nine.
7

A.

I'm there.

8

Q.

And what (inaudible) the last full paragraph on page

10

A.

Okay.

11

Q.

And as of that date, February fifth two thousand

9 lone.

12 three, you denied that there was an agreement for two hundred
13 and forty thousand, that there was any agreement paying four
14 thousand a month.
15

A.

Correct?

On the advice of legal counsel I did.
MR. SMAY: We'll take a continuing objection, Your

16

17 [Honor, to any use of the letter whatever.

THE COURT: You may have a continuing objection.

18

19 |BY MR. PRICE:
20

Q.

Okay.

Then on page two, the second full paragraph, it

21 indicates that on July first two thousand two, our clients,
22 that is the Porters, proposed that the business be divided
23 [among other things six hundred thousand in monthly payments for
24 ten thousand dollars and Straightline Striping at that time
25 lenjoyed a seven thousand dollars a month contract with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 Southline.

Do you s e e

that?

2

A.

I do.

3

Q.

Southline was then a 7-11 corporation.

4

A.

That is correct.

5

Q.

And is the prior owners of 7-11 Corporation.

Is that

6 correct?
7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

It was only after the issues and then later there at

It is.

9 the bottom you said, the last paragraph, your attorney tells
10 |us, nevertheless, my clients, this is the last sentence of the
11 last paragraph at the bottom of page two, it says, nevertheless
12 |my clients, that would be the Cowleys.

Correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Firmly believe that any fair evaluation of their fifty

That would be correct.

15 [percent interest in the business as of July first two thousand
16 two is much greater than the sum proposed and would have no
17 choice but to seek redress in court if we cannot negotiate a
18 resolution.

Correct?

19

A.

That is correct.

20

Q.

This letter is really a threat to sue.

21

A.

No.

I don't believe so.

Wasn't it?

I believe it was a letter to

22 ask them to reconsider their position.
23

Q.

But you didn't believe at that time six hundred

24 thousand dollars was a fair amount.
25

A.

Did you?

Actually, I believed I accepted an offer for six
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1 [hundred thousand dollars on the twenty-fourth of June.
2

Q.

I understand that's what you believe but as of that

3 boint in time the position you were taking is that you didn't
4 [pelieve six hundred thousand dollars was a fair offer.
5

MR. SMAY: Objection.

Entirely mis-characterizes the

6 letter.
7

THE COURT: The letter speaks for itself.

8

MR. PRICE:

Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit Twenty-

9 nine in evidence.
10

MR. SMAY: We'd object again, Your Honor.

11 says this is to negotiate a resolution.
12 [you have any interest in negotiating.

It clearly

Please let me know if
This is a settlement

13 letter.
THE COURT: Well, you brought up the issue of what his

14

15 [understanding was with respect to his attorneys.

Based there

16 kipon, I think it is relative and you waived the privilege.

I'm

17 going to receive.
18

MR. PRICE:

And I'm not sure, Your Honor, but we'd

19 also offer Twenty-six in evidence (inaudible) it wasn't
20 |yesterday.
21

THE COURT: Didn't we already receive Twenty-six?

22

CLERK OF THE COURT: No.

23

MR. PRICE: We did not.

24

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to Twenty-six?

25

MR. SMAY: I thought it was put in yesterday.
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1

MR. PRICE: We talked about it.

2

THE COURT: Now it's received.

3 |BY MR. PRICE:
4

Q.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay, I'd like to return now

5 to the discussion about the events of June two thousand two.
6

A.

Okay.

7

Q.

I would like you to explain to The Court if you could

8 lyour understanding of what the terms of the offer that the
9 Porters made on June the twenty-second.

I believe you referred

10 to that as an ultimatum?
11

A.

I did at the time.

12

Q.

What were the terms of the ultimatum as you described

A.

It was a take it or leave it.

13 it?
14

If you don't take the

15 [offer then we'll line up all the trucks. We'll divide up all
16 the assets.

You'll take half.

We'll take half and we'll go on

17 about our merry way.
18

Q.

What were the terms of the ultimatum?

What was the

19 loffer?
20

A.

Six hundred thousand dollars, half of the current bank

21 accounts, our life insurance policies, our retirement accounts,
22 one of the two rental homes, my truck, Straightline Striping, I
23 (believe that's pretty close to it.
24

Q.

I'm not positive.

Those are the terms of what the Porters offered you on

25 the twenty-second?
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1

A.

That's correct.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

Through the discussions they had assured me that

Anything else you can think of?

4 (inaudible) had, not on the twenty-second, sorry.

On the

5 twenty-second, that's my understanding.
6

Q.

Okay.

What I would like you to do is turn now, if you

7 [would, to Exhibits Five and Seven.
8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

Five is actually in here.

Seven is in Plaintiffs

10 Exhibits.
11

A.

Thank you.

12

Q.

Well, let's just look at one, look at Five.

Five

13 should be a typed up version of the handwritten document.
14

A.

That's correct.

15

Q.

On the twenty-fourth.

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Okay.

Right?

Just so I'm clear, Mr. Cowley, in terms of

18 those terms that are set out in Exhibit Number Five.
19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Were those intended to be in addition to the offer,

21 the items offered by the Porters on the twenty-second or were
22 these to be instead of the offer of the twenty-second?
23

A.

The only thing that this does not list that was their

24 [original offer was the cash on hand of the company and it's not
25 in here so I'm not sure.

I believe this was our total contract
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1 so I think this is instead of what they had offered.
2

Q.

And that is what you claim in this case you agreed to

3 |with the Porters . Correct?
4

A.

It is what I agreed to with the Porters.

5

Q.

And the one copy was signed by Slone Porter.

6

A.

That's correct.

7

Q.

We'll get to the other one in just a moment.

Mr.

8 (Cowley, I want to ask, with respect to the four thousand
9 dollars you received payments consistently every month
10 (inaudible) four thousand dollars.

Correct?

11

A.

That is correct.

12

Q.

And that money has been cashed by you, your wife.

Is

13 that correct?
14

A.

That is correct.

15

Q.

And there has been no correspondence ever back to the

16 Porters, the fact that we didn't have a deal, we're not taking
17 this money, anything like that.
18

A.

19 (money.

There was never a deal that we wouldn't take the
Certainly we approached the Porters in October as per

20 ||my testimony about bringing that payment up to the agreement.
21

Q.

Okay.

I'd like to take you back now to the meetings

22 and discussions of June the twenty-fourth.
23

A.

Okay.

Okay?

As I understand your testimony you arrived

24 sometime in the morning.
25

A.

I did.
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1

Q.

And that you took care of some business, some emails I

2 think and then you met with Vera, began discussions with
3 [IVeralynn Porter concerning what is now Exhibit Five.

Is that

4 correct?
5

A.

Veralynn and Slone.

6

Q.

And Slone came into the discussion.

7

A.

Slone was in the discussion when it started.

Is that correct?
He's the

8 lone that turned on the tape recorder when we started that
9 discussion.
10

Q.

Okay.

Okay.

And from that discussion you and

11 |Veralynn came up with a handwritten note.
12

A.

Yes.

13 the table.

Isn't that correct?

Prior to ever typing the note, we sat there at

Slone, Vera looked at Slone and said I can agree to

14 this set of terms if you'11 agree to engage in the company and
15 |go to work.
16

Q.

And Slone said I, I'll go to work.

Okay.

With those terms that are on the handwritten

17 [note that later got typed up, those aren't something Veralynn
18 [wrote down.

Are they?

19

A.

No.

They are the terms we arrived at.

20

Q.

Okay.

That was in a discussion with you.

Now what I

21 [want to do is move on to see what happened after the
22 handwritten note was made?
23

A.

Vera went, well, we had the conversation about Slone's

24 [engaging in the company and Vera went over to the computer and
25 typed it up.
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1

Q. Where were you when she v»as typing it up?

2

A.

I believe I was trying to communicate with my wife

3 lover the phone.

She was on her way to Jackson Hole and her

4 [cellphone really sucked that day.
5 [hardly at all.

We couldn't get through

I'd get about three words in before I'd lose

6 Iher.
7

Q.

And then it got typed up.

How long did it take to

8 type them up?
9

A.

A couple of minutes.

10

Q.

Okay.

It's true, isn't it, she printed out two

11 copies?
12

A.

She did.

13

Q.

One to you?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And one to Slone?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

What did you do then?

18

A.

I watched Slone sign his*

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Stood there.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

And at that point I told them I would be happy to sign

23 it once Kerin got back and could actually read the agreement
24 and understand what the terms were.

Because we were having a

25 [hard time getting through on the cell phone, I couldn't get it,
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1 h e l p her understand i t .
2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

She d i d .

4

Q.

You never did sign it.

5

A.

I never had the paper back in my possession to be able

She a t some p o i n t came back.

D i d n ' t she?

Did you?

6 to sign it.
7

Q.

Did you ever ask for it back?

8

A.

I felt like they would provide it for me when we met

9 (again.
10

Q.

So the answer is no, you never asked for it back.

11 Correct?
12

A.

I don't recall asking for it back.

13

Q.

And that day you did not sign the document.

14

A.

No.

Did you?

I wrote Vera a note on the document and left it

15 on the desk.
16

Q.

And you wrote your initials next to the note.

Isn't

17 that right?
18

A.

That is correct.

19

Q.

You still have some issues you wanted to discuss.

20 Isn't that right?
21

A.

The only thing I wanted to discuss was the no non-

22 compete clause on striping, I believe.
23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

That wasn't dealt with in the handwritten document

Anything having to do with insurance?
I think I had a concern about insurance.
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1 (inaudible)?
2

A.

No.

I don't believe so.

3

Q.

(inaudible) that was typed up and filed?

4

A.

Right.

5

Q.

Your initials on that document do not, are not there

6 for the purposes of you accepting that document.
7

A.

I had already accepted the agreement.

Are they?
I didn't feel

8 Jlike, at that point, it was on a tape recording that I had
9 accepted it.

I just wanted to clarify two issues.

10

Q.

Alright.

11

A.

I left.

Then what happened?
Vera called later that day.

12 two issues that I had.

We discussed the

The insurance was carried through the

13 [end of the year and we backed off of the no non-compete on
14 striping.

She wanted, she was adamant that it was either we

15 [were going to have a no non-compete or we were not.

And if I

16 expected to be doing any maintenance work, we better have a no
17 non-compete.
18

Q.

At that point in time, your wife still hadn't, she was

19 |gone that day.

Right?

20

A.

She was.

21

Q.

Your wife wouldn't have any knowledge about what

22 [happened that day other than what you told her.
23

A.

Absolutely.

24

Q.

Alright.

25

A.

I did.

Right?

Now, on that day did you call Ann Atkin?
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1

Q.

And when did you call her in relationship to the

2 telephone conversation you had with Veralynn Porter?
3

A.

4 [Vera.

I don't recall if it was before or after I talked to
I'm not sure.

I know that I spoke with Slone after

5 Ann's phone call but I don't recall where that was in
6 relationship to my conversation with Vera.
7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

That I certainly would not be continuing to do any

9 |work for 7-11.

Tell me what Ann wanted you to do.

That Straightline Striping had been fired and

10 that there was no way I would ever do business with them again
11 or any company that I had anything to do with would do business
12 [with them again.
13

Q.

That included AMS.

Didn't it?

14

A.

She never did say AMS is fired.

15

Q.

I ask you, if you would, to turn to the deposition

16 transcript of your wife, Kerin Cowley.
17

A.

Got it.

Where do you want me to go?

18

Q.

I'd like you to turn to pages one-o-two to one-o-

19 three, if you would.
20

MR. SMAY: Excuse me.

Are we now using Mrs. Cowley's

21 |deposition to impeach Mr. Cowley?
22

MR. PRICE: Yes.

We are.

23

MR. SMAY: That's clearly improper.

24

MR. PRICE: I don't believe it is.

We will

25 (inaudible) the testimony to show.
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1

MR. SMAY: You may use the deposition of a witness to

2 impeach that witness.
THE COURT: Well, let's, he hasn't asked the question

3
4 lyet.

We'll deal with that issue.

5 |BY MR. PRICE:
6

Q.

Are you there?

7

A.

I'm there.

8

Q.

I want to take up the questioning on Line eighteen of

9 |page one-o-two.

And the way I'd like to proceed, Mr. Cowley,

10 if we could, is that I'm going to read the question and I would
11 |ask you to please read the answer.
12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Question.

Okay?

14

MR. SMAY: Same objection, Your Honor.

15

MR. PRICE: Beginning of line eighteen.

And on that

16 jday, on Monday.
17

THE COURT: How are you, how could you use the

18 (deposition of someone else to impeach his testimony?
19

MR. PRICE: Because she testifies that he told me,

20 (meaning Tracy Cowley told her that he talked to Ann Atkin and
21 what he told her about that, that discussion is different that
22 [what he's just testified about.
23

MR. SMAY:

Well, he can get that from Mrs. Cowley if

24 he wishes to do so.
25

THE COURT: Well, go ahead.

Overruled.
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1 (BY MR. PRICE:
2

Q.

Okay.

Reading the beginning of line eighteen; "And on

3 that day, on Monday, do you know whether or not your husband
4 [had a conversation with Miss Atkin?"
5

A.

"He told me that he had called Ann.

Yes."

6

Q.

"Do you know what the purpose of that call was?"

7

A.

"I think the purpose, I think the purpose of the call

8 Iwas to kind of feel her out for conversation on Sunday that we
9 |were not invited to or privy to. "
10

Q.

"And anything else?"

11

A.

"Possibly to see if he took over Straightline if we

12 |would still be able to perform striping for them.

At which

13 time she told, she said no, absolutely not."
14

Q.

"Do you know why she said absolutely not?"

15

A.

"Yes.

Because she said that he was scum and an

16 [embezzler and all kinds of things.

I think she was venting and

17 she said as far as, I believe she said as far as that also that
18 |AMS was done as well."
19

MR. SMAY: At this point, Your Honor,

(inaudible)

20 renew the objection about Mrs. Cowley's.
21

THE COURT: That's clearly not interested Mr. Price.

22 (That's her impression and.
23

MR. PRICE: Of what he told her.

24

THE COURT: Yes.

25

MR. PRICE: Okay.

(inaudible)
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1

THE COURT: I t ' s n o t h e l p f u l t o The C o u r t .

2 |BY MR. PRICE:
3

Q.

W e ' l l t a k e t h a t up w i t h h e r , Your Honor.

Okay.

I'd

4 l i k e you t o t u r n , i f you would, t o E x h i b i t Number T h i r t y - n i n e .
5 |Are you t h e r e ?
6

A.

I am.

7

Q.

Isn't it true at some point in time that the Porters

8 attempted to change their proposal on the six hundred thousand
9 [dollars?
10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

When did that happen?

12

A.

In October.

13

Q.

I'd like you to turn to page.

14

A.

Excuse me.

15 in July.

16

It is.

I'm sorry.

Q.

The first time they tried to change it was
I mis-spoke.

I'd like you to turn, if you would, to page number

17 three of Exhibit Thirty-nine and we'11 talk about paragraph
18 thirteen.

First of all do you recognize this document, Exhibit

19 Thirty-nine?
20

A.

I do.

21

Q.

And will you identify the document for The Court?

22

A.

It is labeled as Tracy Cowley's Response to Request

23 for Admissions.
24

Q.

Have you seen that document before today?

25

A.

I have.
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1

Q.

Were you i n v o l v e d i n any way (inaudible)?

2

A.

I was.

3

Q.

What was your involvement?

4

A.

I sat with Craig Smay and completed it.

5

Q.

In fact, I ask you to turn to the second to the last

6 [page of that document, if you would.
UNKNOWN: Third to the last.

7

8 fcY MR. PRICE:
9

Q.

Third to the last page.

Excuse me.

Right.

The third

10 to the last page.
11

A.

Okay.

12

Q.

You see that?

13

A.

Whoops.

14

Q.

In response to request admission number thirteen,

That's your signature.

Sorry.

Isn't it?

That is correct.

15 (would you please read for The Court what, what you said?
16

A.

Number thirteen?

17

Q. Yes.

18

A. "Admit that on or about June twenty-seventh, you

19 [attended a meeting with the Porters at which the dissolution of
20 |AMS was discussed.
21

Q.

22

A. "Admit that on at least June twenty-second, twenty-

Okay.

And the answer there of number thirteen?

23 third, twenty-fourth, the Porters proposed acquisition of them,
24 |by them of Plaintiffs interest in Advanced Maintenance Services
25 and then on June twenty-seventh, Porters substantially altered
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1 the terms previously proposed.

Q.

2

Deny the remainder."

So that was June the twenty-seventh that they, they

3 (proposed to alter the terms previously proposed.

Correct?

4

A.

That is what this says. Yes.

5

Q.

So your testimony previously the first time you heard

6 about a change was in July isn't correct.

Isn't that right?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Is there a reason why?

9

A.

I, you know, I'm not, the dates are what's bizarre on

10 this.

I don't believe the dates are correct.

11

Q.

That's your signature and you signed it?

12

A.

It absolutely is.

13

Q.

I'd like you to turn also to paragraph number sixteen,

I may have mis-spoke.

I don't, I.

14 if you would, of the admissions.
15

A.

Okay.

I believe that's a typo.

It should have said

16 July twenty-seventh. But I'm not sure.
17

Q.

Which is a typo, Mr. Cowley?

18

A.

The date.

Instead of June it should have been July.

19 |And I did not catch it when I reviewed the document.
20

Q.

Is there any other reference at all on this page to

21 July twenty-seventh anywhere, Mr. Cowley?
22

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

23

Q.

There was no meetings that day.

24

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

25

Q.

Okay.

Was there?

Why would it say July the twenty-seventh then?
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1

A.

I don't know.

Our meeting to discuss the changes was

2 [when we discussed the inventory that was done.
3

Q.

I'd like you to look at request number sixteen, if you

4 would.
5

A.

Certainly.

6

Q.

Okay.

7 I'll read it.

That day it says, Admit, this is the question,
It says, "Admit that at this meeting on or about

8 June twenty-seventh that you took possession of the striping
9 equipment owned by AMS along with three vehicles previously
10 owned by AMS and it identifies the vehicles and a third was
11 thereafter."
12

A.

And would you please read your answer?

"Admit that on or about June twenty-second Porters

13 [proposed to acquire Plaintiffs share of Advanced Maintenance
14 Service for among other things payment of half a million
15 [dollars at ten thousand a month and transfer of control of
16 Straightline and service agreement with 7-11 in place and that
17 |on or about June twenty-seventh pursuant to proposal Porters
18 insisted that Plaintiffs take possession of the equipment at
19 Straightline including listed vehicles.

Porters insisted they

20 [would not take the two older vehicles which had previously been
21 offered for sale unsuccessfully.

Plaintiffs took possession of

22 such equipment while reserving agreement to the proposed terms.
23 (Deny remainder."
24

Q.

So you reserved agreement on the other proposed terms.

25 Isn't that right?
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1

A.

That's what it says.

2

Q.

Okay.

So you hadn't reached an agreement.

3

MR. SMAY: No.

That's not what it says.

4

THE WITNESS: Sorry.

5

MR. SMAY: (inaudible) the proposed terms about the

6 two vehicles.
7

MR. PRICE: It says what it says.

8

THE WITNESS: If you, if you look at the agreement it

9 said thirty thousand dollars for a new vehicle for Straightline
10 Striping.

Their point on the vehicles was that we're getting

11 |you two vehicles you can work, use to work Straightline
12 Striping.

Instead of the thirty thousand.

13 |BY MR. PRICE:

Q.

Can you show me Exhibit Five where those terms show

16

A.

I can't.

17

Q.

They don't.

18

A.

They are not there.

19

Q.

You were reserving terms, you were reserving agreement

14
15 up?

20 |on terms.

They're not there.
Do they?

Weren't you?

Were you or were you not?

21

MR. SMAY: The document speaks for itself, Mr. Price.

22

THE COURT: Can you answer the question?

23

THE WITNESS: I was reserving agreement to the

24 |proposed terms on the vehicles.
25

Q.

Yes.

Nothing else?
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1

A.

Not that, not that I recall.

2

Q.

Well, we still have issues on no non-compete

3 (agreements.
4

A.

You still have issues on life insurance.

Not, I think we had resolved the no non-compete issues

5 when Vera and I spoke on the phone concerning the agreement.
6

Q.

Okay.

I would like you.

7

A.

And the insurance issues.

8

Q.

I'd like you to turn, if you would, to your

9 (deposition.
10

A.

Okay.

11

Q.

I believe it's going to be volume two.

12

A.

The thick one or the thin one?

13

Q.

Excuse me. May I approach, Your Honor?

14

MR. SMAY: Volume two is the thicker one.

15

THE WITNESS: Okay.

Got it.

16 MR. PRICE:
17

Q.

That would have been a longer day.

I ask you if you

18 Jwould also to turn, in conjunction with that, to Exhibit Number
19 Twelve.
20

A. Okay.

21

Q.

Do you recognize the documents in Exhibit Twelve?

22

A.

I do.

23

Q.

Turning now to your deposition at page two-o-nine, two

24 ten, do you recall, do you recall having your deposition taken?
25

A.

I do.
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1

Q.

Do you r e c a l l i t occurred i n two s e s s i o n s ?

2

A.

I do.

3

Q.

This would have been the second session on November

4 eighteenth of two thousand three.

Correct?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

And I was asking you some questions about Ann Atkin

7 botes from your, from the meeting with Johan de Besch.

Do you

8 recall that?
9

A.

I do recall that.

10

Q.

And those notes are found in Exhibit Twelve.

11

A.

They are correct.

12

Q.

Alright.

Correct?

That is correct.

And I would like to pick up the questioning

13 then at page twenty-five of line twenty-five of page two-o14 Inine.

Again, I'll ask the question if you'll read the answer

15 [again. Okay?
16

A.

Okay.

17

Q.

Question; "What I would like you to do is go through

18 those."

Let's pick it back up for the reference, let's pick it

19 |back up.
UNKNOWN: Line eight.

20

21 IBY MR. PRICE:
22

Q.

We'll pick it back up at line fourteen.

Okay.

23 |Question; "What I would like you to do is go through those
24 notes and I believe that the order of the notes is the first
25 note pertaining to the meeting that you had with Johan."
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1 [Answer?
2

A.

"Uh-huh."

3

Q.

"Is that correct?"

4

A.

"That is correct."

5

Q.

"And then later I think there are some notes

6 [pertaining to the meeting that was held between Johan and the
7 Porters.

Is that correct?"

8

A.

"Yes."

9

Q.

"What I'd like you to do is go through those, if you

10 jwould, and identify anything in those notes that you believe is
11 incorrect, inaccurate, untrue, incomplete or with which you
12 (don't agree.
13

A.

Could you do that for me?"

"I could."
MR. SMAY: (inaudible) I'm going to object, Your

14
15 [Honor.

It's an improper use of the deposition.

16 on the stand.

He has the notes on the stand.

He has the man
If he wants to

17 ask those questions and the testimony is then different than
18 this, then he can do that.
THE COURT: Mr. Price, you haven't, you haven't listed

19

20 any information about this to impeach.
MR. PRICE: I'm getting to it, Your Honor, in just a

21

22 (moment when he answers this question.
THE COURT: Okay.

23

Go ahead.

24 |BY MR. PRICE:
25

Q.

You said you could and I'll pick it up at line sever
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1 there.
2

A.

Okay?

And you're answer?

"My only, I think an area that I was wrong in was when

3 jhe was asking about who chose to come forward, we had discussed
4 that on Saturday and it was an amicable parting of the ways.
5 [Parting by all four people I believe I put that in there to
6 protect AMS, to help them continue to do work for 7-11.

But I

7 think it's accurate to say that it was not what I had
8 [envisioned.

I enjoyed the last year working."

9

Q.

"Okay."

10

A.

Keep going?

11

Q.

Yes sir.
MR. SMAY: Same objection, Your Honor.

12

13 |BY MR. PRICE:
14

Q.

This is it.

15

A.

"I believe it's accurate that I said I should know by

16 the end of the month what our deal is going to be."
17

Q.

As of the twenty-seventh you didn't know what your

18 [deal was going to be.

Did you?

19

MR. SMAY: Object.

20

THE COURT: There's no reference to a specific date.

21

MR. PRICE: It is.

22 seventh

Nothing here to impeach.

Sorry.

These are notes of the twenty-

meeting with Johan de Besch.

As of the twenty-seventh

23 [he had testified his deposition, "I believe it's accurate that
24 I said I should know by the end of the month, in June of two
25 thousand two, what our deal is going to be."
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1

MR. SMAY: Same objection.

(inaudible)

2

THE WITNESS: Would you like me to answer or do I need

3 to read the answer here?

MR. SMAY: Is this could be impeachment to is plainly

4

5 improper use of the deposition.

THE COURT: Well, he's impeaching his prior testimony

6

7 (inaudible) agreed to the deal on the twenty, twenty-fourth.
8

MR. SMAY: (inaudible), Your Honor.

9

THE WITNESS: What?

10

MR. SMAY: He hasn't asked him that.

11

THE COURT: Well, he's asking that earlier in his

12 testimony today.

What he's (inaudible) is that.

MR. SMAY: That he's not asking that earlier in the

13

14 testimony of the deposition.

It's an entirely different

15 context and it's improper.
16

THE COURT: For whatever it's worth, it's in.

17

THE WITNESS: When I met with Johan my goal at that

18 (point was to make sure that AMS could continue to work.
19 |BY MR. PRICE:
20

Q.

There's not a question pending, Mr. Cowley.

21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

Mr. Cowley, did you ever reach an agreement on the

23 [amount of payout that you were to receive (inaudible)?
24

A.

We did.

25

Q.

Could you read in your deposition at page two thirty-
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1 three if you would.
2

A.

I'm there.

3

Q.

Make sure I'm at the right place.

Okay.

I'd like to

4 |pick it up at page two thirty-two, if we could.

MR. SMAY: Same objection, Your Honor.

5

It's an

6 |entirely improper use of the deposition.
7

MR. PRICE: It isn't, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Why are you, well, he hasn't asked the

9 [question yet.
10

MR. SMAY: He did.

11

MR. PRICE: Yes.

I did ask him a question.

I asked

12 him whether or not they ever agreed to the amount of the
13 payout.
14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MR. PRICE: For his interest.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. PRICE: And I (inaudible) impeach his testimony,

18 iYour Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

19

20 |BY MR. PRICE:
21

Q.

I want to pick it up at page thirty-two or two thirty,

22 two thirty-three and let's pick it up, let me make sure I got
23 the reference (inaudible).

Okay.

Back on page two thirty-one,

24 I started asking questions about the meeting on July
25 seventeenth (inaudible) and we're at line twenty-one.
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1 that?

2

A.

I do.

3

Q.

Okay.

"I think we're t a l k i n g about a meeting t h a t you

4 fbelieved happened on July seventeenth.
5

A.

6

Q.

7

A.

"Correct."
"Was that a face to face meeting?"
Yes.

8 [read.
9

It was.

I believe.

It was.

Sorry.

I should

I forgot our context here.

Q.

Okay.

10 line ten.
11

Correct?"

A.

And on page two thirty-two let's jump down to

I said "Tell me what happened."
"We met.

We discussed the inventory.

I got angry

12 Iwhen Slone put a number on the paper and said okay.

It's

13 [worth, your worth of the company is a hundred and I don't
14 recall the exact figure.

And then we'll take half of, you

15 know, your worth would be about a hundred and four and you'll
16 pe, and you will pay us ninety-five hundred for Straightline
17 Striping and we'll be done. And I said I didn't agree with
18

that.

That we had an arrangement for six hundred thousand and

19 Ihe got a little heated.

He sat there and said you know I

20 haven't even talked to Vera about this but we are on time and
21 materials and we could probably pay four thousand a month until
22 [we see where the business is. And Vera said okay, I believe
23 that, at that point we said then we need to get together in the
24 fall when we know where the contracts are and finish this and I
25 think that was our last conversation until I called him in
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1 iOctober."
2

Q.

Okay.

I want you jump down now t o l i n e n i n e t e e n on

3 ||page two t h i r t y - t h r e e .

See that?

4

A.

I do.

5

Q.

Question, "Well, there had been some items agreed to."

6

A.

"Absolutely."

7

Q.

"Isn't that true?"

8

A.

"The only things that were not agreed were for, were

9 [not agreed to were the payout for Advanced Maintenance
10 Services.
11

Q.

Everything else we had done."

So as of June, June nineteenth or seventeenth meeting,

12 there hadn't been an agreement on the payout.
13

A.

Had there?

On advice from my counsel, my legal counsel, based on

14 the fact we did not have the signed writings or the typed
15 agreements, that's what the answer was.

Yes.

16

Q.

You testified today about the inventory.

Correct?

17

A.

Correct.

18

Q.

And I'm not sure I understood what you think the

19 [purpose or what you told us the purpose of an inventory was.
20

A.

To see what we had.

21 {what it's worth was.

To get a feel for what we had and

So we could make sure that Advanced

22 [Maintenance Services got the stuff that was its and I needed to
23 go through the shop and make sure I got all the striping
24 equipment and stencils and stuff that went with that company.
25

Q.

Okay.

I'd like you to turn your deposition to pages
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1 two s e v e n t e e n through two n i n e t e e n , i f you would p l e a s e .
2

A.

Okay.

3

Q.

In that deposition, do you recall me asking you

4 questions about the inventory?
5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

7 line six.

I do.
I want to pick it up at page two eighteen at

Okay?

And the question, "When you were talking

8 about the meeting you were talking about the meeting on the
9 seventeenth.

Correct?"

10

A.

"I believe so. Yes."

11

Q.

"So what was the purpose of this inventory being put

12 together if it wasn't being used to evaluate the assets of
13 [Advanced Maintenance Systems?"
14

A.

15 |had.
16

"Realistically we wanted to take a look at what we

I don't think either one of us knew."
Q.

"But that was the only purpose was to know what you

17 Hiad? "
18

A.

"Yeah.

19 |on every line.
20

Q.

If it had been the value you would see values
They're aren't."

"I don't know what they represent so I'm asking you

21 |questions."
22

A.

"Okay."

23

Q.

"So you're telling me in connection with your

24 [discussion with the Porters again that the document in Exhibit

25 One, which is the inventory.

Correct, Mr. Cowley?"
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1

A.

"I d o n ' t have E x h i b i t One."

2

Q.

"Do you r e c a l l

3

A.

"Here."

4

Q.

"So you're telling me in connection with your

that?"

5 [discussion with the Porters again, did the document in Exhibit
6 [One have anything to do with your discussion with the Porters?"
7

A.

"It did."

8

Q.

"What did it have to do with the discussion?"

9

Q.

"It had to do with the amount they finally wanted to

10 jpay, they finally wanted to pay for Advanced Maintenance
11 Services.

Initially in our discussions, they, Slone circled

12 and said okay, you're payout is a hundred and four and then
13 (you'11 pay us ninety-five hundred for Straightline and we'11
14 split it right down the middle."
15

Q.

And the next question was "Okay.

And that discussion

16 {happened in the meeting on the seventeenth?"
17
18
19

A.

"On what you believed it on the seventeenth?

Yes

.r."
Q.

Okay.
MR. SMAY: I'm going to renew my objection.

20

Now we've

21 Igot the part that don't even impeach anything.
22 |BY MR. PRICE:
23

Q.

"The purpose of the inventory was to determine what

24 they wanted to pay.
25

A.

Isn't that right?"

"The purpose of the inventory was to find out what we
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1 |had.
2

I don't believe either one of us knew what we had."
Q.

The meeting on July the nineteenth, did either you or

3 [lyour wife say to the Porters that you were kicking yourselves
4 for not having accepted the six hundred thousand dollar deal?
5

A.

Not that I recall.

6

Q.

Is it possible?

7

A.

It's not that I recall.

8

Q.

All of the terms of your agreement were not finalized

9 |on the twenty-fourth of June.
10

A.

Were they?

I don't believe I had anything else left to perform

11 from my end of the agreement.
12

Q.

What about the, what about their end of the deal?

13

A.

Yes.

There was still payments to be made.

14

MR. SMAY: Excuse me.

I didn't hear the question.

15

THE COURT: How about their end of the deal?

16

MR. SMAY: I'm going to object.

That asks for a legal

17 conclusion.

THE COURT: Overruled.

18

He's answered it already.

19 |BY MR. PRICE:
20

Q.

All of the terms had not been agreed to as of June

21 twenty-fourth.
22

Had they?

MR. SMAY: Again, same objection.

It calls for a

23 legal conclusion.
24

THE COURT: (inaudible) legal terms.

25 BY MR. PRICE:
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1

Q.

No.

All the terms of the agreement had not been

2 reached on June the twenty-fourth.

Had they?

3

A.

They had not been fulfilled.

4

Q.

But what about issues on insurance?

5

A.

We discussed them and put them to bed.

No.

Vera had said

6 she'd do what we did.
7

Q.

Which was what?

8

A.

The insurance was extended through the end of the year

9 and we didn't change the no non-compete clause.
10

Q.

The insurance being extended through the end of the

11 jyear didn't happen until your meeting in July.

Did it?

12

A.

I think that's when I filled out the paperwork.

13

Q.

And so.

14

A.

At that time she assured me we'd do what we needed to

15 [do to take care of the insurance issues.
16

Q.

And isn't it true there were discussions about trying

17 to have insurance longer than that?
18

A.

There were.

Absolutely.

19

Q.

It just wasn't possible to keep you on the program.

20

A.

That's correct.

21

Q.

Under the terms of the plan.

22

A.

We had discussions about our making the payments to

Correct?

23 stay on the plan.
24

Q.

And ultimately who made the payments?

25

A.

Quality Maintenance.
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1

Q.

(inaudible)

I f I can have j u s t a m i n u t e , Your Honor.

THE COURT: You may.

2

3 IBY MR. PRICE:
4

Q.

I ' d l i k e t o t a l k t o you about t h e f o u r t h o u s a n d d o l l a r

5 [a month p a y m e n t s .
6

A.

7

Q. What was the, what are the purpose as you understand

Okay.

8 it with the four thousand dollar a month payment?
9

A.

Initially, the four thousand dollar a month payment

10 Iwas a short payment to help them not have to pay ten thousand
11 dollars and use the other money to get Quality on it's feet and
12 [operational.
13

Q.

So you agreed that they could pay four thousand dollar

14 [payments and you just understood it was a temporary payment?

15

A.

It was a temporary agreement until the contracts were

16 renewed.

17

Q.

When did that discussion come up?

18

A.

When they first brought up four thousand dollars a

19 (month.
20

Q.

It would have been in July.

21

A.

That would correct.

22

Q.

Okay.

Isn't that right?

And so that four thousand dollar temporary

23 |payment arrangement doesn' t show up in Exhibit Five which is
24 the, what you claim is the agreement of June (inaudible).
25

A.

No.

It does not.

We accepted four thousand dollars a
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1 [month in an effort to help them get on their feet.

We didn't

2 want the guys to be out of work any more than they did.

I

3 didn't.
4

Q.

In this case, Mr. Cowley, do you know whether or not

5 the Porters would be entitled to a credit for what they paid to
6 [you, (inaudible) four thousand dollars against what you claim
7 is the six hundred thousand dollar contract?
8

A.

Do you know we discussed this, I believe, in my

9 deposition.
10 not.

I don't know if they should receive a credit or

I believe that's what I said in my deposition.

11

Q.

What about as you sit here today?

12

A.

As I sit here today I certainly would be able, I would

13 [be willing to take that into consideration.
14

Q.

Absolutely.

All you'd do is take it into consideration.

You don't

15 [have a position?
16

A.

I do have a position.

I would certainly credit that

17 four thousand dollars against the ten thousand dollar payment.
18

Q.

Different from what you said in your deposition?

19

A.

It is.

20

Q.

Okay.

Now, you received cash, did you not, on or

21 about starting on or about the twenty-seventh of June?
22

A.

We received some checks based on the payout on what

23 |was in the account.
24

Q.

What was the purpose of those, the cash distributions

25 to you?
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1

A.

That was what we had always talked about.

Part of AMS

2 changing to QMS is that the accounts would be split in half,
3 [everything prior to that split-up would be split in half as far
4 |as the cash on hand and the accounts receivable.
5

Q.

As part of splitting up AMS.

6

A.

That is correct.

7

Q.

Okay.

So you didn't ever believe that you owned a

8 bart of Quality Maintenance.
9

A.

Isn't that correct?

Did you?

You know, on the about, on the advice of my counsel

10 brior to having the writings of the agreement AMS was not
11 [dissolved properly and so certainly it could be construed that
12 |we should have part of Quality Maintenance.
13

Q.

Is that still your contention today?

14

A.

That is not.

15

Q.

Okay.

Your contention today is you did reach an

16 agreement which included the dissolution of AMS.

Correct?

17

A.

That is.

18

Q.

Would you turn to Exhibit Thirty-nine, I just want to

19 clarify something.

(inaudible) request that you answer

20 (inaudible) numbers twenty-three and twenty-four.
21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

I'd like you to take a minute if you would and read

23 those.

I'll read the question if you would read your response.

24

A.

Okay.

25

Q.

Let me, let me go through this please.

The response was based on.
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1 to review those?
2

A.

I have.

Absolutely.

3

Q.

Reading number twenty-three, "Admit that you receive

4 additional cash payout pursuant to dissolution on or about July
5 twenty-ninth in the amount of sixteen thousand five hundred
6 idollars."
7

A.

"(inaudible) dissolution occurred July twenty-ninth,

8 two thousand two, both Porters and Plaintiffs then received
9 [distribution from funds of AMS in the sum of sixteen five."
10

Q.

Okay.

"Is that your testimony of how dissolution

11 occurred at this point in time?"

MR. SMAY: That's everyone's testimony.

12

No one claims

13 it occurred on July twenty-ninth.
14

THE COURT: What's your question Mr. Price?

15

MR. PRICE: My question is is that still his position

16 that as of July twenty-ninth, no dissolution occurred and they
17 just simply got a distribution of sixteen thousand dollars.

MR. SMAY: No.

18

That's not his answer.

19 IBY MR. PRICE:
20

Q.

Let's go on to twenty-four.

21

A.

"Both Porters and Plaintiffs received a distribution

22 from funds of AMS in the sum of sixteen five."
23

Q.

What was the purpose of those distributions?

24

A.

To split the cash on hand.

25

Q.

Okay.

To split up AMS.

Correct?
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1

A.

The cash on hand in the account.

2

Q.

Now on to twenty-four.

It says "Admit that you

3 [received an additional cash payout pursuant to dissolution on
4 or about July thirty-first, two thousand two in the amount of
5 eleven thousand eight hundred dollars."

You see that in your

6 [answer?
7

A.

Yes.

"The payment also received by the Porters was

8 [not pursuant to a dissolution but an ordinary ownership
9 Idistribution."
10

Q.

Now my question is to you today as you sit here was

11 that an ordinary shareholder distribution or was that money to
12 split up AMS pursuant to a dissolution agreement?
13

A.

That was based on the advice of my counsel.

14

Q.

Okay.

What I want to understand is your answer

15 different today to that question?

Based on your advice, advice

16 |of your counsel or otherwise.
17

A.

We are not denying that AMS split up at this point.

18 So it would be the distribution of funds from the AMS accounts.
19

Q.

Remember in your deposition I asked you questions

20 about whether you understood the oath you took?
21

A.

I do.

22

Q.

Turn to page forty in your deposition please?

It

23 should be the small version.
24

A.

Okay.

25

Q.

Alright.

Okay.
Now if I can put my hands on the right
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1 transcript.

I had asked you, beginning at line eleven.

Do you

2 see that?
3

A.

I do.

4

Q.

I said question, "Can you describe for me your

5 [understanding of the oath today?"

You see that?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

That's what you've done today as well in your

My answer is "To tell the truth as I see it."

8 testimony of this case, you told the truth as you see it.
9 [Correct?
10

Is that right?

A.

No.

My testimony is that I'm telling the truth as it

Q.

Nothing further, Your Honor.

11 is.
12
13

THE COURT: Okay.

Let's take our morning break.

14 Let's be in recess until ten after.
15
(WHEREUPON THE TRIAL WAS RECESSED.)

16
17
18

THE COURT: Okay.

You may be seated.

Mr. Smay, do

19 (you have some redirect for this witness?
20

MR. SMAY: I do, Your Honor.

21

THE COURT: Okay.

Return the witness to the chair.

22 iMr. Cowley?
23
24
25

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
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1 IBY MR. SMAY:
2

Q.

Mr. Cowley, just some clarifications if I may, you

3 |have Exhibit Five there.

Do you not?

4

A.

I do.

5

Q.

That's the copy of the written document signed by Mr.

6 Porter.
7

A.

It is.

8

Q.

There's a question about whether the terms on that

9 document were all the same as what had previously been
10 submitted by the Porters to you on the twenty-second.

Do you

11 recall that?
12

A.

I do.

13

Q.

And I think you said that they were.

Take a look dcwn

14 at the bottom of eight, there's a couple there.
15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Parties have agreed to no non-compete.

17 agreed to no confidentiality.

Parties have

Those were new, in fact, were

18 they not?
19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Need to make that correction?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

Do you notice any others?

They were.

Those are the ones I

23 Inoticed.
24

A.

The agreement didn't have anything about the cash pay-

25 louts done by the company because that just had been a given.
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1 (We had talked about it all the way through the thing and they
2 (needed funds to start up Quality Maintenance and we didn't, I
3 [didn't foresee that as an issue.
4

Q.

Okay.

With respect to accepting the four thousand

5 (dollars per month at the time, Mr. Porter, Mr. Porter, Mr.
6 Cowley.
7

A.

(inaudible)

8

Q.

Could you have lived without taking the money?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

11

A.

Okay.

12

Q.

Lets see here.

Can I have you turn over to Exhibit Thirty-nine?

(inaudible) looking at (inaudible).

13 (inaudible) number thirteen, Mr. Cowley, on page three.
14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

You suggested that there had been a meeting on the

I'm there.

16 twenty-seventh of June, two thousand two at which the terms
17 |were altered.

And I understand you now that that was mistake

18 and what you were actually talking about the meeting in July.
19

A.

20 seventh.

Yes.

I believe I said on or about June twenty-

It should have been the July meeting.

It's my

21 tadstake and I didn't catch it when I reviewed the document
22 (prior to signing it.
23

Q.

Well, who drafted the answers for you, Mr. Cowley?

24

A.

Your secretary, I believe.

25

Q.

Look over at sixteen.
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1

A.

Okay.

S i x t e e n on t h e document w e ' v e b e e n l o o k i n g a t

2 [or s i x t e e n t h a t t h e ?
3

Q.

Oh.

E x c u s e me.

I meant paragraph s i x t e e n .

4

A.

Paragraph s i x t e e n .

5

Q.

6

A.

I was just checking.

7

Q.

I'm looking at the last part of page three on or about

Thank y o u .

That's

just.

(inaudible)

8 June twenty-seventh, pursuant to the proposal, that being the
9 broposal of June twenty-second, the Porters insisted the
10 Plaintiffs take possession of equipment of Straightline
11 Striping including listed vehicles, here the day of the twenty12 seventh is being supplied by Mr. Price but is this again June,
13 July nineteenth?
14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

"The Porters insisted that they would not take the two

16 [older vehicles which had previously been offered for sale
17 unsuccessfully.

Plaintiffs took possession of such equipment

18 |while reserving agreement to the proposed terms."

Do you mean

19 any other than the terms proposed with respect to the vehicles
20 |on July nineteenth?
21

A.

No.

Sorry.

What was the question again? I'm sorry.

22 I was reading.
23

Q.

My question is your, your answer there that you took

24 [possession of such equipment while reserving agreement to the
25 proposed terms, that is the statement that you reserved
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1 agreement to the proposed terms, (inaudible) then set up
2 [proposed terms respecting the equipment that you had just
3 taken.

Does it not?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Let me have you then take a look at your deposition,

6 if you would, Mr. Cowley.
7

A.

Okay.

8

Q.

(inaudible) talking about.

Over at page ten, two ten.

9 lExcuse me.
10

A.

Two ten.

11

Q.

It would be the second part.

12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

Roughly the middle of that page there is a line

14 seventeen.

The thick one.

You see that?

15

A.

I do.

16

Q.

Mr. Cowley, "I believe it's accurate that I said I

17 should know by the end of the month what our deal is going to
18 [be."

After the agreement you made with the Porters on the

19 twenty-fourth, Mr. Cowley, there were matters yet to be sorted
20 out.

For example, the check given to you on June twenty-

21 seventh .
22

A.

That's correct.

23

Q.

There was the inventory yet to be done.

24

A.

It was more in line with the accounts receivable,

25 clearing out the accounts payable, finalizing the actual cash
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1 a t hand I b e l i e v e .
2

Q.

A l l o f t h a t i n Mrs. P o r t e r ' s i n i t i a l i n s i s t e n c e was t o

3 [be done by t h e end o f t h e month o f June?
4

A.

Yes.

5

Q. And is that what you had reference to in your

6 statement of line seventeen?
7

A.

Yes.

I believe so.

8

Q.

Turn over to page two thirty-two and two thirty-three.

9 I'd like you to turn to two thirty-one, if you would please.
10 Look at line twenty-one and tell us what the subject of these
11 (questions was, Mr. Cowley.

Read that answer for us.

12

A.

My answer on, the question on twenty-one?

13

Q.

(inaudible) answer (inaudible).

14

A.

"I think we were talking about the meeting that you

15 (believed happened on July seventeenth."

My answer was

16 "Correct."
17

Q.

Can we now conclude Mr. Porter that where you were

18 sitting July seventeenth at the time that's the meeting that
19 jyou've so described as occurring on July nineteenth?
20

A.

Pardon?

21

Q.

(inaudible)

22

A.

I believe it is. Yes.

23

Q.

Now flip over to page two thirty-two.

At line eleven

24 begins your testimony regarding what transpired at the meeting.
25 Would you read that for us, please?
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1

A.

Line eleven?

2

Q.

Yes.

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Line eleven of two thirty-two and it runs over onto

5 two thirty-three.
6

A.

Okay.

"We met.

We discussed the inventory.

7 [angry when Slone put a number on paper and said okay.

I got
Your

8 worth of the company is a hundred, and I don't recall the exact
9 figure, then we went, we'll take half of, you know, your worth
10 [would be a hundred and four and you' 11 pay us ninety-five
11 (hundred for Straightline Striping and we'll be done.

And I

12 said I didn't agree with that, that we had an arrangement for
13 six hundred thousand.

And he got a little heated.

He sat

14 there and said you know, I haven't even talked to Vera about
15 this but we're, but we're on time and materials and we could
16 [probably pay four thousand a month until we see where the
17 [business is.

And Vera said okay.

And I believe that at that

18 point we said then we need to get together in the fall when we
19 know where the contracts are and finish this.

And I think that

20 ^as our last conversation until I called him in October, until
21 I called him in October."
22

Q.

Your testimony at that time was that you specifically

23 told the Porters our agreement is six hundred thousand dollars?
24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

The Porters took issue with that apparently?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Look down t o l i n e twenty-two on page two t h i r t y - t h r e e .

3

A.

Okay.

4

Q.

"The only thing that was not agreed to was the payort

5 [of Advanced Maintenance Services.

That's because the Porters

6 [would not agree to (inaudible) payment."
7

A.

"Absolutely.

8

Q.

"Everything else we had done."

9

A.

"Yes."

10

Yes."

Q. "In p o i n t of f a c t on the n i n e t e e n t h the r e s t of the

11 [agreement had been performed. "
12

A.

"Yes.

I t had."

13

Q.

"All that happened on that occasion was the Porters

14 disputed that they owed the ten thousand dollars."
15

A.

Yes."

16

Q.

And that's the point of your testimony at that time.

17

A.

Yes sir.

18

Q.

I think that's all I have for Mr. Cowley.

19

THE COURT: Anything else Mr. Price?

20

MR. PRICE: Just one question, Your Honor.

21 [one, one item, maybe a couple of questions.
22
23

RECROSS EXAMINATION

24
25 |BY MR. PRICE:
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1

Q.

You testified that, on redirect examination, Mr.

2 Cowley that you couldn't live on four thousand dollar a month
3 [payments.

Do you recall that?

4

A.

That's correct.

5

Q.

Those are the four thousand dollar a month payments

6 that you said were the temporary agreement that you had with
7 the Porters.

Is that correct?

8

A.

That is correct.

9

Q.

What was to be the agreement of the parties, Mr.

10 Cowley, if the work didn't come back to Quality Maintenance
11 from 7-11?
12

A.

We had no other agreement.

13

Q.

Okay.

So you didn't have any agreement of contingency

14 in there if in fact the work went away completely from 7-11?
15

A.

I don't believe there's a mention of any other

16 agreement anywhere in this case.
17

Q.

So if Quality Maintenance didn't make any money at all

18 |you were still entitled to get something?
19

A.

I believe that if you review Slone's comments on our

20 conversation on that Saturday night, his concern was, you know,
21 you're not going to be able to pay me and if you don't have the
22 business he didn't care whether I had the business or not, I
23 was still expected to compensate him.

That would be my

24 [expectation whether the business is there or not, it's his
25 responsibility to pay the obligation.
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1

Q.

At least four thousand a month.

2

A.

That was the temporary agreement.

3

Q.

Okay.

Right?

And if the business didn't come back as you

4 anticipated, what was the agreement?
5

MR. SMAY: Object.

He's asked and answered twice now.

6

MR. PRICE: I don't think he answered it (inaudible).

7

THE WITNESS: Our agreement was ten thousand dollars a

8 Imonth.
9
10

THE COURT: (inaudible) your answer.
THE WITNESS: Our agreement was ten thousand dollars a

11 jmonth for five years.
12

MR. PRICE: Okay.

Nothing further, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Smay?

14

MR. SMAY: No.

15

THE COURT: You may step down.

16

MR. PRICE: We would reserve our right to recall him,

17 [Your Honor.
18

THE COURT: Next witness, Mr. Smay.

19

MR. SMAY: Slone Porter, please.

20

THE COURT: Mr. Porter?

21

MR. PRICE: Just quick housekeeping matter, Your

22 [Honor.

To the extent it's not in the record we would offer

23 Exhibit Thirty-nine be admitted.

That's the questions, the

24 answers to admissions.
25

THE COURT: Any objections?
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1

MR. SMAY: Well, they're in the record, Your Honor,

2 (inaudible) answers to admissions.

THE COURT: They're received.

3
4
5

SLONE D. PORTER

6
7

8 Called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff having
9 peen sworn by the clerk of the court was examined and testified
10 as follows:
11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13
14 |BY MR. SMAY:
15

Q.

Mr. Porter, would you give The Court your full and

16 correct name please?
17

A.

Slone D. Porter.

18

Q.

Where do you live, Mr. Porter?

19

A.

I live at 1010 Magpie Circle, Midway Utah.

20

Q.

What is your current business please?

21

A.

My current business?

22

Q.

Yes.

23

A.

I work for True Green.

24

Q.

In fact, you own the local True Green franchise.

25 lyou not?
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

(inaudible)
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

3

Excuse me, Your Honor.

4 observed Mr. Cowley signaling the witness.
5 |before.

I can't let it go any longer.

I've just

We've noticed that

I object to that

6 tactic.

THE COURT: Mr. Cowley, I can't see you so I don't

7

8 [know if you are or not but if you are making any signals or
9 piouthing anything, that would be inappropriate.

MR. COWLEY: Okay.

10

11 |BY MR. PRICE:
12

Q.

Do you recall testifying in a deposition of this case?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Do you recall testimony in this case that you believed

15 that the six hundred thousand dollars offered by the Porters
16 |was ludicrous?
17

A.

At the time, I did believe that. Yes.

18

Q.

At what time?

19

A.

At the time of the original offer.

20

Q.

And why was it ludicrous in your words?

21

A.

Because I understood how much we were taking out of

22 the company every month, each family.

I understood what the

23 [potential earning ability of AMS was.

I knew the kind of

24 business that we had been doing.

And I didn't feel like that

25 was a fair offer.
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1

Q.

And in fact, you didn't agree to the six hundred

2 thousand dollar offer ever.

Did you?

3

A.

I told Tracy.

4

Q.

Yes or no ma'am.

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

When is it you agreed to the six hundred thousand?

7

A.

On Monday the twenty-fourth.

8

Q.

You weren't there on Monday the twenty-fourth.

9

A.

I was on the phone with Tracy.

10

Q.

I want to refer you to your deposition transcript on

I did.

11 [page one ninety-two and one ninety-three.
12

A.

(inaudible)

13

THE COURT: (inaudible)

14

THE WITNESS: One ninety-two?

15 |BY MR. PRICE:
16

Q.

Yes.

17

A.

Okay.

18

Q.

We're going to start, I'm going to do the same and ask

19 lyou to do the same.

I'm going to read the question and ask if

20 jyou'll give the answer.

Okay?

21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

I believe if you go up to one ninety-nine I was asking

23 lyou questions, you see at line twenty-one on page one ninety24 lone, I was asking you questions about July nineteenth
25 (inaudible).
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1

A.

Okay.

2

Q. And what I would like to do now is go down to page one

3 ninety-two, pick it up at line twenty-three.

Question: "At

4 that meeting on the twenty-seventh, isn't it true at the
5 |meeting you said words to the effect to the Porters."
6

MR. SMAY: Objection.

7

THE WITNESS: Yes.

You need to read it accurately.

I don't know where you are.

8 |BY MR. PRICE:
9

Q.

I did, Counselor.

I apologize.

10

A.

Where are you?

11

Q.

I am on page one ninety-two at line twenty-three.

12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

On that line it says question, "At the meeting on the

I'm sorry.

14 twenty-seventh, isn't it true at that meeting you said words to
15 the effect to the Porters that you and your husband were
16 kicking yourselves for not taking the six hundred thousand
17 [dollar offer?" Answer?
18

A.

"On the twenty-seventh?"

19

Q.

"Yes."

20

A.

"I don't remember saying those words."

21

Q.

"How about on the nineteenth of July?"

22

A.

"Yeah.

On the nineteenth of July we might have said

23 something like that after they are trying to offer us some
24 [pittance for their own doing."
25

Q.

Okay.

Reading further down now on page one ninety-
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1 three I ask you questions starting at line seventeen, "And
2 there was also an agreement that you would get paid four
3 thousand a month for five years.
4

A.

"No.

5

Q.

"There was no agreement?"

6

A.

"No.

Is that correct."

That was not the agreement."

That was not the agreement.

See what you're

7 doing, you fail to recognize is that Slone and Vera were
8 directing this whole thing.

Slone and Vera were telling us

9 what they were going to do.

Okay.

Tell me who in the room is

10 going to give somebody a loan for six hundred thousand."

Which

11 I meant to be the two forty because we were talking about a
12 four thousand dollar a month payment.
13

Q.

If you had an opportunity to review and change this

14 [document.
15

A.

I did and I missed that.

But we were just obviously

16 Ion line seventeen discussing four thousand a month so that was
17 a, I mis-spoke which figure.
18

Q.

Would you read, would you refer now to Exhibit Five?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

That would be the (inaudible).

21

A.

The big book?

22

Q.

23

A.

In this one?

24

Q.

Yes.

25

A.

Okay.

In which book?

Plaintiffs exhibits.

Excuse me.

(inaudible)
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1

Q.

Do you recognize that document?

2

A.

I have seen it before.

3

Q.

Wasn't that the document you're claiming is the

4 agreement you reached with the Porters?

That you accepted on

5 the twenty-fourth of June?
6

A.

That's the agreement that Tracy agreed to, he read to,

7 (he was trying to read to me over the phone.

I was in Jackson

8 Hole and we were having very poor reception.
9

Q.

Can you see in that document whether there is anything

10 [with respect to the payment of interest?
11

A.

Payment of interest, yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

It says no interest.

14

Q.

But you were complaining that you wouldn't have agreed

What does it say?

15 to a two hundred and forty thousand dollar zero interest but
16 (you would agree to a six hundred thousand dollar deal with no
17 interest?
18

A.

Well, I guess that's what it says.

19

Q.

That's part of why you thought it was ludicrous

20 because you would never allow them to finance, keep (inaudible)
21 (without (inaudible) right?
22

A.

I was never happy with the agreement.

I didn't say I

23 |was happy with it.
24

Q.

I would like you to turn to page one fourteen of the

25 [exhibit, if you would.
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1

A.

Of my deposition?

2

Q.

Of your deposition.

3

MR. SMAY: What page?

4 |BY MR. PRICE:
5

Q.

One fourteen.

Okay.

On page one fourteen I was

6 asking you questions relative to the inventory.

You see that?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

I asked you a question beginning on line sixteen, I

9 said "Okay.

How many trucks were there total?" And the

10 answer?
11

A.

"I don't know.

Put the list in front of me and I'll

12 tell you."
13

Q

The question was, "What list?"

14

A

"The list of the inventory."

15

Q

Question, "Did somebody do one?"

16

A

"Slone and Tracy."

17

Q

And I asked you, "When did they do that?"

18

A

"During the time period when we were trying to."

19

Q

Trying to what?

20

A.

Yes.

Then you asked a question, "Do you know what

21 that was?"
22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

"It would have been after the twenty-second and

And when did they do that?

24 Jprobably before the nineteenth of July."
25

Q.

(inaudible) reading at line twenty-four.
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1

A.

Where are you?

2

Q.

Page one fourteen.

3

A.

Right.

I was at the bottom, "During the time period

4 when we were trying to negotiate."
5

Q.

You were trying to negotiate.

Do you know when that

6 inventory was being done?
7

A.

Do I know when it was being done?

8

Q.

Yes.

9

A.

It was being done sometime in July.

10

Q.

It's being done between the meeting of the twenty-

11 seventh of June and the nineteenth of July.

Correct?

12

A.

I think so.

13

Q.

So it was during the time when they were still, you

14 were still negotiating with the Porters over an agreement.
15 Isn' t that right?
16

A.

I don't know.

I don't know if negotiate is the right

17 Iword.
18

Q.

That is your word.

19

A.

It is my word.

20

Q.

Have you ever seen any document anywhere that Tracy

Is it not?

21 Cowley has signed as an agreement with the Porters regarding
22 JAMS or QMS for any of the assets or money that's been discussed
23 in this case?
24

A.

He, there's one that says Vera, call me with his

25 initials on it.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 171

1

Q.

Is it your testimony that's his signature on an

2 {agreement?
3

A.

Those are his initials on the agreement.

4

Q.

Okay.

Is that his signature for purposes of accepting

5 the agreement?

MR. SMAY: I object.

6

That calls for a legal

7 conclusion certainly.

THE COURT: Well, I'll find so that we don't have to

8

9 |go into this again that was not his signature affirming
10 (inaudible).

It was on a sticky note attached to the, to it.

11

MR. SMAY: (inaudible) written (inaudible).

12

THE COURT: Well, whatever.

There is testimony both

13 Iways.
14 |BY MR. PRICE:
15

Q.

I ask you to turn if you would to page one seventy-

16 seven and one seventy-eight of your deposition.

Are you there?

17

A.

I am there.

Sorry.

18

Q.

Lets start reading questions and answers at line

19 fifteen of page one seventy-seven, if I can.
20

A.

Okay.

21

Q.

"Do you agree that you were going to get half the cash

22 [out of AMS.

Didn't you?"

23

A.

"Yes. We had made some agreements. Yes."

24

Q.

"So which agreements?"

25

A.

"Some agreements were reached but never finalized."
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1

Q.

"What agreements?

2

A.

"Probably the biggest part of the whole deal was the

What do you mean never finalized?"

3 cash, the total buyout cash price was never agreed upon."
4

Q.

I have nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Cross, Mr. Smay?

5
6

CROSS EXAMINATION

7
8
9 BY MR. SMAY:
10

Q.

Look back in your deposition if you would Mr. Cowley,

11 at page one fourteen.
12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

At the bottom of page one fourteen, your answer there

14 [was "During the time period when we were trying to negotiate."
15 (Do you see that?
16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

That time period was the twenty-second of June through

18 the nineteenth of July in the next paragraph on page one
19 fifteen.
20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And what you were trying to negotiate with the Porters

22 on the nineteenth of July was whether they would comply with
23 ^our ten thousand dollar agreement reached back in June.

Was

24 it not?
25

MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor.

That's leading and
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1 receive those assets with respect to the agreement they talked
2 (about.

I can tell you based upon the evidence that I've heard

3 that I would make that valuation date though as of June the
4 twenty-second, prior to 7-11 knowing anything about the
5 [problems with Mr. Cowley.
6 (both sides.

There are weaknesses as I see it in

With respect to the Porters side, I believe that

7 there's an obligation of good faith and fair dealing between
8 [partners in a business.

And to go, you know, you might have,

9 this is between partners.

Clearly you both had an obligation

10 to 7-11 and I'm not going to comment about the dishonesty that
11 [was committed by both sides with respect to 7-11's involvement
12 [but this particular lawsuit involves, doesn't involve 7-11.
13 involves these two parties.

It

And to have gone to 7-11 behind

14 the Cowleys back and told them of that, I think it violates the
15 obligation that one partner has to another of good faith and
16 fair dealing.

And that's why the value, clearly this business

17 is, the value of it was the contracts it had with 7-11.

Other,

18 if they didn't have those contracts, if I was to come here and
19 |we could easily value what the assets were and just divide it.
20 But a business has more value as an ongoing business with
21 (employees, with contracts in place, with business
22 relationships, goodwill and those type of things.
23 those comments.

I just make

On the other side with respect to the Cowleys,

24 they have a hard time, I'm not going to tell you how I would
25 rule, have a hard time establishing that there was an agreement
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1 for six hundred thousand dollars.

If he had accepted it and

2 signed that agreement on that date, that would have been
3 (inaudible).
4 [occur.

(inaudible) enforce that agreement.

That did not

So with those comments, I'd ask you Mr. Smay, for your

5 closing argument in writing.

I would, I (inaudible), this is

6 an entire case that should have been settled.
7 time to do that.
8 comments.

You're all here.

There is still

But I just make those

I (inaudible) all the evidence.
MR. PRICE: Appreciate it, Your Honor.

9

MR. SMAY: (inaudible) exists (inaudible) you say the

10

11 Cowleys should prove the written agreement if they can and the
12 Porters if they can.

It's also a possibility it seems to me if

13 they don't prove the agreement they have the same claim under
14 the Statute of Frauds to partial performance as do the Porters
15 do and that ought to be considered as well.
16

THE COURT: Yes.

Ultimately.

I would agree.

17

MR. SMAY: Thank you, Your Honor.

18

MR. PRICE: Your Honor, we need a deadline for

19 submittal.
20

THE COURT: Is ten days sufficient?

21

MR. PRICE: I believe so, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT: Simultaneously in ten days?

23

MR. SMAY: Ten days, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Yes.

Thank you, Counsel. Appreciate your

25 courtesy.
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